11 DECEMBER 1886, Page 5

THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

THE debate in the German Parliament on the renewal of the Military Septennate leaves on our minds the impres- sion that the German Government, which is the beat informed in Europe, not only expects a European war, but is honestly alarmed by the anticipation. It is all very well to say that Prince Bismarck wanted his Bill, and therefore instructed all official speakers to make the most of every danger ; but that assertion only partially meets the facts of the situation. That the German Government wished the Septennate to be continued is true, for that provision releases them from an annual Parlia- mentary discussion which they think most dangerous ; but they could not have wished either for the antedating of the Bill, or for the additional force which will be raised under it. They have ample strength for anything but a war with a coalition, they can depend upon their Austrian allies, and they are harassed and alarmed by the financial difficulties which, as they frankly avow, such exaggerated armaments entail. The Hohenzollerns are no friends either of deficits or of waste. They would gladly have gone on as they were, and only demand fresh strength because of the increased armaments both of France and Russia. The military department in Germany is very independent even of the Chancellor, and its two chiefs were ominously pessimistic. The Minister of War, General Bronsart von Schellendorf, who succeeded General von Boon, intimated almost in so many words that although he did not expect war at once—" for in that case, gentlemen, I should not be asking for a Bill, but for a decree of mobilisation "—he saw no ground for believing that peace would be maintained ; while his great comrade, Count von Moltke, was almost fatalistic in his expectation of war. The Count's speech naturally created the most profound sensation. Though now very old—eighty-six—his intellect is as keen as ever ; though habitually silent, he has the reputation in Germany of a man who speaks truth as a mathematician would when dealing with his figures, from a sort of mental compulsion ; and he is by nature such an artist in war, that when speaking of war he appears utterly passionless and unprejudiced. It is, moreover, not forgotten that in 1871 he expected an enduring hostility to arise from the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, and predicted that the next half-century would be a cycle of armaments and wars. The greatest soldier of his era he remains unbitten by the disease of militarism; yet he spoke of France as better armed than Germany, he represented the nations as crushed with the weight of their armour till war was almost inevitable, and in words amid which a pin might have been heard to fall, he asked the Deputies not to come to a vote which might leave on them the responsibility for the miseries of an invasion, and declaring that as yet he had been of necessity reticent, promised to speak out fully before the confidential Committee. It is wholly inconsistent with Count von Moltke's career, with his character, and with his modes of speech in the House, to use such words unless he at least thought most seriously of the situation, and believed it necessary that Germany should stand armed to the teeth, even at the cost of an annual loan during each year of the Septennate. And that, we may be sure, is what he does believe, and what, when his words have filtered down among the people, all Germany will believe also. Count von Moltke is trusted by them as even Prince Bismarck is not. It is a most melancholy belief, for whether founded on absolute truth or not, it overthrows one more

pleasing illusion,—the illusion, namely, that armed nations would keep the peace better than mere armies, because of the house- hold misery wars between such nations must involve. Europe is armed, but never looked nearer war than now ; and the momentary expectation of war, the incessant exaggeration of armaments, the withdrawal of whole populations from in- dustry, the devotion of excessive taxes to military expenditure, produce of themselves many of the evil results of war.

Nations, like men, can learn by persistent training to bear the weight of armour ; but the training has not made the nations calm, or from the Channel to the Ural there would not be this unrest and fear. There is positive fear, not panic ; for while the Governments levy new corps darme's every year, and ask every year for millions to be spent on fresh materiel, the Funds of all nations keep up as if the European sky were still without a cloud.

It has been noticed, especially in France, that the German soldiers did not talk of a coalition, as Prince Bismarck did when the Military Septennate was first voted, but dwelt almost exclusively upon the armaments of France. Russia was

mentioned, but there was evidently a desire not to be explicit about the danger from the East, which the German people, who understand the vastness of Russia, dread the more keenly of the two. It is probable that this reticence was in part dictated by a desire not to offend the amour propre of the Czar, who is hesitating under the pressure of two parties, and to spare the feelings of the aged Emperor, who abhors the notion of a Russian war ; but it was also dictated by the permanent German view of the situation. That view, if we interpret it rightly, is that the brunt of a Russian attack would at first be borne by Austria, Germany having no interest in the Balkans, but that the con- sequent French attack, that "going off of the Chassepots " of which the Chancellor spoke, would be directed against Germany. There would be no war with Russia until Germany declared one in aid of Austria ; but there might be war with France upon a sudden outburst of the French Army. Wars are quick now, and a war of invasion from France would be repelled or partly successful in a fortnight ; and it is to this, therefore, that the German Staff almost exclusively draw German attention. They talk not of the vast forces a coalition might set in motion, but of the increase of the French artillery, which has been enormous, of the quantitity of horses the French have acquired and trained, of the huge sums, double their own they say, now spent in France upon equipments. They dread a rush, in fact, and in certain contingencies expect it, and desire to be in momentary readiness to meet it. Whether they are right, no one in Europe can say ; for no one knows whether, when it came to the point, the French people would not seize control of the situation, and prohibit a war which it is believed they internally still dread. If they could vote in time, the war might still be prevented by a refusal of financial supplies. The German Government, however, it is clear, think this no security, and believe either that the French people would fight them, or that the order of mobilisation, by exciting the Army, would paralyse popular resistance, which could not refuse means when war had actually commenced without risking a counter-invasion. One can hardly conceive French Radicals, with their Republic still so imperfectly rooted, once more tossing the reins to the military department, and making Generals their masters ; but the Government of Berlin clearly think they will, and the opinion is entitled to heavy weight. The end of the struggle between the forces which make for peace and war is not yet, and may be materially affected by unexpected events, especially in Russia, where the struggle is most fierce ; but the total effect of the German debate is not reassuring to those who, while utterly deprecating war for the reasons which now provoke it, still cannot compel themselves not to hear how the nations snarl.