A warning to Europe

Is America poised to sacrifice Greece?

Nicos E. Devletoglou

It has been common knowledge for some time that the CIA and the American government were Involved in the Greek coup which brought Colonel Papadopolous to power, and in the subsequent seizure of office by the junta. Left-wing critics have, on the whole, maintained that the purpose of this intervention was to serve the interests of the NATO defence line against the USSR. In this important article, however, the Greek conservative, Nicos Devletoglou, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Athens, and one of the most distinguished and controversial figures in Greek democratic politics in recent years, argues that there was a deeper and 'more sinister Purpose behind American manoeuvres.

It would appear that today only in myth and folklore is American foreign policy in the Middle East pro-western. Under the aegis, if not daily control, of the United States, the integral Greco-Turkish axis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has fallen into disarray; Greeks and Turks in Cyprus are at each other's throats; a shocking invasion of that island has taken place creating massive new problems and solving none of the old ones; the legitimate head of state of Cyprus is recovering abroad from an assassination plot aimed against him, which took instead the life of his democratically elected government; and Turkey has almost gone berserk in Geneva With romantic visions of that Ottoman Empire that was. Predictably, too, the usual 'ceasefire' has been speedily imposed — thus completing the by now classic American scenario according to which more bloodshed and turmoil are likely at the expense of future prosperity and democracy in that area.

In a nutshell, whether intentionally or not, the United States is rapidly becoming a serious embarrassment both to western values and to European security. Only two explanations seem possible. These, and other similar, developments have come about either by blunder or by imperfect design. The former case can be hopefully dismissed within the celebrated reason-above-all Kissingerian approach to international relations. Perhaps, therefore, we should look a little deeper into the latter. Considering that only a few years ago an American in Egypt was about as popular an Oddity as President Nixon is today in Washington, is it not an uncontestable proposition that the American President's recent 'triumph' in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East must have taken place at a price?

An early lesson in politics teaches that all organised relations are based on exchange. But we also learn that a vital distinction can be made between natural and pervense forms of exchange. Natural exchange involves mutual or voluntary agreement of each party, which results in benefits to both. Perverse exchange involved coercion of one party by another, which results in benefits to the latter only. From time immemorial it has been well known in international relations that, much as natural exchange often obtains among equals (e.g. the United States and the Soviet Union), perverse exchange flourishes among unequals (e.g. the United States and Greece or Cyprus or Turkey). One should never forget that for the United States, 'whether as a negotiable ace for future use or as a present capital asset, the oil fields of the Middle East amount to a priceless acquisition as far as the next decade or so is concerned. Thanks to its still undisputed supremacy in industrial and technological sophistication, and massively boosted by Middle Eastern oil now, the United States should be guaranteed a promising future in a comparatively energystarved world for decades to come.

Why should not Greece, therefore, as op

posed to the more populous and (for the moment) less expendable Turkey ultimately feature at least as conveniently as did, say, Formosa in the Kissingerian vision of tomorrow's world? Contemporary American diplomacy is epitomised by its consistent contempt for all that is traditional and expendable — especially when it comes to handing out timely presents to deserving adversaries. Sacred cows such as Israel, Vietnam or Formosa have been systematically reduced to ordinary ones, which, whenever not overtly sent to the slaughterhouse, are curiously left 'free' at the mercy of an increasingly carnivorous world. And, as if the writing on the wall were not plain enough in the case of Greece, on August I the New York Times "apocalyptically" reported in a frontpage article that "the Central Intelligence f Agency has now been instructed no longer to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece in contrast to that Agency's deep involvement in Greek politics during the past twenty-five years."

Perhaps this explains the recurring theme in Greece today that the Soviet Union's steady progress to annex Bulgaria could well be setting the scene for the phased fall of Greece to the Communist bloc. Preposterous though this idea may seem at first, it can hardly be unexpected of Greeks to be deeply conscious of the road to serfdom so recently chosen by the United States for Formosa. For these are fears growing in perfect harmony both with current American "indifference" toward Soviet gains in the Balkans and Soviet "indifference" toward American gains in the Middle East.

In brief, they are consistent (a) with the Soviet Union's fervent hopes to dominate Greece as a "natural" extension to Soviet supremacy in the Balkans; (b) with the recent and much publicised "success" of United States policy in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East; and (c) with the fast emerging neo-isolationist trend within the United States — for the first time since the second world war a majority of Americans are known to believe that the United States should not come to the defence of its allies in western Europe in the event of an attack by the Soviet Military forces. Taking into account, too, the psychological shock of South Vietnam being progressively lost to the Communists after so much more toil, blood and capital was poured there, why should Greeks and other informed Europeans today not imagine that America may well be poised to sacrifice Greece next? At a time when United States foreign policy is undergoing the most extraordinary changes in a • quarter of a century, the lingering luminous fog still enveloping American intentions in that area is now lifting fast.

It is against such a background that one may begin to realise why it is no exaggeration to say that for the first time in Greek history the country faces a terrible prospect of annihilation by becoming permanently, indeed even structurally, alienated from Western Europe in general and from the European Community in particular. Hence, too, what clearly amounts to an historic mission is required today both of the new Greek government and of the European Community itself.

