Evolving defence strategy

David W. Wragg

Following The Spectator's recent series on 'Defence and deterrence' by Senior Officers of the Services (May 25, June 8 and 29, July 20), David Wragg, the author of several books bearing on these questions, particularly on aviation, looks at the problem from the point of view of the more detached but expert observer.

The major problem in attempting any overall assessment of defence requirements is to achieve the correct balance between the different services. Discussion is usually held against a background of axes being ground. Even so-called independent observers are frequentry guilty of bias, the additional complication nemg to convince them and their followers that such a bias does exist. Interservice problems such as these cannot be resolved by the occasionally revived idea of a single unified defence force on Canadian or Israeli lines, since the fundamental question of whether to spend money and devote manpower is not one of which service to choose, but instead a question of defence by land, sea or air.

A further problem must be that any realistic assessment of our defence needs is hampered by continually reduced funds and by the firm belief among politicians that any return to conscription would be politically disastrous. The result is that no defence assessment ever shows the wide gulf between what we are doing and what we need to do. Ideally, all three armed forces need more money and more manpower, but the politicians and their advisers have become adept at playing the chiefs of staff off against one another. To a certain extent, the 'Senior Officers' discussing Britain's defence policy in recent issues of The Spectator pressed their own service hardest to the neglect of the others. The *most obvious example came in the consideration of the RAF in which while rightly making the point that it takes time to move surface forces, during which something can be done to ascertain the extent of hostile intentions, the article completely ignored the fact that the .Army and Royal Navy face a Soviet threat of considerable dimensions because strong Soviet forces are already in position. Thus there is much that the Soviet Union and its allies could do at sea and on land without drawing attention to their aims beforehand by any undue or obvious additional build-up of forces in any one area.

The Royal Navy faces a Soviet fleet of unprecedented size, possessing ten times the number of submarines in service with the Geman Navy in 1939 — with the added threat of many of the Soviet submarines being nuclearpowered and therefore freed of the need to surface regularly to re-charge batteries, so making detection more difficult. Not only do the Russians have a heavy surface-to-surface missile superiority, against which carrier-borne aircraft are the West's only real defence by knocking out Russian warships before they have NATO warships within the range of their missiles, but the Red Fleet is now putting aircraft carriers into service. Contrast this with the run-down of the Fleet Air Arm to just one attack carrier, HMS Ark Royal.

NATO's geographical limitations have left shipping around the Cape exposed to attack, while Britain's own totally inadequate defence policies mean that the invaluable North Sea oil and gas fields are also highly vulnerable to attack or sabotage.

11A012 provides more of a propaganda boost ror uermany and our other EEC partners than a serious attempt to curb any Soviet attack, which would leave NATO's totally inadequate

forces in Germany at the mercy of Warsaw Pact forces capable of reaching the Rhine in three days. Like it or not, the army is bogged down in Northern Ireland in a crisis which will last for some time, while at the same time, for our defence needs and to fulfil treaty commitments to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus we should be playing a strong leading role in restoring order to Cyprus; the defence needs arise from the importance of Cyprus as a staging-post to the Far East and from the base enjoying a vital strategic position for the defence of NATO's southern flanks and counter-attack against a large part of the Soviet Union. This is not to underestimate the RAF's purpose or its needs. Fighter crefence of this country is inadequate, air transport provision is little better, particularly in the absence of

heavy-lift helicopters, while maritime-reconnaissance capability is also too limited and airborne early-warning, intended to warn against low-flying enemy aircraft, at a pathetically weak capability. Above all, our fighter, or interceptor, strength is further diminished by the absence of any aircraft mush faster than Mach 2.0— twice the speed of sound — in an era when Maeh 3.0 interceptors are in service with,or on order for, not only the major powers but many relatively minor ones as well. Missiles are never an adequate form of defence, not only because of the inherent weaknesses of missile systems, but also because no democracy would ever want to be without the recall capability only offered by manned aircraft, or to be unable to investigate an intruder.

The quality of the RAF's new equipment is poor. The Jaguar fighter is a fair weather aircraft, unable to match the speed of the Phantom, the versatility of the Harrier, or the load and range capability of the Buccaneer, but costs at least as much as any of these. The Panther, designed to form the backbone of our air defence and attack capability, is no faster than the Phantom, has no better range than the Buccaneer, but lacks that aircraft's ruggedness and warload, and has a rate of climb considerably inferior to the now dated Lightning.

The same can be said about the Royal Navy's new warships. The Type 21 Amazon class frigate is poorly armed and not armoured, while there are also deficiencies in the Type 42 Sheffield class destroyer. The really promising ship, the Type 22 frigate, is so far in the future as to be a likely candidate for cancellation; the real economy would be to have only ordered Type 22s, thus providing the financial, support and training benefits of standardisation. The

through-deck cruiser, or mini-aircraft carrier, has no protective armament worth mentioning and its aircraft capacity is poor for its size; it can only carry Harriers, with an operational range of little more than a hundred miles, against the thousand or so miles of Buccaneers from a carrier only a third larger, such as HMS Hermes before conversion to the commando role.

