Ma. OUNLIFFE . B History of the Boer War enjoys this dis-
tinction among all the innumerable volumes which have dealt with various aspects or phases of the long struggle, that it is the only considerable treatise which has not been written by an eyewitness. This at once gives it an immense advantage, as a serious contribution to the careful study of the campaign, over everything which has yet appeared, excepting, perhaps, the
Times" History and the brief but scholarly work of the great General Staff of Berlin. As first-hand authorities, books like De Wet's Three Years' War, or Mr. Goldman's study of the cavalry aspects of Lord Roberts's campaign, are of great value to the historian. But the inevitable tendency in any writer to take a partisan view of events quorum pars magna fuit renders these unsafe guides when we are concerned rather with facts than with arguments or ideas. Books, again, which are written from the point of view of the war corre- spondent, like Dr. Conan Doyle's excellent general sketch, or the works of Messrs. Nevinson and Pearse relating to the siege of Ladysmith, are by their very nature devoid of that careful sifting of evidence and calm judicial verdict which are essential to any work of real historical value. As throwing light upon particular incidents, or serving to elucidate obscure points of detail, the contemporaneous impressions of eyewitnesses are, of course, essential. But it may well be doubted whether for an accurate and im- partial history of warlike operations it is ever possible to trust solely to the work of any actor in the scenes under review ; and it is for these reasons that we prefer Mr. Oman's History of the Peninsular War to the work of the immortal Napier, and shall probably find Mr. Cunliffe's account of the operations terminating in the fall of Bloemfontein more reliable even than the long-awaited official history compiled under the direction of the protagonists themselves.
The" Times" History, again, has set itself to draw a definite lesson from the war. It is a brilliant essay on the manifold deficiencies of our military system, and of the military training of the "nineties," invaluable for the practical conclusion that it draws, and the policy which it urges upon the states- men of the day for the reform of that system and training. Nevertheless, there is still room for a dispassionate appreciation of the South African Campaign in cold blood by an historian ,Nhose avowed objeet is the study of the practice of war in itself and for itself; and this is what Mr. Cunliffe has set himself, as we think highly successfully, to provide. Judged from this standpoint, Mr. Cunliffe's second volume is infinitely superior to his first. This is at once explained by the circumstances in which each volume was written, as set forth in the preface. Vol. I. appeared in fort- nightly instalments during the actual progress of the war; first-hand information from the actors themselves was there- fore unobtainable, and Mr. Cunliffe was obliged to rely • The History of tho Boer War to the Occupation of Bloemfontein. By F. IL E. Cludiffe. 2 vols. Vol. IL London: Methuen and Co. [153.)
principally on the very unsatisfactory material furnished by the daily Press, and on such scanty official documents as came to light from time to time. The sanguine expectation which we all enjoyed in the summer of 1901 of the early termination of the war brought Mr. Cunliffe and his publishers to the fortunate decision to drop the instalment system, and to postpone further publication until the whole of the second volume was ready. That three and a half years should have elapsed between the appearance of the two volumes is a matter for congratulation rather than for apology, for although the flood of literature, despatches, and official reports that has poured in upon the historian since the winter of 1901 has enormously increased the labour of compilation—and as late as last spring the evidence given before the War Commission and the publication of the German Staff History entailed much reconsideration and re- casting—it is thanks to this deluge of information that Mr. Cunliffe has been able in his second volume to give us the full advantage of his real talent as a student of war.
Mr. Cunliffe is, however, no mere armchair critic. He is fully qualified to speak with authority, though he has neither been a war correspondent nor commanded a troop of Irregular horse. There are few, even of our most distinguished soldiers, who possess such an intimate acquaintance with the detail of Napoleon's campaigns, and his grasp of the larger aspects of the problem of war is profound. When he criti- cises, and he does not hesitate to do so—there is no ambiguity, for instance, as to his view of the famous " spatchcock " telegram, or the lamentable blunders which led to the capture of the great convoy at Waterval—his criticisms carry additional weight from the modesty and moderation of their expression. He argues that "it is often more unjust to abstain from comment than to indulge in it," and while he does not shrink from exposing mistakes such as these, and above all, from showing their deplorable effect upon the whole causes of the campaign, there is no gloating over painful incidents, and wherever possible he concedes to the officers responsible every reasonable plea of extenuating circum- stances.