On the part of the Greek government only definitive and responsible action will do, mak ing serious progress possible towards joining the Common Market and ending the by now standard pattern of rule by uncertainty and coercion in Greece — which already engulfs Cyprus. The Greek armed forces, as seasoned patriots and staunch westerners, must certain ly honour their pledge to Mr Constantine Kar amanlis's government that the political evolution of the country will henceforth became a purely political progress in the pursuit of freedom and democracy in Greece and Cyprus alike.

Equally, the European Community and particularly the British Government in the context

of the Geneva talks must soon appreciate that the impending de jure loss of Bulgaria first, and

the probable one of Greece next, to the onward Soviet march south poses a serious threat to European security. So much so, in fact, that it would seem that the Community should at once display a unique mixture of tolerance, understanding and forward thinking in its efforts to prevent the whole of the Balkans succumbing to the Soviet dictatorship. Greece must be given "favourite son" treatment now. Because this is a time when American assurances that the country is under permanent American "protection" sound about as convincing as are the customary noises made by any central bank assuring everyone of the stability of its currency on the eve of a longexpected devaluation.

But three bold steps are necessary here. None iS inconsistent with the professed political interests and ,strategic orientation of the new Greek government and its armed forces. They amount to firmly establishing in practice at this time, first, that Greece is not going to be allowed to develop into either a banana republic or a Soviet satellite; second, that the national unity government is in the process of Paving the way to free elections; and, third, that the Greek people will be invited at an early and Clearly identifiable moment to choose whether Greece is to remain a monarchy or become a republic. No Greek is likely to forget how in a radio broadcast on June 1, 1973, declaring the monarchy "abolished and the heirs to the King deposed," Mr George Papadopoulos had the audacity to proclaim Greece a republic Whether, as he put it, the Greek people consented or not to the change. This was the darkest moment in the Colonels' devastation of the principle of democracy in Greece, and all Greeks are anxiously waiting for an early oPportunity to redress the balance.

With deep relief, therefore, free people everywhere have now learned that the Greek government is scrapping the existing illegal constitution replacing it with the 1952 Constitution Which came into force in accordance with the due process of law in a free society. This is a significant step toward the restoration of legality and democracy in Greece. Those of us who firmly believe the national unity government of Mr Karamanlis to be the only one capable of returning Greece to such normality, are nevertheless studying with some apprehension certain developments which, however inadvertently, may be leading to yet another serious violation of the sovereignty of the Greek people.

For, clearly, whether in terms of a nationwide referendum or a National Assembly elected by the people to decide on the matter, it is important to appreciate that the issue regarding the Greek monarchy is whether or not the King will be deposed and certainly not whether the King Will be reinstated. The difference is a crucial one: because the monarchy in Greece was

and thus unacceptably, "abolished" by a singularly undemocratic act of an undemocractic regime. And such a stigma in the political history of Greece cannot be tacitly or Otherwise legitimised by the present or any Other Greek government. Far from any pro-royalist bias obtaining here', King Constantine should in fact be invited to return to his country pending the referendum on the future of the monarchy, Particularly in view of his capacity as perhaps the most distinguished political victim of the Colonels' dictatorship. Such fair play is mandatory on moral grounds, too, considering that the Ring of the Hellenes consciously chose to endanger his throne by physically and repeatedly defying the recent dictatorship in Greece. The argument that the Greek government is

too preoccupied with the crisis in Cyprus to devote the kind of sensitive attention required in the case of King Constantine is, of course a Compelling one. Equally, it is imperative to be clear that questions of constitutional order and necessary decorum cannot easily be ignored — whether in the sho.t or in the long run. Greek history is not lacking in tragic examples where

the manifest will of the people was violated in the name of "political wisdom" — the latest of which was the Colonels' coup in 1967.

Only on he basis of such a foundation of political credibility can the truly monumental task of containing the centrifugal forces tending to pull apart Greece and its economy prove at all successful. Because if the government may effectively count on the active co-operation of a united people and .a united army, the impending politico-economic chaos can be avoided. What is thus further required at this already late stage is a realistic time-table capable of confronting inflation and political disintegration according to progressive plans which would bring within the process of political responsibility and national decision-making not only the elderly friends of Mr Karamanlis but also young leaders from the banking, industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy, together with popular and dynamic trade unionists and academics. Perhaps, too, the Dark Ages in the diplomatic representation of Greece will come to a tong overdue end with the welcome rise to power of Mr George Mayros, as Foreign Minister, who is more than likely to locate deserving talent for his forthcoming key ambassadorial appointments.

Only with such a balanced government, basing its legitimacy on a network of massive popular participation and drawing its strength from the very seriousness of the problem which it will be called to cope with, Greece may reasonably hope to return to normality, to retain its identity within the European Community of free nations and accordingly to discharge its normalising influence upon Cyprus as the national centre of Hellenism. With this kind of government Greece will at last emerge well placed both to demand and to enforce the detailed application of the current UN resolution on Cyprus; to definitively cease being a US-inspired embarrassment in international relations; to succeed in supervising in association with Britain and Turkey the return of Cyprus to independence and constitutional normality; and finally to induce Turkey to comprehend that flourishing relations with Greece, probably one of its best allies in the long run, and not crude noises about so-called Aegean oil, are the latter's surest bet.