10 JUNE 1978, Page 7

Mieux que les cubains

Sam White

Paris France's continuing and growing influence in Africa has been a cause for wonder to its former rivals in the nineteenth-century rush to exploit that continent. It is a wonder cur rently mixed with unease often shared by the French themselves. It is as though in yet another of those famous fits of absent mindedness they have acquired com mitments and virtually a second empire Which could stretch their resources to the limit and involve them in a Vietnam-style quagmire. On the face of it all of de Gaulle's famous warnings to the Americans over involvement in Vietnam could apply with at least equal force to the present French military involvement in Africa. Here again a Western power is intervening in what are essentially a series of African civil or tribal wars; here again corrupt and despotic regimes are being propped up by Western arms; here again the protection of existing garrisons could on the face of it involve the dispatch of expeditionary forces. And yet of course Africa is not Vietnam and France is not the US.

France is protected from major folly by its lack of means just as the Soviet Union and its Cuban agents are protected from it by distance. On neither side can the fighting constitute much more than tip-and-run affairs and for this type of fighting the French are marvellously well equipped and Positioned. France has a force in metropolitan France of some 40,000 parachute troops and marine commandos (of whom 15,000 are paras) on constant stand-by and some 16,000 similarly highly trained and Professional soldiers strung out at strategic Points through Africa. Eight thousand of these men are already engaged in fighting at five different points — in the Lebanon, in Chad, in Zaire, in Djibouti and in Mauritania. In addition France has permanent bases in the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Gabon. Then there are naval bases in the Indian Ocean to complement the military ones. The only doubt that arises in connection with France's capacity to intervene in localised African fighting arises from a Shortage of military transport.

In the recent Zaire operation France had to requisition civil airlines to transport part of the equipment necessary and it was in the last analysis dependent on US logistic supPort. Its own major cargo plane the Transall required two refuelling stops to reach Zaire. However, by 1982 the French army will have at least thirty new-version Transalls capable of making the flight to any point in Africa in one hop. So much for France's capacity to intervene in brief but in most cases probably decisive bursts of fighting on behalf of its African allies. We now come to the scale of its alliances on that continent. This is enormous and has come as something of an eye-opener to French public opinion in the wake of the debate which followed the Zaire operation. France has direct military defence treaties with five African countries — the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, the Central African Republic and Mauritania. These treaties are explicit — France must provide direct military aid involving troops should any of these countries find themselves in trouble.

This is by any standards an odd collection of states for it includes two of the most sophisticated and enlightened in Africa and two of the most corrupt and backward. This contrast is reflected by their heads of state, with Senghor of Senegal and HouphouetBoigny two of the finest products of French civilisation who have held some of the highest offices in the French Republic, and at the other end two ruffianly products ,of the lower ranks of the former French colonial army, Bongo of Gabon and the notorious 'Emperor' of the Central African Republic, Bokassa. In addition, however, to these five above-mentioned countries to which the French have given direct military guarantees there are at least another twenty to which military aid in one form or another is promised in the event of their being attacked or facing serious internal trouble. This is a colossal swathe of countries running across the entire continent from north to south and from east to west over which France has a direct influence.

Just what strides French influence has made in Africa over the past twenty years may be judged from the representation at the recent African summit presided over by President Giscard. When de• Gaulle gave independence to France's former African

colonies in 1960 they numbered only fourteen; the number of French-speaking African states represented at the Paris conference was twenty-one. Today France has doubled the number of Frenchmen living in former French African colonies and almost doubled its trade with them. Some of these African states, like Gabon for example, are virtually run by the French and in others their capitals teem with Frenchco-operants. A bizarre feature of the system is that the Quai d'Orsay plays only a formal part in relations between France and Frenchspeaking Africa; the real power belongs to the Ministry of Co-operation and its agents who, as in de Gaulle's and Pompidou's day, report directly to the President.

This explains why the Quai is often embarrassingly at sea in African matters and why French diplomats view with such dismay a posting to an African country. The system was perfected in de Gaulle's day by the remarkable and controversial Jacques Foccard and though Foccard has long since fallen to political vengeance the system remains much as he shaped it. Foccard, a businessman with considerable business and espionage experience in Africa, knew every African leader of every current intimately, and he established a system of communications with them which worked, like a charm and being direct and personal was very much to the African taste. Furthermore the African leaders knew that in dealing with him they were dealing directly with de Gaulle. Altogether the French stake in Africa is now so considerable that there can be no question of lightly turning away from it. It provides France with something like a world role in a major strategic area and also with ready access to raw materials. Obviously the kind of special relationship the French have tried to build up with the Soviet Union will suffer and is already suf fering as a consequence, but if that is the case then the attitude here is 'So be it'. And if their actions in Africa annoy some former imperial powers then they ask them to consider what would be the consequences of French inaction. In short they suggest the view ought to be, rather the Frey than the Cubans.