TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CRISIS AT VERB MLLES.
I7 there is one form of government worse than another, it is the despotism of a small individuality under Republican forms, and that is the government of France under M. Thiers. It is absurd to talk of it, as some of our Liberal contemporaries do, as a Republican administration. With the exception of M. Jules Simon, every Republican has been expelled from the Ministry, and we have nothing but a worn-out old statesman forcing a monarchical assembly reluctantly to carry out his personal policy, and using as his instruments men who, in obeying a Republic, are false to their own most cherished and most acknowledged convictions. M. Thiers is as tricky as the Orleanists, as hostile to Italy as the Legitimists, as sycophantic to the Army as the Bonapartists, and as reckless of human life and freedom as ever was Emperor or King. He professes to be Republican, and compels the representatives of the people to vote against their consciences ; he swears that he is disinterested, but tries to ostracize all rivals, or that failing, to put a moral gag in their mouths ; he extols his own liberality, humanity, and patience, and ships 20,000 untried human beings to the wretched wilds of New Caledonia. We say nothing of the murderous scenes enacted during the storm of Paris, for we have grave reason to believe that some of the criminals, mixed up with the Communists' ranks, perpetrated acts which, if they do not justify slaughter, render it, at all events, absolutely inevitable. We have from English lips at least one account of atrocities perpetrated on wounded soldiers which would have driven a British army more frantic than the French, and for the moment have rendered it impossible to restrain the soldiery. But these huge deportations are ordered without law in cold blood, after time has been obtained for full investigation ; they are proscriptions, not storming enterprises, and they stamp the man who orders, or sanctions, or can arrest them but allows them to proceed, indelibly as a tyrant. A Republic of M. Thiers' pattern is, and must be, a Republic with every Republican principle omitted. It is not free, for the Army works its will more independently than it ever did under the ex-Emperor. It is not honest, for the representatives of the people are voting day by day in the teeth of every convic- tion they possess ; and it is not strong, for M. Thiers has no popular support, is only a ruler sustained from hour to hour by the jealousies of three parties, each stronger than his own. His re'gime is personal government merely, and if there is to be personal government, we prefer that of a King, who is at least above rivalries and personal prejudices, who would be in full accord with the dominant tone of his Assembly, who would relegate the men of the sword tb their proper duties, and under whom able men would have at least a chance of rising to the leadership of the State. There is no one point dear to Liberals on which a Republic such as M. Thiers is trying to found would not be worse than a monarchy. It could not be maintained without degrading the Republican idea, for it must be as repressive as a despotism ; or without cor- rupting the Army, for the support of the bayonet is essential to its existence ; or without deluding the electorate, for a majority of all France is clearly in favour of re-establishing the throne. A Republic supported by rifles, in which electors are not free, and Representatives dare not speak their minds, and a weak executive deports whole cities, and force itself is degraded by being compelled to put on a mask of legality, is a Republic which we will leave to be defended by the Liberals who believe in names, and are ready to postpone all the ends of free government in order to secure its form. For ourselves, we prefer a real Throne, with all its evils, to a President's chair possessing every attribute of a throne except dignity, security, and permanence. We say it with deep regret, for we had hoped against hope that France would not recommence the sterile circle of her politics, but we see no hope in the immediate future except in the admission of the last Bourbon to the throne of France. No Republic is possible for the time except the Republic of M. Thiers, a patty and unwise despotism, exercised under lying forms, and of the only other alternatives the ancient monarchy is for the time the best. No other arrangement can apparently reconcile the theory and the fact,—the theory that the people rule, and the fact that their representatives are four out of every five decided Royalists, differing only as to the individual who shall first be raised to the throne. In other words, no other arrangement can restore common honesty to French politics, the first condition for any im- provement in the situation of France. Nothing can be. accomplished, no new man can rise, no great project can be attempted, no reformation can be thought of, while out of every five representatives four must lie to themselves and their- constituents, while the head of the Executive must plead' liberty as an excuse for despotism ; while the Chamber itself,_ as a whole, must fawn upon the Generals whom it ought to. command. This, the necessity of dishonesty, must be brought to an end first of all, and it should be brought to an end' quickly. The Assembly have already abolished by a vote of' 484 to 103 the disabilities of the Bourbons ; they are pro- bably in the right in awaiting the result of the 120 elec- tions to vacant seats before they proceed further ; but if those- elections are taken and prove Royalist, the monarchists wilt be mad to admit of any further delay. Delay is not gain for- the Republic, or for France, or for the Bourbons ; but for the military pretender who will, if time is allowed him, arise from within the ranks of the Army, and once again subjec5 France to all the evils of a despotism tempered only by the- necessity of conciliating Prastorians. The Government of M.- Thiers is not popular with the Army, is detested by the pro- letariat, is scorned by the Assembly ; it may disappear in an. hour, and then France will once more be a prize for any- adventurer -with a sword. Already there is danger of civil war. Already the Army, which is so powerful in the State- that the most serious question at this moment to be settled is, that of promotion, disturbed by the appointments made in, the army created by Gambetta, threatens to split into fac- tions; already the parties are attracting to themselves military leaders, already the peasantry, in despair of securing order,. are muttering that the Emperor kept the talkers down. The Assembly never was so pressed by events, and never can have a better opportunity, for its candidate is offering a constitu- tion, its electors are willing, its Army has at its head an. officer who is, at all events, ready, if not desirous, to accept a. King, and it acts at a moment when of all moments the first prerogative of royalty, clemency, may fittingly be exercised.
But it will be said, more especially in England, why should: not the 'Assembly elect the Comte de Paris or the Duke- d'Aumale, instead of the chief of the Bourbons, with his ex- ploded ideas of divine right ? For two reasons, one of the ideal, and one of the most practical kind. We believe that at this moment the first requisite of a throne in France is that" the monarch should think himself entitled to reign by some other right than the will of a party ; that he should be one- of the men who do not feel uncertain about themselves, who. do not desire perpetually to conciliate individuals or interests. by dishonest concessions,—who are, in fact, even if it be througle a delusion, free from preoccupations. And in the second- place, all that France can gain from electing the Orlean- ists she can gain from admitting Henri °jug., with the additional advantage of reconciling the Legitimist party to. the country. Nobody says the Comte de Paris can govern by- himself any more than the Comte de Chambord can, and if the- Duke d'Aumale can, there is nothing to prevent his doing so. under his cousin any more than under his nephew. The- election in fact of the Comte de Chambord secures all the advantages that can be secured from monarchy, conciliates er great party which can produce leaders, if not followers, an& realizes what is apparently the will of the majority of the people, and is for those reasons preferable to the continuance of an interregnum which accomplishes none of those things Fora Royalist Chamber to call itself Republican and act as it were Cessarist, is not to create a Republic.
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