Ideally, the politicians would put the country first, tell the public the harsh truth, and spend more on defence for the foreseeable future, not only building up all three services and improving their equipment, but also ensuring that adequate reserve forces exist. Of course, more than just hardware and manpower, a political will to use the forces thus created, and to mark out spheres of British and European influence, would be needed. The Soviet Union, anyl the minor dictatorships who often take on the aggressive role of the Soviet bloc by proxy, would have to be made to realise that certain aggressive acts would invite certain countermeasures short of the nuclear deterrent being used or all-out warfare resorted to, while more aggressive activity would activate the final tripwires.

However, given that inadequate finance would be available, that the uncertainties of a service careen would dampen recruiting, and finally that conscription would not be resorted to, it is necessary to identify just those areas of defence activity which would be the most important and worthwhile for our survival. This is a dangerous gamble — since really the only certain feature of any future conflict must be the uncertainty of the means of warfare used.

It is essential that certain questions be asked. First, would we be fighting alone, or with allies in Europe or elsewhere? Secondly, could we survive as an offshore island to a communist Europe? Thirdly, where does the greatest threat to our survival come from? Fourthly, which part of our armed forces might, on present strategy, be lost, indeed wasted, in any future war?

The answer to the first question must be that we would be unlikely to be fighting alone in Europe, or anywhere else for that matter, It would be no bad idea then for the locally-raised forces to concentrate on land warfare, for it is an army more than any other service which needs to be acclimatised and have knowledge and training of warfare in its area of operations. Those forces requiring strategic mobility could be provided by this country. If, incidentally, we were to fight alone, we would either have to be independent of fixed shore bases, or have large enough ground forces to defend base positions. The second and third questions can be answered together. We have survived in the past without contact with Europe, and Taiwan today survives without contact with mainland' China. The key to survival would probably, indeed definitely, have to be American support. We definitely could be brought to our knees by the interruption of our supplies of oil, raw materials and food.

As to the final question, the answer now, as in 1939, must be those forces positioned in Europe. Europe, if it has the will, has the economic, industrial and manpower resources to defend itself on the ground and in the air above its main centres. British and American support guards against the will being born and smothers the defence realities for Europeans. All of the answers point towards a maritime strategy, with certain important modifications. Certainly, the Russians have realised that all of the great powers of history have been maritime powers. Post-war experience has shown that maritime operations, sometimes amphibious in nature, always with their own airpower, are the key to success, especially 'when shore bases are no longer tenable. The sekis the only way of transporting complete and fully equipped airfields and ground forces into battle, and then whipping them away again as necessary. The important modifications to such a strategy must be the existence of numerous

shore-based naval fighter and bomber squadrons for home defence, along with adequate maritime-reconnaissance, airborne earlyWarning and transport squadrons. There must also be a large and well-equipped Royal Marine element, with commando carriers, assault ships and heavy-lift helicopters. A part-time Swissmodel army, as suggested by the senior Royal Navy officer, is also essential for home defence duties, and to assist in Europe should this be practicable. The home defence ground forces cannot be lightly dismissed — not only for use in areas such as Northern Ireland, for in today's climate we cannot be sure that terrorism can be contained in Northern Ireland, or that the lessons of British weakness there will be lost on other extreme left wing groups throughout the British Isles.

In effect, Britain should provide the backbone for Europe's Navy — but it should be a backbone capable of an independent existence. Some further fall in recruiting could result from this, unless conscription followed, because many who today serve in the RAF or Army might feel unable to transfer into the Royal ' Navy — although a full-time core for a Swissmodel army would be necessary. We are in any case looking at a maritime strategy as a result of defence cuts, otherwise a broader-based approach would be both necessary and desirable.

It would not be cheap, for at the least another Polaris submarine is needed — and this is the real question, rather than the purchase of the Poseidon missile — and three large aircraft carriers must be seen as a bare minimum for the air element, which would include UK, Malta, Cyprus, Singapore and Hong Kong-based squadrons as well. A strong destroyer or frigate force would also be needed, along with minehunters, more hunter-killer nuclear and coastal conventional submarines. Assault ships and commando carriers are just two more necessities for the successful application of maritime air power. Indeed, the need to protect• long shipping routes and oil rigs far from shore suggests many more than three aircraft carriers, with many locally based fast patrol boats at home, in the Mediterranean, Caribbean and Far East as a cost-effective and vital addition to our existing forces.

Not cheap indeed, although heavy traditional industry in the depressed areas would benefit, and offset the cost by savings in regional aid and social security payments. However, defence is a form of insurance, and cheap insurance is poor insurance with too many loopholes.