THE WAR SURVEYED : THE CAPTURE OF BARDIA
By STRATEGICUS
IN spite of the fine impression made by the capture of Sidi Barrani, there must have been many who held their breath until the occupation of Bardia was officially announced. The High Command had gone out of its way, it seemed, to encourage caution. Time after time we were warned that the position was not completely surrounded, though it was admitted that probably only a few troops of the garrison would escape. Then there was the fact that the capture of Bardia was a very different operation. The Bardia stronghold rested on the sea and could not be surrounded ; it was covered by a position which Nature had made strong ; it was not an Egyptian posi- tion, but had been in Italian hands from the beginning, and one had to expect that the deep gashes in the plateau and the roomy caves had been turned into first-rate defences. More- over, the Italians boasted unrestrainedly about it ; and, if the thoroughly shaken forces of Graziani were to purchase a respite in order to re-form and take up new positions, a long and stout defence at Bardia was the natural price.
In the event all these fears proved groundless ; and others which we might have cherished disappeared with them. In less than three days the position was captured and over 30,000 prisoners were taken. How was this brought about? It must now be recognised that the whole of General Wavell's cam- paign has been closely articulated. Part of it derives from the invasion of Greece, which gave the Navy Crete and, with it, a more spacious sphere of action towards the west. Then came the daring attack upon Taranto, which put so great a propor- tion of the Italian capital ships hors de combat ; and Admiral Somerville added his contribution by damaging the battleships still more. It is significant that the British naval squadron had only to deal with an Italian submarine and some motor torpedo- craft. If the Italian fleet had been intact, and if it had wished to challenge the British squadron, it is impossible that the sea bombardment could have taken place, except at the cost of a fleet action. It would have been welcomed, of course ; but one part of the plan would have been disturbed.
The Royal Air Force, as usual, played its part magnificently, and showed once more that the services can co-operate per- fectly without the merging of one in the other. From the beginning of this campaign this skilful liaison has been the governing condition of the success. But, after all, the Navy is taken for granted ; and for some time now the Royal Air Force has been the pride of everyone. It was the action of the Army that secured our closest scrutiny ; and, perhaps, we have looked even more closely since the capture of Sidi Barran. What element of luck was involved, we may have wondered. Even there, it would have been said, there was little chance of strategical surprise ; at Bardia there was none. The forces were in contact ; and the wide-flung perimeter of the defences looked very forbidding.
It was while the Egyptian coast was still being cleared up that armoured detachments were sent speeding into Libya. On December t5th there was fighting around Bardia ; and the danger seemed to be that either it might be rushed at great cost or it might be allowed to harden into a static posi- tional defensive. But from the first probe, a few days after the patrols reached Bardia, the defences were photographed scientifically ; and, by constant raids, the perimeter was pene- trated, prisoners were taken and every element of the defence was tested and examined. Only when the position was thoroughly known was the assault launched, by the ground forces, from the sea and from the air. Then the army, under the least promising conditions, feinting on one sector, attacked at another and secured the advantage of complete tactical surprise. As a consequence, part of the garrison appears to have been cut off from the rest and had to surrender almost at once ; and the Australians, being well inside the perimeter of the defences, pressed things to an issue.
The most impressive feature of the victory was only dis- closed later. The cost of capturing this strong position and, what is more important, taking over 30,000 prisoners, was no more than 400 casualties. If that supreme factor—the negligible cost—had been lacking, the victory would have lost much of its glamour and indeed much of its value. For an army does not fight positions: it fights other armies. When the enemy army is put out of action, the positions are merely a matter of occupation; and it is obvious that General Wavell intends to destroy the Italian army in Libya. It was estimated that, at the beginning of the offensive, Graziani had some 250,000 troops at his disposal. It has been put as high as 300,000 ; but the Near Eastern Command apparently favour the lower figure. If this is correct, more than a third of it is accounted for already. It is a striking achievement to have attacked a large well-found army, on the eve of its advance upon the envied goal, and in less than a month to have com- pletely destroyed a third of it, with only negligible losses.
Other units must be shaken severely, though General Berti drew off the remnants of the Tenth Army to Tobruk ; and, since the appetite grows through feeding, our eyes begin to look westward. It will be a pity if these brilliant victories lead us to forget that Graziani has still double the number of troops already accounted for at his disposal, and to expect that Tobruk, the main naval base of Libya, will fall into the hands of the British Commander like a ripe plum. The advance has already carried the Imperial troops and the Allied contingents far from the rail-head, far, that is to say, from the source of supply. The area is almost entirely without those communi- cations upon which a great army depends. The evacuation of the prisoners alone must impose a strain upon the com- munications ; and for a further advance, equipped as the army must be if it is to be ready to give battle to a strong force standing upon prepared positions, the matter of supplies is vital.
It is here that Bardia will be of service. It is a natural harbour, and it will be very useful for the evacuation of prisoners and the bringing up of supplies. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the army could be properly supplied, in any reasonable time, without help from sea-transport. Bardia is not to be compared with Tobruk ; and if that port is captured it will provide an admirable advanced base. Armies today consume immense stores of. supplies. The consumption of petrol alone must be a constant problem ; and a stationary tank is of very little use in an area which is constantly being raided by enemy aeroplanes. The way in which the matter of supplies has already been dealt with must argue some very fine organisation ; but, now, that matter will loom larger in the minds of the staff. The Italians, so we have been informed from Italy, will make " a last stand at Tobruk "; and we must expect something of the sort, since it would need only a few more victories like those of Sidi Barrani and Bardia to destroy the whole of the Italian force at present remaining in Libya.
Although the Imperial forces have already achieved contact with the Italians at Tobruk, we should expect a pause for the re-supply and refitting of the attacking units ; but it is sound strategy to allow the enemy as little time as possible to recover. The Command are once more dangling hopes and cautions before our eyes ; but now we have learned sufficient confidence to be content to trust General Wavell to strike at the moment that is best for him and worst for the enemy. We have now discovered, in the most convincing school, that we have in General Wavell and his subordinates men who can extract the last advantage out of the modern tactical methods. There is no reason, fortunately, to think that they are not equalled in the British Command at home. Though it is said that our liaison in Belgium and France did not compare with that of the Germans, the lesson has now been learned ; and while we can command the services of such soldiers as these we can look confidently to the future. The skill with which these victories were achieved would be triumphant anywhere
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