SIR EDWARD GREY AND EUROPE.
ACOMPLETE change has come over the European scene since last week. Vienna, which was breathing war, is now breathing peace and blessings. There is talk of demobilizing the Austrian reservists who have so long stood under arms. The bourses, those sensitive barometers of international nervousness, indicate anticyclonic con- ditions once more, and every nation in Europe feels that the danger of war has drifted away from the face of the land. Nothing can bring back that immediate danger but the gaffe of some rash soldier or vain statesman. Such a thing cannot be provided against, of course, but it is certainly not expected to happen. It is notoriously unsafe to prophesy about affairs in the Balkans ; but the prospect really seems as fair as we have painted it by contrast with the black misgivings which have haunted Europe for years. In popular belief when Armageddon came it was to be heralded either by the collapse of the Turkish Empire or by that of Austria-Hungary. One of those events has happened, yet the Powers have refrained from joining in a territorial scramble ; and the Concert of Europe, which was apparently dead after the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, has come to life again, and for practical purposes is less impotent than it has been any time these thirty years. At all events, it is something that the symbol of European amity is raised again and exacts at least a formal reverence. Such results as these could hardly have come about without a guiding hand or a miraculous run of good luck. For ourselves we are certain that the guiding hand was there and was the sole cause of the happy issue ; and we believe that all Europe is of the same opinion. The hand was Sir Edward Grey's. We cannot praise too highly the patience, the tenacity, the coolness, and the wisdom with which Sir Edward Grey has managed the negotiations. The peace will be his peace. Probably no other Foreign Minister could have done what he has done. It need not be forgotten that there were natural conditions in his favour, such as the freedom of London from prejudice, intrigue, and passion, and the fatal disadvantages of premature publicity. But when this is remembered the sum of Sir Edward Grey's achievement remains enormous. His patience and quiet resolution would have won the admiration of the late Lord Salisbury, who was himself a master of similar methods, and one of the best friends of peace that modern times have known.
To look back upon all the contending ambitions which have developed expectantly in the Balkans for many years is to get some measure of the strength of the storm which Sir Edward Grey has deflected from its course. The yield- ing of Montenegro is only the culminating signal of his success. The Montenegrins had long set their hearts on the possession of Scutari and on the acquisition of a slice of Albania. That ambition, though in its way impudent, was nevertheless extremely dangerous because it was in direct conflict with the determination of Austria-Hungary and Italy. As long ago as 1897 Austria-Hungary and Italy drew up a convention as to their attitude towards Albania. They agreed on a common policy of " hands off," and decided that the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty was the best means of keeping Albania, intact. But they foresaw that the Turkish Empire might collapse, and their understanding provided that in that event they should both recognize the independence of Albania. In other words, Montenegro, so long as she held on to Scutari, was satisfying an ancient aspiration in defiance of the long-established policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy. When States have brooded for years over what they will do in given conditions it is no easy matter to call them off. The very fact that Austro-Italian policy was fixed gave reason and colour to the alarming reports of last week that Austria-Hungary and Italy contemplated a joint expedition in Albania—Austria-Hungary to operate in the North and Italy in the South. Of course, such an expedition would have upset the whole work of the Concert and been an assault on its very existence ; nevertheless Austria-Hungary and Italy might have rigged up some very plausible argument about the only possible means of giving effect to their joint policy of nearly twenty years' standing. On the other hand, there was King Nicholas of Montenegro apparently quite unable to resist the will of his ferocious subjects, and really commanding a certain amount of sympathy in his very awkward position. Fortunately King Nicholas had the courage to yield— possibly aided by the fact that the capture of Scutari was, after all, more of an accommodation than a military feat—and thus saved at one stroke not only the peace of Europe but his own kingdom. He clearly gains more than he loses by the evacuation of Scutari. The Powers would have turned him out in any case, and even if the Concert had not moved in unison, but had only consented to action by Austria-Hungary and Italy, these two Powers would have been extremely uncomfortable neighbours for King Nicholas so long as they remained in Albania. We sincerely trust that all question of military action either by the Concert as a whole, or by Austria-Hungary and Italy as the mandatories of the Concert, or by Austria- Hungary and Italy on their own account, has been disposed of. If an expedition entered Albania it would be difficult indeed to get rid of it. If the result were not a per- manent occupation, the erection of the new government in Albania would at least be delayed for some time. The episode of Montenegro and Scutari was only the last of many similarly precarious situations which have been settled by goodwill and an even temper. Among the others we cannot help mentioning the restraint of Austria- Hungary in the matter of the Sanjak. Although we have had much to say in criticism of Austria-Hungary's treat- ment of the Slays, we acknowledge the debt Europe owes to her for having said no more about her designs on the Sanjak. It is a territory she had long brooded over, and though no doubt the military difficulty of holding it had become increasingly formidable, she would have enormously complicated the tangle in South-East Europe if she had maintained her pretensions.
As matters stand the frontier of the new independent State of Albania has been delimited except in the South, and the Thracian line has been drawn between Bulgaria and the piece of territory adjoining Constantinople which remains to Turkey in Europe. But what is to be done about the rest of the new frontiers—those between Bulgaria and Servia and Bulgaria and Greece ? As nothing is said on this subject we are left to conclude that the Ambassadors' Conference in London proposes that the Balkan Allies shall be left to settle the matter for themselves. Now we cannot help thinking that this is a dangerous plan, unworthy of a body that has accomplished so much and might now be expected to have the confidence of its prowess. The relations of Bulgaria with Greece and Servia are not too pleasant, to say the least of it. The relief of the external menace from Turkey has given time and opportunity for the return of the ancient dislikes among the Allies. A struggle among the Allies might eventually cause the troubles of South-Eastern Europe to break out all over again. If the Ambassadors drew frontiers for all the Balkan States they would make a square job of their work. It may be said that it is quite unimaginable that the Concert would agree to any plan for forcing the Balkan Allies to accept such frontiers. That may very well be so, but still an all-round settlement offered by the Concert would unquestionably have great prestige. It would make a struggle distinctly less likely. It would provide each Balkan Government with an excuse for agreeing to a proposal that is likely (whatever it may be) to be unpopular with ambitious and exultant people. Russia would be a party of course to any proposal that came from the Concert, and the voice of passion in Servia and Montenegro would thus be to some extent quieted. If Sir Edward Grey could yet guide the Conference to this crowning work he would render the finest service to our perplexed times which is possible for a Foreign Minister.
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