PAN-GERMANISM.* THIS book, by an American professor of history, is

an experi- ment in the art of seeing a question from somebody else's point

of view. Mr. Usher has tried to get inside the mind of Germany, and appreciate Pan-Germanism as it is understood by Germans. He sees it as a policy of selfish acquisitiveness, a wholly unethical thing, quite unrelated to what Bismarck contemptuously called " the English phrases about humanity," yet real and very definite. And he justifies it on the ground that any other great nation, finding itself in the position of Germany, would act as Germany does. Having justified it as a policy, he comes to the question whether it can succeed; and after a very careful analysis of the pro's and con's concludes that it cannot so long as the present balance of power is preserved. The lesson for those who would keep peace is obvious. The Triple Entente must be maintained, and the

British Navy be strong beyond challenge. No one who reads Mr. Usher's book with a dispassionate mind can refuse to admit—unless, of course, Mr. Usher's statement of facts is at fault, which in all material respects we believe it is not—that the duty of every Englishman who loves peace is

to preserve our friendship with Russia. Our entente with France is never seriously criticised, but that with Russia is a common target of Liberal criticism. Russia on the side of Britain could turn the scale against Germany ; Russia on the side of Germany could turn the scale exactly the other way. It is a strange thing to reflect on that Liberals advocated friendship with Russia till that object was achieved; they then began to denounce Russia and to sing the praises of the country which they had hitherto pronounced to be the most illiberal in Europe. Strange that Liberals, who are always talking of peace, should recommend us to take the surest path to war ! Our only hope of ultimate peace is derived from Germany's habit of never striking till she is confident of success. So long as Britain, France, and Russia maintain a defensive combination her hopes of success will be reduced to a minimum. Although Mr. Usher has undertaken to pre- sent Pan-Germanism from the German point of view, we cannot discover any evidence, internal or external, of a close personal acquaintance with Germany and Germans. His work appears to be rather that of a man who has made a close study of the literature of his subject.

Mr. Usher must be allowed to describe Pan-Germanism in his own words :—

" To secure a share of the world's trade in some fashion which will not expose her to the attacks of the English fleet, and which will create an empire less vulnerable in every way than she believes the British Empire to be, an overland route to the East must be found. The Germans consider perfectly feasible the construction of a great confederation of states, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey, which would control a great band of territory stretching south-east from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. A railway from Constantinople to Baghdad would effectually tie the great trunk lines, leading from the Rhine and Danube valleys, to Constantinople and the Persian Gulf, and so establish a shorter route to India than that via Suez. Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Persia, India herself, the mother of nations, would fall into German hands and be held safe from conquest by • Pal}-Gerinanitm. By Boland G, usher, PluLt, London: Constable and

s' [tn. Sd. net.]

this magnificent overland route to the East. Pan-Germanismis, therefore, in the first place, a defensive movement for self.: preservation, for escaping the pressure of France and Russia, both bent on her destruction. It is, in the second place, an offensive movement directed against England, its object, the conquest of the English possessions in the Mediterranean and in Asia. She expects thus to obtain an outlet for her surplus population and manufactures and to create an empire as little vulnerable politically, economically, or strategically as any the world has yet seen."

Perhaps a good many Germans still have hopes of enlisting the Balkan States on their side, but it must be confessed that nothing could well be more depressing to them than the situation in South-Eastern Europe. The policy of Austria goads the Balkan Alliance to fury, and yet so long as the Dual Kingdom bolds together it would not pay Germany to

lay siege to the affections of the Balkan Alliance (as a short time ago she laid siege to those of Turkey) at the cost of losing the confidence of Austria.

According to the Pan-Germans the reputed strength of the British Empire is a sham. Britain was never so strong as she seemed ; she ruled the world because her enemies were dis- united, and she was able, with a skilful diplomacy that has. never failed her, to play off one nation against another.

The Pan-Germans, who after the manner of their race fai' to appreciate any organization which is not perfectly methodical, regard the British Empire as a thing with- out geographical or economic unity. They can hardly think of it otherwise than as an unwieldy and vulnerable mass. According to Mr. Usher Germany has more real fear of France and Russia, though she looks upon France as e strong man who has run his course and is now reaching senility and on Russia as an uncouth stripling not yet conscious of his strength, not skilful enough to use even the strength of which be is conscious, and not intelligent enough to avoid being easily deceived. Germany does not think the French Republic a form of government capable of attracting the best governing minds or of taking decisive action promptly. "The German," says the author, "believes the forces hostile to the Republic were never stronger than at the present moment." If the German really does believe that he is deluding himself. We feel pretty confident in saying that the third French Republic was never more firmly established than now, and that there is not a single monarchical pretender who has enough force of character or a popular enough personality to prosecute his cause. Anti-militarism in France is much less formidable than it was. The call for a longer term of service in the army has been received with almost universal approval—not, of course, with enthusiasm, but with a quiet determination to make what sacrifice is thought necessary. Again, lawlessness and revolutionary outbursts in France are but wens on the face of stable government. He who reads these last things as signs of a

