THE ZENITH, DECLINE, AND FALL OF THE THIRD EMPIRE.* No

man of letters has, of late years, had a more dismal task than that which Mr. Blanchard Jerrold has set himself, in acting as the apologist of the intrigues and the crimes, the blunders and the disasters of the Third Empire. It is, indeed, creditable, rather than the reverse, to Mr. Jerrold's head and heart, that, in this, the concluding volume of his work, there has not been denied him what Carlyle has called the misery of miseries, the misery of being weaker than one's task. For we must say—and it is well to say it at once— that as a narrative of some of the most remarkable events that have occurred within the memory of men of middle age, it is -singularly, almost distressingly, disappointing. Three important wars come within the range of this volume,—the Crimean war, the Italian war, and the Franco-German war. Yet the story of none of these is told with graphic force or literary enthusiasm ; Mr. Jerrold's pages are devoid of the nerve and fire which characterise M. de Mazade's Life of Count Cavour, and, perhaps, spring from the character of the hero; and they have none of the graces, somewhat Corinthian and frosty though these, no doubt, are, of Mr. Kinglake's Crimea. As for the central figure himself—his life, his character, his guiding ideas—the reader will find less genuine light upon them in Mr. Jerrold's four volumes, than in the brief " notes " which were all the late Mr. James Macdonell was able to give of that "France since the- First Empire," which he had studied with a literary enthusiasm that partook largely of the character of personal love. In only two portions of this volume can Mr. Jerrold be said to warm to his work, even to the extent of giving fresh informa- tion upon historical facts which every well-informed man has at his finger-ends. These are where he relates once more the nego- tiations of the French Commercial Treaty, and where he tells of the private life of the Emperor and Empress. The picture of Cobden falling asleep in the coarse of a four-hours' discussion -with M. Rouher, or airily getting rid of details of negotiation by exclaiming "No trade," is a very pleasing one. It not only throws fresh light on that remarkable man whose strength largely lay in the fact that from first to last he was a child of nature, but, as does Mr. Morley's Life of Cobden to a greater extent, it raises our opinion of M. Rouher, and makes one regret all the more that so good a man of business bound up his for- tunes with those of a "bankrupt imposture" like the Third Empire. Then,.again, it is in no spirit of disrespect for Mr. Jerrold that we say there is a good deal of the " historian-in- waiting " about his writing. There is something comic in his anger at Prince Bismarck, the " ungenerous and un- chivalrous guest," for checkmating the Emperor and crushing the Empire like an egg-shell, after having been so kindly treated by the Empress. Nor was the Court or the private life of the Tuileries as free from scandal as Mr. Jerrold would, by implication rather than by actual assertion, make it out to be. It is notorious that the scenes from the former, given, we shall not say by M. Zola, but by Alphonse Daudet, in his Nabab, for example, are only too true to the life. Then -there is no longer any denying that the Marguerite Bellanger intrigue was a fact. At the same time, we can well believe that

the Emperor was a good-natured and affectionate husband, father, and host. The most pathetic potions of the volume, indeed, are those about the poor Prince Imperial. He was un- doubtedly precocious as a boy, and some of his sketches, which are reproduced here, show considerable power of caricature.

We confess, however, that Mr. Jerrold's apologia does not materially change for the better our view of the Third Napo- leon's public character and life. He figures in these pages, as he must figure in history, as a Mazzini without a mond backbone, as a conspirator full of Napoleonic unscrupulousness, but without Napoleonic courage. Mr. Jerrold evidently cannot make out why, even after the Coup d'Etat might be supposed to have been forgotten, not only Liberals, but nearly all men of char- acter and brains," cut" the Empire, and why a Pr6vost Paradol

and an Emile 011ivier hardly find any pity for the hard fate that came in the wake of their desertion to it. He allows the " his- torian-in-waiting " spirit to carry him to such lengths that he more than hints his belief that M. Gambetta is only an un- scrupulous adventurer; which would seem to show that the description by M. Gambetta of the Imperialists as not a party, but a horde, must have struck home. Yet the bitterness of • The Life of Napoleon III. By Blanchard Jerrold. In 4 vols. Vol IV. London: Lougmane, Green, and Co. 18E2. •

anti-Imperialist Frenchmen, which was sometimes so great as to lead many of them altogether wrong—notably in regard to the Italian war and the commercial treaty with England—is easily explicable. They hated the Emperor, not, perhaps, because he was a conspirator, for, according to M. Thiers, France is a nation of conspirators, nor even, perhaps, be- cause he tried to establish Cresarism, but because the Caasar- ism he thought good enough for France was a disreputable, tenth-rate Csarism, and because he so far succeeded in his efforts to enervate the French people that he brought the country

