The idea dominant at the Porte is evidently to threaten
resistance, to (Her fictitious reforms in Armenia, which with- out autonomy are worthless; to concede no land to Monte- angro that can be occupied peacefully ; to assist the Mussulinan Albanians in resisting Greece; and to collect a regular army, under Osman Pasha, to hold down East Roumelia and Mace- donia. If the Powers, overawed by these preparations or divided among themselves, drawback, this programme will be carried out, and the bloodshed will be terrible. But if the Powers are not overawed, and do not divide, but send a combined Fleet to the Bosphorus, the Porte will be aware that the empire is at stake, and, according to all experience, will yield. The Powers, which see the danger clearly, and do not desire a great war just now, will, we believe, avert one by adhering to each other, and insist- ing that the decision of Europe, once formulated, must be final. It is foolish to say that is an unprecedented doctrine, when applied to a distribution of territory. The Congress of Vienna distributed territories of more importance than the Turkish,— halved Saxony, restored Hanover to the Guelphs, gave Norway to Sweden, and made the "Low Countries" independent.
