11 APRIL 1941, Page 4

THE WIDENING CONFLICT

THE best comment on the latest extension of the war is Mr. Cordell Hull's description of " the barbaric inva- sion of Yugoslavia, the attempt to annihilate that country by brute force," as "another chapter in the present planned movement of attempted world-conquest and domination." It is quite certainly that. Yugoslavia could, no doubt, have averted her present ordeal by capitulating to Hitler on the terms accepted by her late Premier and Foreign Minister and indignantly repudiated by a resolute and united nation. If those terms had been accepted Hitler would have won the bloodless victory he hoped for, and Yugoslavia would have been as completely subjugated as she would be after military conquest. The state of Rumania and Bulgaria is proof enough of that. Yugoslavia has spurned the capitu- lation to which those States reconciled themselves and preferred the heroic example of her neighbour Greece. Her leaders are under no illusions as to what their decision means. They have challenged a German army and air- force powerful, numerous and much better equipped than their own. They must steel themselves at the outset to relinquishing large areas of their country where no defensible positions exist, and see their homes, even in those centres which they have declared open towns, subject to the desolation that has fallen on Coventry, Plymouth and Southampton. Knowing all that is in store, they have won eternal honour by their resolve to defend their freedom.

Yugoslavia's decision has changed the whole balance of the war. Till Sunday it seemed possible that Hitler would be able to avoid a major Balkan campaign, in which case his principal effort would be directed towards the Atlantic and the soil of Britain. Nothing that is happening in South- East Europe will affect the submarine campaign against British shipping. That will no doubt continue with all the ferocity of which the German Admiralty may prove capable. But the major military operations are in the Balkans, and the prospect of the invasion of Britain recedes, temporarily at least, unless indeed the very appearance of diversion of effort leads the German strategists to believe they can after all infuse into an invasion-attempt the element of surprise. If they do they will suffer the surprise themselves; there is no danger of the vigilance of Sir Alan Brooke and his regional Commanders being relaxed. To that extent Yugoslavia's resistance brings relief elsewhere, as Greece's resistance gave important assistance to the British troops facing Graziani in Libya. Many of those troops, their task in Africa accomplished, are now on Greek, and probably enough on Yugoslav, soil. They are an integral part of the triple resistance to German aggression. It is not true that Germany had to go into Greece to fight Britain. British troops have been on Greek soil for weeks, but they made no move so long as Greece was fighting Italy alone. It is when German aggression is turned towards Greece, as it was turned last year towards Poland and Norway and Holland and Belgium, that General Wavell's force comes into action in support of the States attacked. In discharge of that errand Britain finds herself launched on what may be a protracted Continental war, fought from distant bases with lengthy communications in seas where a surface-attack is negligible but the sub- marine menace is still far from mastered.

It will not be wise to underestimate the magnitude of the adventure. Yugoslavia's entry into the conflict is a development of the first importance. If M. Tsetkovitch had had his way Hitler would have attacked, and almost unquestionably overrun, Greece, without an hour's anxiety about the security of his right flank. He would have used Yugoslav territory as he chose for, the furtherance of his operations. Those advantages are today denied him. A million men, not .as well equipped as they should be, but enough so to make them formidable foes, and of a courage proved by the tradition of generations, are across his path. They must suffer. They must see the temporary abandon- ment of much of their native soil. They may, if the con- centration of German effort swings against their countm be beaten in some early battles. But they have already rendered inestimable service to the Allied cause. Their heroic decision to fight rather than sign away their inde- pendence has immensely heartened the threatened Greeks, drawn Russia still farther out of her paper entanglement with Germany, provided the Turks with an inspiring example of national resolution and strengthened still further the determination of America to mobilise the whole of her almost limitless resources against a criminal aggressor. And whatever Yugoslavia's lot as she faces the German tanks and bombers, her co-operation with the Greeks against Signor Mussolini's demoralised divisions in Albania should settle that discredited army's fate finally and leave Greece free to face the new invader with the support of two active allies at least, and perhaps of more.

That is the immediate prospect, but from the events of the past week large horizons widen out. What Germany's ultimate objective in the south-east is must be to some extent a matter of speculation. Her original plan was a vast twofold drive towards Suez through the Balkans and along the north coast of Africa. If the latter succeeded sufficiently the former might be confined to air-attack from bases in Greece. Unfortunately for the plan, the African drive ended in spectacular disaster, but the pertinacity of German strategy is notorious and the signs are that the original scheme is being tried again. Some variations are necessary, most or all of them to Germany's disadvantage. Italy, who was to have been responsible for the North African thrust, has defaulted catastrophically and Germany has had to take the enterprise over. If her new attack at Benghazi has as its purpose and effect the detention in Africa of British troops who would otherwise be in Greece, it diverts German forces equally, and they are likely to achieve less where they are than they might have in the Balkans. The other variation, of course, springs from Yugoslavia's resistance. That changes the situation definitely for the worse for Hitler, though not so com- pletely that the failure of his new move can for a moment be counted on. It has not been undertaken without elaborate preparation and the flower of the German army is available for it. The very impetus of the attack may carry Hitler in the next few days a great deal farther than we like. Meanwhile he loses invaluable raw materials and food which Yugoslavia supplied.

There are still unknown factors in the situation, the chief of them being the Turkish Government's intentions. We need not complain that we are in ignorance about them still. Mr. Eden and Sir John Dill may not be, and even if they are it is still more important that the Germans should be left in the dark. That Turkey will fight if her oo territories are threatened is not in doubt, but for the defeat of Hitler what is needed is her active co-operation at an early stage with the British, Greek and Yugoslav forces, now defending the Balkans. If they were beaten Turkey 5 own destiny would be decided. That cardinal fact is .0 likely to be lost on men so sagacious and public-spirited as President Inoenu and M. Sarajoglu. Turkey is relieved of any anxiety about Russia's attitude in the event of her intervention, and between Russia and Yugoslavia a still more cordial agreement has been concluded, which implies, if it does not specifically state, that Russia will refrain from giving assistance of any kind, in the matter of oil, for example, to Yugoslavia's assailant. There is no sign of an active move by Russia—all the indications are to the contrary—but she is clearly acutely conscious of the collision of her own interests and Germany's in eastern Europe, and it must not be forgotten that she is rendering the considerable service of keeping large German forces immobilised on the Russo-German frontier. It may well be a critical conflict that is opening, and it is fortunate that the war in Africa is so nearly liquidated apart from Libya. It will be a material gain, in spite of the length of the voyage entailed, if American supplies for the Near East can be sent by the Cape direct to Suez. Even though still non-belligerent, America will make her influence on the Balkan operations powerfully felt.