THE WAR RESOURCES OF EUROPEAN STATES.* WHETHER war be the
outcome of the present political and military state of Europe or not, the publication in a collected form of the admirable essays which Colonel Maurice contributed to Blackwood is most welcome, and cannot fail to be useful. They had their immediate origin, it may be remembered, in the issue of Sir Charles Dilke's Fortnightly series, the errors and misleading tendencies of which they serve to correct; but, of course, they date back much longer, and are, in fact, the fruit of special professional study for another, though kindred purpose, —a work on National Defence. But Sir Charles Dilke having thought it expedient to incorporate in his last essay, as Lord Wolseley's "own explanation" of a speech he made, certain com- ments privately obtained from Colonel Maurice, and declined to cancel the statement when he was expressly told that it was nothing of the kind, Colonel Maurice, for this and other reasons, resolved to deal with the whole question, and hence we had the able and instructive papers published in Blackwood,. The story may be read in the introduction to this volume, and it seems to us that Sir Charles took an unwarrantable liberty, and refrained from doing the handsome thing when he was informed of his error before the article he had printed was sent to press. We heartily agree with Colonel Maurice that the comments of Sir Charles on the first organisation scheme, which meant business, and proceeded on the only sound lines—those which give us something real—did nothing but mischief. So much it is needful to say on this incident, because Sir Charles Dilke's mode of treating the subject not only raised prejudices, instead of affording support, but turned public attention from the genuine issue. If we are to have a solid Army, for the first time since Cromwell died, we must begin somewhere, and make what we have a complete, practical, and movable entity. That is the cardinal point in the business, and he who cavils at the formation of two corps d'armee so equipped as to be able to go anywhere at short notice, shows that he does not under- stand the essential conditions of an organisation which, as Colonel Maurice aptly says, should be "warlike "—that is,
• The Balance of Military Power in Europe: an Examination of the War Resources of Great Britain and tho Continental States. By Colonel Maurice, Royal Artillery, Professor of Military Art and History at the Royal Staff College. Loudon William Blackwood and Sous.
capable of waging instant war—as well as military. When you have the minimum of two corps, you can make your establish- ment four or eight, if you want, and are willing to pay for it. A mere collection of squadrons, batteries, and battalions is not an Army, though it is a costly and inefficient substitute for one. An Army, like, say, a Railway, is a work of art, and you might as well say that a lot of coaches, locomotives, and trucks, and a fine stock of rails constitute a Railway, as to say that bodies of soldiers, guns, and waggons, in an inorganic state, constitute an Army. Surely it is time to have done with vapid talk, and to build up our Army, as we build up our banks, factories, and great trading concerns, on strict matter-of-fact business principles, which alone will attain the end in view.
The power we can exert in our own defence, not only in these islands, but throughout the Empire, will depend upon the solution of this military question. For although it is now admitted that adequate and permanent provision for the security of our coaling-stations is absolutely necessary in order to leave our first line, the Navy, free to act on the seas, still, unless we have also a highly mobile force always ready to go anywhere, we shall be deprived of a great and special advantage. That important truth is cogently demonstrated by Colonel Maurice, and may be said to form the very kernel of his excel- lent book. How and where the power of the two kinds of force should be applied at any time, must depend upon the circum- stances of the moment ; but, as in the changing course of human affairs, we shall certainly, sooner or later, need both in order to safeguard the Empire, it is of the last importance that we should have both, and keep them in the best attainable condition for immediate use. The idea that we can stand apart from neigh- bouring nations is a delusion. "I have no confidence in the system of isolement," wrote the Duke of Wellington in 1841. "It does not answer in social life for individuals, nor in politics for nations. Man is a social animal. I have still less con- fidence in la paix armee ;" because, perhaps, as he said on another occasion, "if the whole world is armed, it will be scarcely possible to avoid coming to blows." But as the whole world is armed, and as isolation in itself is danger, it will be well, at least, that we should seriously consider the advice tendered by Colonel Maurice, who sees that our maritime position con- fers great power, and that we shall be wise if we act with those having the means of helping us if we help them. But to do that effectually we should possess, in addition to our Navy, a mili- tary force which, if it be small, will be effective, provided it is com- plete in itself, and is an integral organism endowed with motion wherever it is set down. What, compared with the Continental myriads, which we cannot rival, is a numerically feeble force, may in certain contingencies, and in combination with our squadrons, become great, perhaps deadly. Every shore is open to our ships, and there are places where our handful could strike a blow which would paralyse huge armies and frustrate vast designs. It is possible that we may try the policy of isolation on the assump- tion that we can flourish while the world quarrels ; but should that be the pleasure of "our masters," we agree with Colonel Maurice that they and all of us "will run at least the infinite risk of having by ourselves, and with our own strength alone, to resist Russia, and very probably Russia and France, under cir- cumstances most disadvantageous to ourselves." On the other hand, by joining those Powers with whom we share the "com- munity of danger," we may, by that very act, marshal a potential array ashore and afloat which will oblige the disturbers to keep the peace.
What is most desirable is that all persons, great and small, who are interested in the welfare and maintenance of the Empire at large, as well as the safety of the United Kingdom, should study and comprehend, as far as they can, the new conditions under which we are compelled to live. We do not feel disposed to call it, as Colonel Maurice and Sir Charles Dilke call it, the "reign of force," because force—sometimes more, and, we admit, sometimes less—has always reigned, being the ultimate sanction of all arrangements at all times. Even the best treaty has rarely been more than a modus vivendi. But undoubtedly, since 1851, and still more since 1859, the conditions of international existence have materially changed. The alteration, however, has not been solely in the gigantic development of armies. Side by side with obligatory military service, science has blessed us with her discoveries to an extent which we hardly realise ; and it is the triumphs of science which have rendered possible not only the existence, but the swift and overwhelming
operations of skilfully constructed armies ashore and afloat. Rapid means of communication have done more than the arming of the nations, to make warfare what it is, and to change the relations of every State to every other State in that respect. With our multiplied complex and multifarious interests on the face of the globe, we cannot hope to escape the consequences involved in the change, unless we study and comprehend the facts, and adapt our policy and practice to the new conditions. The volume published by Colonel Maurice should be a great help towards that end. If it is one long argument upon great practical themes, it is also full of information. The scope is large, but the • aims are singularly definite, a quality which immensely increases its value, not only as an instructor, but as supplying the means of forming a judgment. The style is luoid and flowing, and the book has this great additional advantage, that the author, an accomplished soldier, has written it with a- single eye to the common weal.
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