11 AUGUST 1877, Page 6

THE NEWEST SCARE,

THE pro-Turkish Press is endeavouring to get up a new scare. It is quite clear that nothing can be made out of the panic about "Russian victories," the "conquest of the Euphrates Valley route," the " imminent danger of Con- stantinople," or the coining "enormous aggrandisement of the Northern Colossus." The English people, though liable, as Lord Salisbury said, to be deceived by maps on too small a scale, are quite aware that Russia has gained no victories ; that the Euphrates Valley remains as .completely in Turkish hands, and therefore as useless to mankind, as it ever was; that Constantinople is in no particular danger, except from its own garrison ; and that the Colossus just now, instead of growing bigger, is bleeding from every pore. They cannot be frightened by those scarecrows any more, and are even slightly ashamed of their momentary panic. Still the friends of the Turks, who cannot be contented unless this country rushes into the fray, have not lost heart, and consequently they are intent on dressing up a new bogey. The Emperors of Germany and Austria met on Thursday at Mehl, and there plans were arranged, as gossips say, for the final parti- tion of "the Ottoman dominions." Already, it is asserted, there is evidence of this design afforded in the pressure which Prince Bismarck is exercising at Vienna to induce the Austrian Government to allow the Russian army to enter Servia, and so pass behind Osman Pasha to Sofia. This movement has hitherto been forbidden, as too threaten- ing to Austrian interests, but now it is to be allowed, and a Russian corps d'arinee, probably assisted by a Servian force, is to attempt the western route to Constantinople. This concession shows that the three Emperors are agreed upon the future of Turkey, and as their decision must be inimical to English interests, England should intervene at once, ally herself with Austria and Turkey, and without knowing in the least what plan she is resisting, light up the flames of war all over the world.

There is no smoke without some fire, and we are by no means disposed to assert that the alarmists have absolutely no ground from their point of view for their prognostications. We have believed from the first and still believe that this war was preceded by seine hind of understanding either between the Governments of St. Petersburg and Vienna, or between the Houses of Ronaanoff and Hapsburg. It has al ways seemed and seems now to us incredible that the Russian Government, the best-informed in Europe, and in certain respects one of the most timid, should have entered upon so vast an undertaking without making sure that Austria would not fall upon her flank while the campaign was proceeding. We have believed also, and still believe that the German Chancellor is friendly to the war, that he would not be sorry but glad if Turkey ceased to misgovern any part of Europe, and that he is not sorry but glad that Russia should exhaust or even cripple herself in performing what he regards as a just, if not an absolutely necessary work. Those are the primary conditions of the problem, patent to everybody who has watched the recent course of European affairs, and in restating them we state nothing that ought to raise the faintest feeling of surprise, still less of alarm. And we may further admit, though we have no knowledge whatever of the fact, that when the Emperors of Germany and Austria met it is quite possible that the alliance of the three Emperors may have been re- cemented, that the understanding among the Powers may have been made more definite, and that this understanding may include arrangements to be carried out if Turkey falls to pieces. We understand Sir Stafford Northcote's answer of Tuesday to mean that he thinks this also, though he has no information which he can communicate to Parliament.

And what then ? Surely this then,—that one of the condi- tions upon which the Russophobes have insisted from the beginning as their conditions of contentment would be at last and happily secured. By far their most reasonable con- tention has always been that Russia was most dangerous when acting alone, that her Court was selfish, if her people were not, and that on the final conclusion of peace she would, if left alone, look far too much to her own interests. We ourselves recognise that danger, and accept that proposition, with this reserve, that it is far better, great as the danger might be from her ambition, that Russia alone should do the work, the final liberation of Europe from Asiatic government, than that nobody should do it. And now that, on the theory we have described, it is becoming clear that Russia cannot do the work alone, that she must depend upon the offices of other Powers, where is the change in the situation, except in the precise direction that the Conservatives and their allies in this matter originally declared to be desirable? Russia is ceasing, as they wished, to act alone. That she is not acting with England is true, and is to be regretted, but that is the fault of the very party which brings the charge ; but she is acting with Powers who, on their theory, have interests very nearly identical with our own, is specially acting with the composite Power always pointed out by them as our inevitable ally. Austria is in danger, they have always said, from Russian ambition. Now they say Austria and Russia are going to act together. Very good; then is Austria about to be a moderating influence on the side of English interests, or not ? If she is, what are they grumbling about ? If she is not, why are they perpetually asserting that Austrian and English interests are identical ? If they are so, then the junction of Austria and Russia must, so far as it extends, be a benefit to England, That it may be an injury to Turks is true, but then the whole contention of this party is that they care nothing whatever about Turks, are not fighting for them because they prefer Asiatic to European Governments, but are only solicitous for the "direct and permanent interests of Great Britain." They have literally nothing to complain of, and in calling on England to resist are calling on her to oppose their own most vehe- mently-cherished ideas.

But, say the alarmists, Turkey may be partitioned. What is that to them, upon their theory that English interests alone are to be considered ? It is, of course, a great deal. to honest Turkophiles, like Lord Beaconsfield, who definitely prefer any Semitic rule, however bad, to that of any of the "snub-nosed races," whether bad or good ; but they are not maintaining his intelligible and courageous opinion, but another, that they arc to consider only English interests. How is it against English interests that Russia, Germany, and Austria should settle the future of Turkey, rather than Russia should settle it alone ? Suppose Turkey is partitioned, and Austria re- ceives Bosnia and the Herzegovina ; Greece Epirus, Thessaly, and Crete ; and Russia Armenia, while Bulgaria is governed by a German Prince, how are we injured more than we should be by any treaty that Russia, if victorious, is likely to conclude ? Is it to our injury that there should be as decent and orderly government in Bosnia as in Dalmatia? . Have we any reason for going to war because Bulgaria is ruled by a Prince of Reuse, or a Duke of Leuchtenberg, or any other civilised person, instead of Chevhet Pasha ? It may be said that it would be vexatious to see Greece, which has done nothing, obtain three provinces, and we confess ourselves to annoyance with Greek behaviour,—but after all, she will receive nothing that is not her own, by a title older and more perfect than any that we English can plead to any possession outside this island. The truth is, these fears are not only imeginary, but affected, and the real fear is for the future of Constantinople, which many of the advocates for war sincerely believe may in certain contin- gencies be dangerous to the British Empire. Well, let us admit for a moment their whole argument, and then ask them what is the logic of their position. Is Constantinople, in their judgment, more likely to be Russian an consequence of the alliance of the three Enapeiorsi.or less likely ? Have they not from the first said, and said, in our judgment, most truly, .that Austria is sure to dislike the Russian possession of Con- stantinople more than any other Power ? They will not deny it, and in aiding Russia, Austria is enabled to resist that pro- ject effectively, and yet without war. To believe the alarmists, the steps of the syllogism stand in this wise :—Russia has been compelled by unexpected difficultiee to ask certain serious concessions from the Austrian Government. Conse- quently it is certain that Russia is about immediately to carry out the project which Austria, above any Government in Europe, is certain to dislike.