THE ARMY AND ULSTER.
[To ens EOMoa or rex “Breorrron."]
Sns.,—Are we not too apologetic about the Army ? True, no command was disobeyed, but those fifty-seven resignations saved us from civil war. When has any Army, or portion of an Army, done a deed that more deserves the thanks of a grateful nation ? And to do it required both courage and self-devotion, for it endangered the future careers of all of them. But let us consider what this action of theirs has saved us from, at least so far. Suppose the Army embarked on a policy of coercing Ulster, they might be successful, or they might be defeated. When half-hearted men come into collision with men at least as brave as themselves, well armed, and with some training, but burning with zeal, the half-hearted men are apt to go to the wall. What a disgrace it would be to the Army, bow everyone would point the finger of scorn at the officers and soldiers who had failed against civilians ! It would be the greatest loss of prestige the Army ever had. But more than that, the Army would get no pity. Seventy or seventy-five per cent. of the relatives of both soldiers and officers are Unionists, and to these either success or failure
of the Army against Ulster would be very hateful, success almost more than failure. The feelings of families would be outraged, and many would be split from top to bottom, and service in the Army considered not an honourable but an accursed thing, and that by the very people, whether peasantry or gentry, whose sons now are its chief support. But suppose the Army won and forced Ulster under Redmond and a Dublin Parliament. Before Ulster was subdued, she would have become a veritable cockpit. Then, instead of loyalty, Ulster would take on a legacy of bitterest hate against England and her Army for what she considered, and rightly considered, an act of abominable treachery unequalled in the history of the world. Ulster then would do all she knew to push the rest of Ireland (and the Hibernians need no pushing) into separation from England, and some day, when England was embroiled, or likely to be embroiled, with some foreign Power or America, would offer Ireland as a deadly vantage-. ground from which to attack England. Fleets of cruisers or destroyers sheltering in Belfast Lough or other harbours would easily stop the carriage both of food and cotton to Liverpool, Glasgow, and the whole west coast of Great Britain, and in penury and hunger the vast manufacturing populations of Lancashire and Yorkshire would rue the day in which they turned the Army of England against the loyal working men of the North-East of Ireland. From this so far the Army have delivered us, and for this they are being covered with abuse. Have our politicians ever had the wisdom to see it in this light P—I am, Sir, Sec., R. Rentenzw. Siddinghurst, Chiddingfold, Surrey.
Previous page