lower than it has ever been in history. He is condemned, in fact, because he was a weak, shallow, hesitating, and ultimately un-

successful conspirator. Again, Mr. Jerrold endeavours to prove —and to a large extent succeeds in his attempt—that Lord Palmerston was wrong in holding that "our ally" of the Crimean war was animated by a deep, ineradicable hatred of England. Where Lord Palmerston erred was not in believing that the Emperor would have liked to strike a blow at England —for a war of revenge for Waterloo might have suited his dynastic purpose as well as • anything else—but in crediting him with anything very deep. Napoleon conspired all round, but never thoroughly ; so he succeeded only in making the Volunteer movement in England a success, in making Prussia the greatest military nation in Europe, in rendering the Italy he helped to create, first ungrateful, and then hostile. Finally, Mr. Jerrold is extremely bitter against Prince Bismarck, for bluntly refusing to " compensate " France after Sadowa; and he is no doubt perfectly right in his contention that the Prince did not object, but in his own way led up to the Franco-German war.. But, after all, this simply means that when he first met the Emperor, Prince Bismarck perceived what a broken-backed, political gambler he had to deal with, enticed him into a game of "cut-throat euchre," and remorselessly crushed him in Cali- fornian fashion. Had Mr. Jerrold proved that his hero cherished

a strong love for any country, or any place, or any idea—for France, or Italy, or Democracy, or the principle of nationalities—

he might have "reduced" the verdict of history upon him. But he has done nothing of the kind ; he has at the best apologised for him, as a conspirator for whom circumstances, including his own dreams, and even sympathies, proved too strong. And in the whole Carlylian vocabulary of intellectual invective, there is not a word forcible enough to characterise accurately such a half-successful weakling.

As has been already indicated, Mr. Jerrold's narrative of

the Crimean and Italian wars is not remarkable as furnish- ing new facts. We believe him to be sound in his conclusion that Napoleon lost by the Treaty of Villafranca all that he seemed to have gained by Solferino and Magenta; and in his evident belief that if the Emperor had gone on with his work. of freeing and making Italy, no European Power was prepared, or would have dared to oppose him. Mr. Jerrold does not give

sufficient importance to the blunder of the Mexican expedi- tion. Although he cannot deny that Morny was a scamp of the worst type, he glozes over the scandalous business of the Jecker bonds, and he tries to make himself and his readers believe that the politicians of the United States did not give the

Empire notice to quit their continent, although they were polite enough and strong enough to let him fall easily. On the whole, the best part of the volume, that too in which Mr. Jerrold is at his strongest, both as a historian and as a special pleader, is his description of the events that led more immediately to the collapse of the Empire, although we must remark, in passing, that his estimate of the motives of the Members of the French Oppotition is almost ludicrously inadequate. Mr. Jerrold's narrative of the doings and fatal success of the French War Party, with the Duo de Gramont at its head, at the time of the

Hohenzollern candidature, is, at all events, the best thing he has given us in this volume :—

