10 JANUARY 1936, Page 21

The New British Commonwealth BOOKS OF THE DAY

By H. V. HODSON THE international crisis has exposed some serious weaknesses in the present structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Dominion Governments were not specifically consulted beforehand, either when Sir Samuel Hoare made his famous Assembly speech or when he negotiated with M. Laval in Paris. They were not committed by the United Kingdom Government's policy, and they would certainly have refused to be committed, had they been invited, save on their own publicly expressed terms. Yet at both those moments decisions had to be taken that might involve, not far below their surface, the issue of eventual peace or war ; and only a very few constitutional theorists would deny that if one member-nation of the British Commonwealth were at war the choice for any . other member between being at war and being neutral would be a choice for or against the legal integrity of the Empire. This critical problem must be faced in the light of a clear understanding of what the British Commonwealth is, what is its value to its own peoples and to humanity, and

towards what ideal goal it should be heading. It is the great . • merit of Mr. Coatrnan's notable new book that he has formed for hiinself such an Understanding, and expounds a worthy philosophy of the COmmonwealth with almost prophetic fervour.

It is impossible not to be moved by his enthusiasm, nor to applaud his dictum that " the destiny of the British Commonwealthis. that- it shall become a living working model of the world Commonwealth of the future." (He seems, by the way, to neglect this lofty standard of our imperial destiny in some of his economic chapters, with their praise for the Ottawa agreements and their favour towards nationalistic experiments in the control of production and marketing.) Nevertheless one cannot_ escape feelifig that with his head high in an almost mystical cloud Mr. Coatman sometimes allows his feet to slither and stumble. Thus he remarks to our astonish- ment : `:Jnside the British Commonwealth, political contro- versy is now out of the way, except Tor those 'matters still outstanding between the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom.", Has Mr. Coatnian never heard of Dr. Malan or colonel Stallard, or Mr. Lang of New South Wales, or the extreme Canadian nationalists ? It is significant that he devotes not a single page to an attempt at applying his philo- sophy to. " those matters still outstanding between the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom." Again, he professes to find in the system of arbitral tribunals planned by the 1930 Imperial. Conference a " successor " to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council " more closely fitted 'to the spirit, the conditions and the needs of the British CoMnioriwealth of the future." This is to confuse utterly the functiOn of appeal jurisdiction in civil, criminal and constitutional cases, and the function of arbitral intervention between governments ; and it is also to ignore the vital difference between a permanent court and a sketchy scheme of ad hoc tribunals.

One might cite other passages in which Mr. Coatman allows his enthuiiasms to run away with him." Thus he describes the Committee of Imperial Defence as " a truly

• all,Empire body"—which it certainly is not—and remarks how valuable has been the work already accomplished in unifying the defence and foreign policies generally of all the -British countriea.", Surely -the point here is that defence Ibifigiaa'Biltafinia By J.- Ceatinan; Ca.& (Jonathan Cape.

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policy is a by-product of foreign policy, and that it is hopeless to strive for unity of imperial defence in the absence of unity of imperial foreign policy. As Mr. Coatman himself declares, and as the present international crisis is bringing home to us, the sudden emergence of a war crisis would find the British Commonwealth in a far less favourable position for united action than we would like. We come back to the issue which this article began by raising—how, in the face of proper determination' in the Dominions to conduct their own foreign policies and take decisions for themselves, even on the question of war or neutrality, arc we to safeguard the integrity of the Commonwealth in a warlike world, and keep its influence for peace at the highest by ensuring that it speaks at critical moments with a united voice ?

It is an extraordinarily difficult problem, hedged about with imponderables, and there can be no simple or immediate solution. Sokitur ambulando is a sound maxim for such occasions, but it is also a dangerous temptation to mental laziness. One key at least to the solution has emerged during the present international crisis. The Dominions and the United Kingdom were unanimous in their support for the League of Nations, and moreover, despite earlier hesitations and neglect to think the matter out, unanimous in their broad interpretation of the responsibilities that membership of the League laid upon them. Can anyone doubt that in the absence of such a criterion for their policy, the nations of the Commonwealth would have floundered and argued, torn by divers national, regional, imperial and idealistic motives ? Such doubters as there are would surely be convinced if the truth were known about the reactions of- the Common- wealth nations to the incident of the Hoare-Laval peace plan ; for a veering away from a straightforward League policy at once produced violent discord in the Commonwealth, and among the motives that induced Ministers to change their minds was undoubtedly the prospect of strong _imperial dissent. On the other hand, United Kingdom Ministers could —in private--expostulate with equal justice that if, as a result of a strong sanctions policy, Italy grew desperate and attacked the British fleet or British possessions, the Dominions were for the most part unprepared, materially or morally, to shoulder their due share of the burden of consequent war, either as members of the League or as sister nations in the Commonwealth.

It is not only in relation to the Abyssinian conflict that this vital issue is being precipitated into harshly practical shape. The Dominions, who are separately represented and take responsibility at the London Naval Conference, have also to make up their minds how far they take practical responsibility for the consequences of the policies they may there adopt. The more far-seeing minds in the Dominions, as in this country, are well aware of this problem in Commonwealth relations, and are giving it their best thought. But it would be illusory for them or for us to seek a solution in policies or machinery not based on a genuine and considered will to co-operate ; for the issue at stake is whether there is among the peoples of the Commonwealth a loyalty larger than their national loyalties, a loyalty for which they would make sacrifices comparable with those they would make for their nation States: