PRELUDE TO THE OFFENSIVE
By STRATEGICUS
IT seems almost an insult to describe the campaign which has cleared North Brabant up to the Maas and the Hollandische Diep as a prelude. The battles which effected this change were
among the bitterest in the whole episode that began with the landing in Normandy. Yet it cannot be ignored that the general effect of the operations in the northern part of the western front is to pre- pare the way for the great attack upon Germany. The campaign, in so far as it had a beginning and did not emerge from the terrible fighting entailed in the clearance of Zeeland and Flanders, only dates from about three weeks ago. The country south of the Scheldt estuary is a gift to the defence, and the Germans had taken full advantage of its potentialities. The flooded ground was dotted with immensely strong works—forts, pill-boxes and dyke defences— cunningly camouflaged ; and each of these points was designed to be self-sufficient. They were even, quite frequently, comfortable, warm and dry and air-conditioned.
They gave the Canadians more trouble than can well be imagined. The troops had to approach them through the water-logged fields.
They were for days at a time moving through water and mud ; sometimes they were waist-deep in the water. The strain of such fighting needs no emphasis ; and the r5th Army had at the outset perhaps as many as 6o,000 troops of excellent quality. The dilu- tion by almost as many who were never intended to face such attack weakened the defence very little on the whok, because they were hounded on by the hard fanatical core of Nazis who formed the S.S. and parachute formations. If we are irritated by the delay this defensive caused us, all the more should we appreciate the success that has at last crowned the attack. But it was not until the reduction of Zeeland and Flanders was clearly winding to its last phase that the concerted move towards the Maas began.
Not yet can the full story be told of the clearance of Walcheren. Though it is nearly complete, as I write. there may be some days before the threat from the north of the Scheldt can be entirely dis- regarded. The reason for the dragging-out is one which we have encountered before. The successful breaching of the dykes, whik it must have made the defence less coherent, clearly placed obstacles in the way of a swift success. This factor has never yet been fully appreciated. In France it becomes more evident every day how efficient was the -air offensive ; but its very success may have been responsible for 5o per cent. of the difficulty of creating an efficient supply-system. The terrible effect upon communications can now be seen, and the longer it is studied the more one is inclined to withdraw the reservations about the value of the air factor. But we cannot have it both ways ; and, while we recognise that this rupture of the communications behind the enemy lines is of the first importance, we have to remember that these communications will one day be in the rear of the Allied armies. The Allied engi- neers have achieved wonders ; but even now the ruin of French transport hampers us, as it impedes also the French restoration.
When the Second British Army began to take a hand in the campaign for the clearance of North Brabant events moved swiftly, and in some ten days or so the troops of the two armies were along the Maas and Hollandische Diep westward from the north of Herto- genbosch. The remains of the r5th Army now appear to have ithdrawn north of that river-barrier, and even the Moerdyk bridges have been destroyed. What small pockets of resistance have been left behind have been abandoned to their fate. Model obviously wishes to put a sound water-barrier between him and Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Montgomery no doubt has his plans for the continuance of the campaign ; and he has many choices, though crossing the Moerdyk bridges cannot be one of them. But it is probable that Model has also his preoccupations with the area of the South and North Holland provinces ; and they should keep him from any further adventures on Montgomery's flank, assuming the Allied design to be a movement to the east.
The results of this campaign in North Brabant are considerable. The first, and perhaps in the last analysis the most important of all, is the use of Antwerp as a port of entry. When that is in effective use the whole of the northern group of armies will find the supply-problem immensely eased. Without that it is difficult ta imagine how any campaign against Germany could make us: of the Allies' special advantages. The urgent needs of daily supply rank very low in this respect. It is the multiplicity of weapons and the astonishing way their use eats up ammunition and petrol that forms the worst difficulty. Until these calls are met the superior power of the Allies cannot be brought to bear ; and the advantage of an elaboration of defensive works and the higher skill and training of some of the German troops must tell. The grand assault has, of course, not yet been tried. The Allied command had no intention of making the attempt until they had accumulated a sufficiency of supplies and had made provision for an abundant flow of them. Antwerp means that, if not immediately at least before long.
Another result is the establishment of a defensive river-line covering Montgomery's left. The barrier that holds the Allied troops south of the Maas also holds the Germans to the north. This argument is the more cogent in view of Model's desire to hold North and South Holland and of his now disposing of a very considerably smaller force to do so. This hard and tiresome cam- paign has, indeed, made great inroads in his strength. It has been conservatively estimated that he has lost some 4o,000 troops out of an original roo,000. The estimate is certainly on the conservative side, because there have been over 26,0oo prisoners. On general grounds it would have seemed reasonable to have assumed at least the same number of killed and wounded. But even with a loss of only 40,000, the bulk, of them taken from the better trained units, Model should have no urgent incentive to further adventures.
If we assume that the estimated number are out of the battle for the future it follows that the Allied left flank may be taken as secure even as it stands and, therefore, the zrst Army Group will be able to use its considerable strength towards the east. Such a move may be expected within a reasonable period. Indeed, the German commentators are already talking of " zero hour.' This may mean little or much ; but it is difficult to ignore the crescendo in the air-offensive. Before the invasion of Normandy it was possible to read the signs of approaching attack. As I pointed out at the time, the area and the incidence of the air-offensive even suggested the place and time of the invasion. It was, of course, im- possible to guess exactly where the Allies would land ; but a broad indication was given. The time of the invasion was more clearly indicated ; and the same sequence of events appears to be developing now.
The general destruction of forward bases has already gone far. The destruction of synthetic oil plant has also been proceeding with greater weight recently. But now the interference with the com- munications—" interdiction "—has been growing for about a week ; and that appears to suggest that the time for the grand assault is not far off. For it is the fact that communications can be got into some sort of working order for immediate purposes with gangs of labour within a short time. Some of Ilk destruction of communi- cations is not so easily repaired ; but of this we cannot have sufficient evidence to judge at present. If we had known, for instance, of the destruction of the Seine bridges, would it not have been possible to have predicted that Normandy was the destined area for the landings? •
We need hardly emphasise the fact that the Allies are adepts at concealing their plans. The mere scale of the distribution of
targets offers an easy method of deceiving the enemy. Within this enormous air-bombardment is concealed the great design. After- wards we shall be able to recognise it, though at the moment it is not obvious. But the various ingredients of the overture can be discerned. The stage is set. There is certain to be a speedy sequel to this prelude_
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