"On the 10th, M. Benedetti met the King, by accident, at Ems; and his Majesty said that Prince Leopold, being on a journey in Switzerland, had not yet been able to join hie father; consequently, he had no answer from him. He telegraphed to the Duke, that war would be inevitable if military preparations were openly began. Whereupon, on the 11th, the Ministry decided to make a 'dilatory declaration' to the Chambers, and to brave the impatience of the Deputies and the war shoats of the Press. 'The Government,' said the Foreign Minister, 'understands the impatience and anxiety of the Chamber and of tbe country; but it is impossible to make a defi- nite statement yet. It is waiting for an answer. All the Cabinets with which we are in communication appear to admit the justice of our complaints. I hope to be shortly in a position to satisfy the Chamber; but to-day I appeal to its patriotism, and to the political sagacity of each of its members, and beg them to be content, for the moment, with this incomplete information.' The Emperor was dis- tressed by the contrary counsels to which he was compelled to listen. He was very ill. On the 3rd, a consultation of physicians had taken place, and it had been agreed that an operation was necessary, but it was adjourned. It would have interfered with the course of public business. In almost incessant pain, he had to listen to the discussions of a divided Ministry ; to Generals who assured him that the Army was in splendid condition, that the Prussians were a fortnight behind- hand, and that victory was certain ; to the Court party, who were opposed to the Parliamentarians; to the Clericals, who detested the Confederation of the North ; and to the sincere, if misguided, friends of his dynasty, who, believing in the reports of Marshal Lebceuf and his comrades, saw the Emperor returning, after a short, triumphal campaign, along the via sacra of his capital, at the bead of his vic- torious legions. He was not among the enthusiasts. He had no belief in a short war, at any rate. Nor was he a man of war, but a devout lover of peace. He kept himself throughout the negotiations severely; within the role of a constitutional monarch. He presided in the council-chamber ; but his responsible Ministers acted freely, as the despatches of the Duke de Grammont prove On the 14th, Bing William and the French Ambassador, quite uncon- scious that a personal offence had been given or taken, parted on the most friendly terms in the railway-station ; the Ring leaving for Coblenz, and M. Benedetti for Paris. The re- solve to go to war was not only made but declared by Prince Bismarck on the 14th, when, in a reply to a despatch from Lord Granville, advising a moderate course, be stated that France must not only withdraw her demand for a guarantee as to the future, but that she must disavow the Duke de Grammont's speech of the 6th, and blame the violence of the Press. The blunders of the Olivier Cabinet had put the German Chancellor in a position to bear himself thus haughtily, and with the approbation of public opinion in Europe. Meantime, there were hesitation and indecision in the French Ministry. On the morning of the 14th, at 9 o'clock, a Cabinet council sat at the Tuileries, with the usual result. A long discussion ended only in an adjournment. The publication of the offensive Ems telegram in the Gazette of North Germany had been telegraphed to the Government ; and it was believed that when it became known in Paris, it would be impossible to control the indignation of the public. At a second meeting of the Ministers, in the afternoon, after a protracted discus- sion, it was resolved that the Reserves should be called out. The Emperor was sad, unwell, and had remained a silent listener, until his Foreign Minister rose and said that the question might be solved by an appeal to Europe,—by a Congress. The word "Congress," ac- cording to witnesses of the scene, made an extraordinary impression on the French Sovereign. He was moved, till tears filled his eyes. A Congress had been his favourite court of appeal on many occasions. Was it to solve this grave difficulty P The draft of a communication to be addressed to the Powers was at once drawn up ; and it was agreed that the Government should inform .the Chambers on the morrow that the Hohenzollern candidate had been withdrawn, with the approbation of the King of Prussia, and that with respect to the future, France referral it to the judgment of a Congress of the European Powers. This,' said Albert Sorel, 'would have been a master-stroke.' It would have confounded the machinations of M. de Bismarck, and given France a strong claim upon the gratitude of all lovers of peace. But it was not to be. The Olivier Cabinet was destined to blunder to .the end. A third council was called on the 14th, to meet at ten o'clock at night at Saint Cloud. When the Ministers parted at six o'clock, peace appeared to be assured ; at ten o'clock, it was war. The swift change has been attributed to the communication to the French Government of M. de Bismarck's inter- view with Lord Loftus, in which he formulated the demands he had determined to make on France, and to the news of the movements of German troops towards the Rhine. How these reached Paris re- mains a diplomatic mystery ; but if they were conveyed to the French Ministers through the secret agency of the German Chan- cellor, this was the crowning episode of his conspiracy to provoke France to war. All the testimony which has crept or been thrust into publicity agrees in presenting the Emperor as the first to wel- come hopes of peace, and the last to consent to the arbitrament- of arms. At the night council at Saint Cloud the War Party was in force. It was in the ascendant in the Palace, and among the tried Mends of his dynasty. It had the sympathies of the Empress, whose impulsive nature resented vehemently the tricks and the open insults to which M. de Bismarck, their ungenerous and unchivalrons guest, had subjected her adopted country. It has been said that the Empress Eugenie urged on the War Party, and was, indeed, the ohief instigator of the war, because she believed it would secure the throne to her son. Her heroic condact after the fall of the dynasty, and when she was asked to save it at the expense of the honour of France, should have shielded her from this charge. She approved the war, because she believed that the honour of Prance demanded it; but none who have had the honour of approaching her Majesty, or of studying the elevation and strength of her character, have for a- moment believed that her share in the responsibilities which-weigh upon those who governed France in July, 1870, may be traced to other than patriotic motives. The French War Party wrought an evil of terrible magnitude. All who were of it must bear a share of the blame. Rashness folly, and vanity were uppermost, when the war broke out ; but all alike sought, according to their lights, the honour and the glory of France."

" According to their lights," says Mr. Jerrold. But of what kind was their " light P" Not of that pseudo-moral sort which is some-

times said to be "from 'Heaven,"—that, even the most shameless defenders of the Empire will not venture to affirm. Not of the intellectual sort that does not pretend, to be connected with morality, for the Franco-Geman wax, entered into without pre- paration of any kind, was "worse than a crime, it was a blunder." The only " light " that can be associated with the war, and with the Empire to which it gave the coup de grace, is the light that renders darkness visible. That, indeed, is pre- cisely the operation Mr. Jerrold has performed, and so he may find, to his cost, for this volume is sure to provoke rejoinders, both here and in Prance. The maxim which those who are most friendly to the Third Empire should remember, above all others, is, "The least said, the soonest mended."