BOOKS.
THE POLITICIAN WORDS WORTH.* Till republication of Wordsworth's epoch-making but now well-nigh forgotten tract on the Convention of Cintra should be welcomed alike by those who reverence the memory of the poet-politician, and by all who wish to realize the stages through which English thought has passed in connexion with a political principle of the highest importance. Wordsworth was, in fact, the herald of Nationalism. His views were very sound. They were in advance of the public opinion of his day. Some of his utterances may be said, without exaggeration, to have been prophetic. He was an idealist, but one who did not scorn to temper his idealism by the light of practical necessities. More- over, he was not open to the charge which may, with some justice, be brought against nineteenth-century Liberalism— namely, that its aims were purely destructive. Mr. Gladstone in conversation with me on one occasion recognized the justice of this criticism. Shortly before he determined to adopt the
lrordnvorth on the Convention of Mara. (Published 1809.) With an Intro- duction by A. V. Dicey. London: Dumphrey Milford. l. Od. nat.]
policy of Home Rule for Ireland, I had an opportunity of consulting him as to whether it would be wise for me to enter Parliament as a moderate Liberal. He advised me not to do so on the ground that the Liberal programme, which for many years previously had been centred on the destruction of privilege, was at the time nearly completed, and that, therefore, the advent of a period which would be of less interest to Liberals was to be anticipated. That construction formed an essential part of Wordsworth's political ideal is abundantly clear from his attitude to what we should in modern phraseology term militarism. He saw that the frame of mind engendered by military training and habits of thought tended in some degree to deaden the imaginative qualities and to substitute an exaggerated belief in the efficacy of force in the place of those moral aspiration's on the development of which he considered the real progress of the world mainly depended. "The paramount efficacy of moral causes," he said, "is not willingly admitted by persons high in the profession of arms." But he did cot on this account fall into the other extreme of condemning the military spirit or underrating the importance of military zeal and efficiency. His ideal was to "unite the civic and military spirit in one people and in enduring harmony with each other."
Although, however, Wordsworth's political views were sound, and although his poetic imagination enabled him to clothe them in language of glowing eloquence, at the same time he stands greatly in need of an interpreter. His fiery indignation against oppression of all kinds, his enthusiasm in the cause which he defends, and the redundancy of the thoughts which bubbled up in his mind as he wrote, led him to be tautological, and occa- sionally even somewhat obscure. Moreover, an old-world turgidity is to be found in some of his metaphors which rather jars on modern literary taste. For instance, in dealing with a weak point in his case—namely, that it was the right and duty of the Corporation of the City of London to address the Crown in condemnation of the action of the Generals who hid signed the Convention of Cintra without waiting for the results of the inquiry which was then proceeding as to their conduct—he says "it is melancholy to think that the time is come when an attempt has been made to tear out of the venerable crown of the Sovereign of Great Britain a gem which is in the very front of the turban of the Emperor of Morocco."
For these reasons the value and interest of the republished tract are greatly enhanced by the illuminating prefeee- emanating from the pen of Professor Dicey by which it is accompanied. Professor Dicey clearly explains to us why it was that Words- worth's utterances produced so great an effect at the time. The moment chosen for. their publication was singularly propitious. Up to the time of the Treaty of Amiens, the war with France had been the work of a party. Subsequently, the English publics began for the first time fully to realize what Napoleon meant when, in one of those public addresses whose bombastic mendacity latter-day German statesmen and professors have endeavoured to emulate, he proclaimed to the world that his aim was "to re-establish universal happiness upon better and surer bases." He meant the subjugation of all independent nationalities. Henceforth the war changed its character. The Whig opposition sank into insignificance. Tories, Whigs, and even Revolu- tionists joined hands. Wordsworth was able to show, not merely with plausibility, but with some reason, that in the revulsion which took place in the opinions of himself and his associates there was nothing inconsistent. "Their conduct proved that they kept their oyes steadily fixed upon principles." The war was thus transformed from a party into a national war.
