THE SULTAN'S ACTION.
TE Bulgarian Question has become painfully tiresome ; but it is, unhappily, necessary to keep it for the present continually under view. It has become the pivot not only of what is called "the Eastern Question "—that is, of all manceuvres for the redistribution of the Turkish dominions— but of all international relations on the Continent. The great war expected to break out in the spring or early summer, if it breaks out at all, will be in form a war between Russia and Austria for ascendency in the Balkans, in which other States will join ; and the causa causans of that war will be Russian pressure upon Bulgaria. That pressure has this week been sharply increased, and it is necessary, therefore, to point out how.
As our readers will remember, Prince Bismarck, in his great speech of February 6th, informed Europe that while Germany must, and under certain circumstances would, defend Austria in arms, she cared nothing about Bulgaria, thought that Russia was entitled, under the Treaty of Berlin, to supreme influence there, and held that Prince Ferdinand's position was altogether illegal. Moreover, if Russia, in order to re-establish her position, asked the Sultan as Suzerain to take the initiative, and demand a return to legality at Sofia, the German Govern- ment would, with all its diplomatic strength, support that request. The Russian Government, which, whatever its real purposes, desires time, accepted this hint, and pro- posed to the Sultan as a preliminary step to inform Prince Ferdinand that his presence in Sofia as Prince was contrary to the Treaty of Berlin. This proposal was strongly backed by the German Ambassador, and caused at first much perplexity at the Porte. The Government of the Sultan, it must be remembered, has no quarrel with Bulgaria, and never has had ever since the Treaty of Berlin was framed. On the contrary, it regards that State, so long as it is not in Russian hands, as a bulwark for Constantinople, which can never be approached by land without the consent or the subjugation of the Prince, be he petty or be he great, who holds the passes of the Balkans in his hands. Moreover, Prince Ferdinand has shown himself specially willing to cultivate good rola- tions with Constantinople, and has even forwarded the tribute which his predecessors, Aleko Pasha and Prince Alexander, had, upon one pretext or another, declined to remit. It was supposed, therefore, on all sides that the Porte, while fully acknowledging the illegality of Prince Ferdinand's position, which is, indeed, from the point of view of diplomatists, incon- testable, would either decline to formulate its view on paper, or, more probably, would demand explanations which it would take months to prepare, criticise, and perhaps impede by some important demur. This course was the more probable, more- over, because it was understood to be acceptable to Austria, England, and Italy, all of which desire, for widely different reasons, that the Bulgarians should settle their own destiny.
There seems to be no doubt that this was the decision of the Porte up to March 5th ; but the decision of the Porte is not in serious affairs final. Behind the group of great officers now known by that name, sits Abdul Hamid, the Sultan, himself one of the most remarkable figures even in a line which has hardly produced an ordinary or an invisible man. Raised to power by a Palace revolution personally timid, and hampered by an ignorance such as cultivated Europeans can scarcely conceive, the present Sultan knows more of what hap- pens than almost any predecessor, has defeated and crushed the strongest men in his dominions, has gathered into his own hands all sources of power, appoints and dismisses Ministers without assigning a reason, and is more feared and better obeyed than many among the most terrible of his predecessors. The Russian and German Agents, supported by the French, appealed to his Majesty direct, and their arguments were so successful that the Sultan, contrary both to his wont and his policy, acted rapidly. Whether they urged on him some new menace, or made him some new promise, or traded on his extraordinary fancy that Sir W. White will some day nod assent to a plan for his deposition—as Sir H. Elliot confesses that he did in a previous case—we shall probably never know ; but, at all events, the following message was on the 5th inst. telegraphed by the Grand Vizier to M. Stambouloff, the Premier of Bulgaria :—" On the arrival of Prince Ferdinand of Coburg in Bulgaria, I declared to his Highness in a telegram of August 22nd, 1887, that as his election by the National Bulgarian Assembly had not received the assent of all the signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty,
and as that election had not been sanctioned by the Eittblime Porte, his presence in Bulgaria was contrary to the Berlin
Treaty, and was illegal. To-day I have to declare to the Bulgarian Government that, in the view of the Imperial Government, his position remains the same,—that is to say, the presence of Prince Ferdinand at the head of the Principality is illegal, and contrary to the Treaty of Berlin." The sudden decision, the use of the telegraph, which for such a communication is altogether irregular, and even the form of words adopted, all indicate the pressure which must have been placed upon the Sultan ; and it is by the extent of that pressure that we must judge of the gravity of an incident which, but for its antecedent circumstances, would have no importance. It is nearly impossible for the Bulgarians to dismiss their Prince under such a command, and quite impossible for the Sultan to send an army to Philippopolis to enforce his view. If he did, Macedonia would be in insurrection ; Bulgaria, knowing what a Turkish occupation is, would resist to the death ; and the end would be another diminution of the territories of the Sultan. Nevertheless, two great Governments do not exert themselves in that style without any object in view, and we may rely on it that they think they have given Prince Ferdinand, and therefore the independence of Bulgaria, a very serious blow. In all probability they have given him one. His object, of course, and that of his advisers, has been to gain time, to consolidate his rule, and to show Europe that he can govern Bulgaria without in any way disturbing the peace or impairing the security of his neighbours. He is now forced either to declare himself independent, and Sovereign by election only, in which case Russia would advance "to carry out the Treaty of Berlin," or he must continue to reign by a title which all Europe pronounces to be legally im- perfect. He will probably take the latter course ; but it is impossible to deny that his position will be decidedly impaired. Neither Russia nor Germany can hold diplomatic intercourse with him, and probably even Austria will find it difficult. No one will advance him a loan. The Opposition
within the Sobranje can plead at every turn that his is only an ad interim Government, and his position, if he tries foreigners for treason, will be hardly definable in international
law. Above all, his internal enemies, who stick at nothing, and who have dangerous allies both in Macedonia and Montenegro, will lose no occasion of declaring that he is a
usurper, and as such a justifiable object of attack. It will require great fortitude and some largeness of mind to face such accumulated difficulties, and though M. Stambouloff may be credited with the poseession of both to a great extent, the Prince himself is still more or less of an unknown quantity. The sudden swerve of all correspondents into the path of detraction is in itself proof of the severity of the blow, and we cannot but think that in this last move Russia has scored something, though not much, and has given one more proof of her unchanged and unchangeable intention. Per fas aut nefas, and by peace or war, she means to master Bulgaria.
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