Mr. Cunliffe's second volume opens with the investment and siege of Ladysmith—his first had already brought us down to the successful termination of the relief operations—and the problems of the defence of that place, together with the arguments against and in favour of its retention, are care- fully set forth. Sir George White's decision not to attempt the occupation of Bulwana is, we think, justly endorsed, on the ground that after Nicholson's Nek, and the despatch of the Dublin Fusiliers to Estcourt, there were not sufficient troops available to justify such an attempt. Mr. Cunliffe is less convinced of the wisdom of retaining the cavalry in Ladysmith, a decision deliberately arrived at in spite of the opposing arguments of Generals French and Hunter. Events proved that for defensive purposes the retention of the Dublin Fusiliers in their place would have been of more value, and that, owing to the longueurs of General Buller's advance, the opportunity for a vigorous offensive against the flanks and rear of a retreating enemy never came. Still, as Mr. Cunliffe points out, while it is extremely doubtful whether these regiments would have made much of a partisan warfare on the Colenso line for the defence of the communi- cations with the South, their value as a mobile reserve in Lady- smith would have been incalculable against an enemy who had really intended to drive the attack home at one point in the widely extended perimeter of the defences ; and, in addition, to send them away was to "proclaim beforehand to the Boers the passive nature of the intended defence."
The events of the siege itself, and more particularly of the great assault upon Wagon Hill, are comprehensively dealt with. The brilliancy of Sir Ian Hamilton's later services does not save him from being held responsible for the failure adequately to secure that section of the defences. On the other hand, General Hunter is excused for his irregular conduct as Chief of the Staff in leading the successful sortie upon "Long Tom" by the new and interesting fact that the sortie was only permitted by Sir George White on the con- dition that General Hunter should lead it.
We are unable, of course, to do more than touch upon the fringe of the many problems which are raised by Mr. Ounliffe in his valuable contribution to the history of the war down to the occupation of• Bloemfontein. In his chapter on the Volunteers of the Empire, and in his general view of the value of the services performed by the Irregular contingents, our historian perhaps shows the defects of his merits. His conclusions are professedly not arrived at from first-hand impressions ; they are the result of the careful sifting and weighing of the evidence that has been obtainable, and the great proportion of this evidence is clearly derived from " Regular " sources. Consequently his views err, if at all, in showing an excessive partiality for the "Regular" point of view. The merits of discipline and rigidity of training are perhaps overestimated ; while in dealing with the incidents where their defects were the causes of disaster, the real significance of these incidents is overlooked. But if Mr. Cunliffe thus fails quite to grasp the newest fact and the greatest lesson of the war, he errs in good company, and his estimate of the potentialities of Irregular troops. though not as high as it might be, is at least more moderately expressed than that of the great majority of the Regular soldiers of distinction whose versions of the campaign are the main authorities for his book.
In his appreciation of Lord Roberts's strategy at the opening of his campaign, Mr. Cunliffe is evidently of opinion that the Field-Marshal attached an excessive importance to the relief of Kimberley, and placed this before the more vital necessity of destroying Cronje's army in the field. Though the evidence is overwhelmingly conclusive in showing that Lord Roberts's strategical plan from the first was the occupation of Bloemfontein, and that the relief of Kimberley was never more than a side-issue in this plan, we doubt whether the actual destruction of Cronje's army was ever part of the original scheme. Mr. Cunliffe has occasion to remind us, as the German Staff History also points out, that throughout all the later stages of the campaign Lord Roberts preferred to manceuvre for positions and to occupy towns rather than to strike bard and inflict heavy loss upon an enemy whose deter- mination to prolong the struggle he undoubtedly under- estimated. It is, therefore, quite a tenable view, though Mr. Cunliffe does not advance it, that the occupation of Bloem- fontein was considered as an object of high importance in itself; and this it undoubtedly was, as securing the relief of Ladysmith and the evacuation by the Boers of Cape Colony. The preliminary relief of Kimberley—to which, on political grounds, great importance was attached at home—would be no obstacle to this, whereas the willingness to face the exhaus- tion that the raid would entail upon the cavalry, and the strange neglect to keep touch between French's column and the infantry at the drifts on the one hand, and to get or keep touch with Cronje's army at Magersfontein on the other, which are inexplicable if Cronje's army was really the objec- tive, are readily to be explained upon the hypothesis that the march on Bloemfontein alone was in the Field-Marshal's mind. We are inclined to believe that this was the real state of the case, and that the victory of Paardeberg—for which, at any rate, little preparation seems to have been made before- hand—was simply a fortunate accident, contemplated at the eleventh hour, when Cronje's faulty strategy had unexpectedly placed him in his enemy's hand, and achieved by the iron determination of General French and by the quite exceptional marching powers of the infantry. However this may be, the perusal of Mr. Cunliffe's volume not only leads us with him to "a sense of the greatness of the difficulties which attend the study and practice of war," but to the clear conclusion that, until the advent of the veteran Field-Marshal, the British army was without a single leader who, in breadth of view and willingness to take immense risks for the accomplish- ment of great ends, possessed the qualities which are essential to the victorious conduct of a serious campaign.
We cannot conclude this notice without finding one serious fault with Mr. Cunliffe. He has apparently decided not to proceed with his History.
MADAME DU BARRY.*
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