final break-up knows little of the moderation and tenacity of the French social life which lies below and beyond. But if

the Germans hold France to be insufficiently disciplined owing to her democratic government, they regard Russia, according to the author, as "too autocratic to be dangerous in proportion to her strength." Her actions " depend too entirely upon the personal opinion of her rulers, and too commonly lack support in the opinion of the nation to make her a very valuable ally or a very dangerous enemy." We wonder. Surely that is just as true of Germany as of Russia. However, Mr. Usher is of course not stating his own opinions, but what he believes are the opinions of Pan-Germanists.

Mr. Usher takes the chief strength of Britain and France to be an enormous radius of financial influence. In the Morocco crisis of 1911 Germany was checked in her attempt to coerce France by French and British bankers.

" It seems that the Emperor would have been willing at any rate to mobilize the German army and sought the German bankers with a request for a loan to the Government. The bankers informed him that they had no money with which to meet their own pressing obligations and that the nation as a matter of fact stood on the verge of bankruptcy. Not only could it not go to war, it was doubtful even whether it could continue to do business for another week. No one seems to have realized in Germany the sum total of the private loans made in London and Paris. When war seemed probable, a concerted movement by the London and Paris bankers for the recalling of all loans practically stripped Germany of ready money, and the sale of securities on the Berliti Bourse to meet these demands almost precipitated a panic of the utmost seriousness. It transpired that Germany was conducting nearly ninety per cent. of current business upon borrcw3d money

subject to recall at a moment's notice. By the use of their economic weapons, England and France rendered Germany help- less and made war impossible. It is clear that in the present era there are weapons stronger than armies."

After that passage the reader will be surprised to learn that Mr. Usher considers that German financial conditions would

IA more favourable than those of Britain if a war were actually in progress.

"The Germans claim that those financial factors, which seem to be weaknesses in time of peace, would be in case of war a tower of strength. Germany is almost, if not quite, self-supporting, and, with the trade between her and other European nations overland in time of war, she could become entirely self-sufficing. Nor is she dependent upon her imports for the raw materials to keep her factories busy or to maintain her army and navy. What- ever the balance may be upon the hooks of the world, she is actually rich, actually richer than England or France. So long as her army is unbeaten, no one can take away from her her factories, mines, and fields. Whoever may own them on paper, she owns them in reality and will continue to own them as long as she is strong enough to keep them. Supposing now that she should repudiate the whole debt which she owes other nations, should seize the capital out of which her economic development was created, what then ? Would she not actually possess her economic development for nothing? Could she ever be compelled to pay for it by anything short of actual conquest, and is there in the world any nation strong enough to subdue her upon her .own soil ? Would not such an economic blow destroy her enemies with greater certainty than any conquest by sea or land ? Indeed, .has she not everything to gain from war and nothing to lose ? So long as peace prevails and she continues to recognize the validity of present notions of commercial morality, she must continue to pay huge sums, must continue yearly to part with actual wealth in goods until the debt is paid. The moment war breaks out, she .need pay nothing. If she is defeated, she will merely be com- pelled to pay what she was already obligated to pay. If victorious, she need never pay interest or principal."

We cannot help thinking that this prediction of repudiation by Germany is unjust to the Germans. Germany, of course, as a reserve of ready money, said to be a hundred and forty millions of marks, kept " in a stocking "—otherwise locked up in the fortress of Spandau. We cannot follow Mr. Usher in his belief that Germany would, as we under- stand him, make money by making war successfully. She might gain in several conceivable ways by war (and we are

-not among those who regard the desire for immediate material gain as the chief, much less the only, cause of war), but make

money she would not. We agree with Mr. Norman Angell up to that point, even though we reject his absurd conclusion that if all statesmen accepted his premises wars would cease. In the author's opinion, if Pan-Germanism is to succeed it is essential that the Balkan States should be on the side of the Triple Alliance. With what chagrin, then, as we said at the beginning, must Pan-Germanists look upon the Taaneeuvres of Austria-Hungary, who never seems to open firer mouth or make the slightest movement without exciting the indignation of the Balkan States and her own Slav population. We cannot summarize Mr. Usher's examination of the weaknesses of Pan-Germanism at home, such as the spread of Socialism in Germany and the jealousies within

the Triple Alliance. The conclusion of this very sympathetic -survey of Pan-Germanism by an impartial onlooker is that Tan-Germanism could succeed only if the Triple Entente 'broke down. We agree. The Triple Entente is a league of peace. The more we reflect on the facts the more surprising at seems that any friends of peace in Britain should be willing to break up that. Entente.