THE: LATE EXPEDITION AGAINST BORNEO.
ADMIRAL COCHRANE'S despatches, of which we gave a sum- mary last week, have put us in possession of two points of intel- ligence which are to a certain extent satisfactory. First, the piratical Sultan of Brune has suffered some loss, inconvenience, and alarm at our hands ; he has been forced to hide in the moun- tains from our resentment, and the forts he had erected against us have been all destroyed. Secondly, some precautions -have been taken for the future : the Iris and the Hazard will remain on the coast as long as circumstances may render their presence necessary. So far all is well; but the result greatly falls short of what we had a right to expect. Are the demolition, of a few forts and the capture of some eight-and-thirty guns a sufficient chas- tisement for the Sultan's crimes? Does it follow, that because the Admiral was unable to secure his person, all other means of coercing him were precluded ? It is said, forsooth, that the terri- fied Sultan will lay to heart, the lesson we have given him, and that, finding how unsafe a residence we can render his capital, he will dread to provoke our just vengeance. Those, who rea- son so, allow their 'judgments to be led away by European analogies which are here totally out of place. It is much more likely that the Sultan will read the lesson the re- verse way. If we, have taught him that his wigwam me- tropolis is accessible to our dread engines of war, we have also given him reason to believe that he can at any time make himself secure in his trackless inland retreat from our de- sultory and transient hostilities. We shall be constrained by and by to convince him of the fallacy of this notion ; but, meanwhile, it will operate upon him as a strong encouragement to mischief. The fear of remote and uncertain consequences is of all senti- ments that which least exercises a wholesome control over the minds of barbarians ;, but the secret advisers who have for some time directed the Sultan's conduct will not fail to ply him with more prompt'and effectual incentives, and to make further use of him as an instrument for thwarting and annoying the British. Sir Thomas may have had good and sufficient reasons for not deposing Omar, but be should at least have forced him into an unconditional surrender by starving him out. This he might have done by establishing a force in Brune, and cutting off the fugitive's connexion with the town and with-the sea, the main source of his supplies. Instead of this, the Admiral sailed away, leaving behind him a manifesto amounting to a condonation of all ' the Sultan's past offences, and only threatening him in case he be guilty of fresh transgressions. The proclamation was no doubt drawn up in the choicest and most emphatic style of Ma- lay rhetoric ; but its substance in plain English was this—"I'll let yen 'off this time, because I can't catch you: but mind you don't db itagain." When a roguish schoolboy is addressed in this way, he is apt to put his tongue in his cheek ; and a barba- rian, prince may be expected to act just like a schoolboy on a similar occasion. In Borneo, as in the Punjaub, we have chosen to halt half-way ; and the result in both cases will be, to en- tail upon us treble expenditure and trouble, and an incalculable amount of needleis suffering upon our opponents. We assume that our Admiral would have been fully justified in inflicting extreme penalties on Omar. The grievances alleged against the latter -are the murder of his uncles Muda Hamm and Bedruddeen with their families ; and his attempt to entrap, by false representations, the captain of a British man-of-war. The former fact is by some supposed to afford us no just pretext for war, inasmuch as- we have no right to call an independent Sovereign to account for his treatment of his own subjects ; and the' evidence for the second charge amounts only to strono. presinfiption. But the Sultan's conduct entitles us to consider the charge established : for, instead of parleying and offering to clear himself, he opened a fire on our ships. Here at least was an indisputable cases belli. But, besides thist we do not hesitate to allege, that the minder of the unhappy princes, who fell vic- tims to their attachment to the English and their faithful adhe- rence to their engagfinfents•with us, was a deed directly affecting ourselves ; a deed of which we were bound to take cognizance, and for which we had a right to inflict exemplary vengeance. Let it be remembered that the Sultan of Borneo was a pirate, and an abettor of pirates and therefore a criminal beyond the pale of international law. inen we first came in contact with him, we might with perfect justice have set him aside, and given his throne to some more trustworthy occupant. But Sultan Omar, acting under the advice of his uncle Muda Hassim, professed a zealous determination to second our endeavours for the extinction of piracy. Upon this consideration, we accorded him our friend- ship, and relieved him at his own request from the importunate presence of two of his most dangerous vassals. Written pledges were exchanged between him and the representatives of our sovereign ; but those subscribed by the fickle barbarian were of course not worth, in point of fact, the paper on which they were written. Asiatic diplomacy makes very light of the faith of treaties. Our only reliance was on the integrity of Muda Hassim and his high-minded brother Budruddeen. While they retained their legitimate influence, they were living symbols and guarantees of their nephew's adherence to his compact. They were murdered because they were our friends, because they were opposed to piracy, and because their murderer desired to resume that practice. The act was equivalent to a signal for hoisting the black flag. It was not the unchallengeable act of an irresponsible despot, but the first step by which a tamed pirate signalized his
relapse into his old lawless ways. That such was its real import, is manifest from the subsequent conduct of the Sultan ; who, im- mediately after the crime had been perpetrated, began to put the river and the city in a state of defence. Under all the circum- stances of the case, we think the following words in the Admiral's despatch are strictly justifiable : "There did not appear to me the shadow of a doubt as to 'my right, with reference to those princi- ples which govern European states under similar circumstances, to proceed with an armed force, and demand an explanation of these hostile deeds." Why did not the Admiral follow out his , own sound views to their legitimate conclusion ? Possibly, be- cause, as may be surmised from some hints in his despatches, he acted upon his own responsibility, without sufficient general .or special instructions for his guidance in a contingency which ought to have been provided for, and was crippled in his proceed- ings by doubts as to how his conduct might be regarded by the home authorities.
The fact affords but one more illustration of the vacillation, in, difference, and want of system, which have long marked the ma- nagement of our interests in the regions Eastward of the Straits. of Malacca. Had there been one man-of-war stationed off Sarawak in the month of March last, the deplorable events 'which have called for our interference would have been prevented. The mis-. chief being done, the whole fleet in those seas is collected to avenge it; and our countrymen in Canton are left without one ship to protect them against a furious rabble; and, after all, the business for which their lives and properties are thus exposed to danger is very lamely performed. These things call imperatively for amendment.
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