Westminster Commentary
Soldiers of The Queen
By JULIAN CRITCHLEY, MP
Legislation will be proposed giving power to re- tain for an additional six months certain National Service men who are serving full-time, and to recall for a similar period National Service men who have a liability to part-tinge service.
—Tin: QUEEN'S SPEECH.
Is half a loaf better than none? I doubt it. It is, of course, some comfort to those who have opposed the defence policy of the Government to find that at last, after many denials, each a little less robust than the last, there is, after all, a shortage of men in the Army. What is of no com- fort is that' all that this modified form of selective service is designed to do is to bring the Army up by the beginning of 1963 from the basement to the 'floor' of 165,000—the number believed to be necessary to fulfil a conventional contribution to the Government's existing nuclear strategy.
If we are to incur the unpopularity of con- tinued conscription why not, in Heaven's name, do the job properly? Except for a handful of critics that are to be found in both wings of the party, the Conservatives in the House seem to have been unaware of what has happened. There has been criticism, it is true, but only from those who have previously criticised—from the rest only some scattered comment. The party is in a curiously relaxed mood. One wonders what it is that would have to happen for it to become really upset. At present I doubt very much if there is anything. If, for instance, the Government were to have slipped into the Queen's speech a para- graph abolishing the Monarchy, one would not have been surprised if only the philatelists amongst the 1922 Committee would eventually have noticed. It is not so much that the Govern- ment is in control of its backbenchers, it is more that there is a feeling of mental and physical exhaustion brought on by the strain of having at last to come to a decision over the Common Market, the unnatural excitement of this year's Tory Party conference, and the enervating effects of a twelve-week recess.
On the wider aspect of defence policy there have been one or two encouraging signs. Upstairs, at the party's defence committee, Mr. Watkinson is reported to have said that the new five-year plan, that will be incorporated in next year's White Paper, is going to be 'evolutionary, not revolutionary.' No one would expect a revolu- tionary defence policy from such a source but the use of the word 'evolutionary' holds promise.
Three factors are compelling a reassessment of our defence policy. Nuclear parity has signalled the end of 'massive retaliation,' and would imply the possibility of limited conventional war as the premium that the great powers will have to pay in order to avoid a nuclear conflict. This has had its consequences for Europe. Under pressure from the new administration NATO doctrine has charged; it is now based on the `short pause' to be brought about without the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. This, in effect, means the re- emergence of the soldier. Berlin has become the focal point of the cold war, and if Britain is to obtain the best terms of entry from her Com- mon Market allies, we must not be accused of failing to match our effort with theirs. And Kuwait has spotlighted the extent, nature and weaknesses of our oceanic strategy.
The real reason why so much of our defence effort since the war has been unsatisfactory is that we have tried to do too much. In 1945 we in- herited a maritime strategy which kept numbers of troops scattered around the globe, their pre- sence acting as a means of internal security, and as a deterrent to attack. We readopted this com- mitment despite the loss of the Indian Army. Then we became, for the first time, a European land power by our pledge (almost immediately broken) to keep four divisions in Europe, as our contribution to the NATO shield. This, of course, was not all. Lord Attlee decided that we should become a nuclear power, and that in order to do so we should build and explode our own atomic bomb. To this the Conservative Government has added a V-bomber force, and the H-bomb—all this during a time when successive Prime Ministers have talked of our decline in power, when we have had to endure biennial economic crises, and have slowly extricated ourselves from the responsibilities of empire.
It is true that from time to time we have said that we favour interdependence, but to this con- cept we have only been paying lip-service, for `independent contributions' are not the same thing as interdependence. It is against this back- ground, that of attempting to do too much rather than too little, that Mr. Watkinson's boast of having in recent years reduced the percentage of the GNP spent on defence from 11 per cent. to 7 per cent. must be judged. One cannot at the same time stress the need for interdependence, boast of a reduction of spending and continue to maintain all that we have committed ourselves to do. The result has been that much we have done and are doing is unsatisfactory. We find ourselves with a striking force of V-bombers at a time when those who can are changing to the mobile mis- sile. For economic rather than military reasons the Government is now compelled to prolong the life of the V-bombers by buying Skybolt. V- bombers may be credible today, but even with Skybolt will they still be in 1968?
The need to reinforce our army in Europe has now been admitted, and it is common know- ledge that there is much that is unsatisfactory about BAOR's equipment. The state of our forces in Europe has not measured up to the demands of the 1957 White Paper. Overseas, the apparent success of the Kuwait operation (no air cover, no opposition) has not disguised how thinly spread are our forces. Our commitments have tended to increase rather than decrease, and we would find it impossible to react to two emergencies at one and the same time.
The only way out of this is to spend more or to cut our commitments. What then will the Government do? We are unlikely to spend much more than £1,600 million on defence, but it is clear that if we could abandon or reduce one or more of our three basic commitments while keeping expenditure constant, we would be able to do the remainder properly. It would seem that there is now to be competition between the two parties to see who can withdraw the legions the faster—a competition which the Labour Party is likely to win for they have an extra incentive. A large and immediate reduction in our, overseas bases would save them the embarrassment of advocating the continuance of conscription. Yet at present our bases are a wasting asset rather than a liability. Some garrisons might well be reduced, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Singapore; but the commitments in SEATO and CENTO will remain. If the Americans are to be persuaded to take over some of our Far Eastern responsibi- lities, they may only do so in return for the quid pro quo of a proper contribution to Europe. The truth is that in the short run the possibility of immediate savings overseas is illusionary, though in the long run it may turn out to be substantial.
A realistic White Paper would phase out the V-bombers after Blue Steel, cut some overseas commitments, particularly in the Far East, strive for greater mobility, and with a well-equipped army up to a minimum strength of 182,000, make a proper contribution to what is now the most important theatre of all : Europe.
Previous page