This transformation," Professor Dicey says, "was due in no small degree to Wordsworth's tract on the Convention of Cintra." Wordsworth was able to embody in something approaching to a political programme the national ideals and inchoate aspirations which were simmering in the public mind, but had heretofore received no adequate expression. Moreover, Professor Dicey, by dispensing with a good deal of rather unnecessary verbiage, makes us easily understand what Wordsworth really meant. Ho has formulated the leading principles of Wordsworth's programme in a few concise and pregnant sentences which enable us to appreciate the extent to which those principles were assimilated by the public thought of this country, and, albeit with the growth of time they have been developed, have never been abandoned.
The facts connected with the Convention of Cintra have been so frequently described that it is unnecessary to dwell upon them at length. It will be sufficient to say that early in August, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley landed on the coast of Portugal in command of an expeditionary force, and fought and won in quick succession the beetles of Bolles and Viroiero. Had he been left in command he would have followed up his advantage, and would without doubt have completely crushed Junot's army. But most unfortunately, whilst the battle of Vinriero was still in progress, Sir Harry Burrard arrived on the scene and took command. Twenty-four hours later the latter was superseded by Sir Hew Dalrymple, a cautious and unimaginative veteran who was jealous of Wollealey and who refused to be guided by his advice. Junot fully understood the perilous nature of his position. He sent off Kellermann, who spoke English and was considered a skilful diplomatist, to the English camp with a view to seeing, in the words used by this latter officer, whether "he could get the French army out of the mouse-trap." Before the end of the month the Convention of Cintra was signed. It consisted of twenty-five articles which Wordsworth described as "a long ladder into a deep abyss of infamy." Its main pro- visions were that the French should surrender Lisbon and other Portuguese fortresses ; that Jtmot's army should be transported back to France by British vessels ; that they should take with them what was euphemistically called their "private property," which Wordsworth rightly held for the most part consisted of plunder ; that French civilians who remained in Portugal were to be treated with the utmost leniency ; and that those Portuguese who had been traitors to their own country should be placed under the special protection of the British Government. More- over, the Convention contained the very singular provision that "should there arise doubts as to the moaning of any article it will be explained favourably to the French army." The main defect of the Convention was that the Portuguese Government and authorities, whether civil or military, were not consulted, and were, in fact, practically ignored.
We are now able to deliberate on this subject with the equa- nimity which will probably be displayed by our posterity in A.D. 2015 in discussing the recent expedition to Gallipoli. Mr. Oman, in his monumental history of the Peninsular War, sums up the case by saying that "while on the military side the Convention was justifiable, it presented grave political faults." Public: opinion was at the time; however, in no mood to accept any such half-hearted verdict. The Times of November 4th, 1808, contained the following diatribe against the soldier who, in subsequent years, was destined to raise the military fame of England to a higher point than it had ever attained before :— " We will venture to say, that every patriotic and honest heart in this empire felt almost as much indignation on reading this account of the dinner given to Sir Arthur, as it did on reading the articles of the armistice which he signed and negotiated. There was a time when 'military characters' as they are hero termed. would have declined the honour of meeting a man who had signed such an instrument of national disgrace as this armistice, till he had purged himself 'before a Court Martial (as we hope Sir Arthur can do) of all voluntary agency in the formation of it."
In order to understand the outburst of public opinion which took place when the news of the Convention of Cintra reached England, it is necessary to take account of the general European situation of the time. In 1808-09, Napoleon was at the zenith of his military fame and power. The astonishing series of successes which had attended his arms had engendered the belief that on land he was invincible. A thick pall of despon- dency descended on the whole of Europe. Suddenly the general gloom was illumined by a ray of light. It shot forth from Shakespeare's "tawny Spain." Not only was a large French force obliged at Baylen to lay down its arms, but a new character was imported into the war. The whole Spanish nation rose in arms. Napoleon did not realize, and indeed never realized, the nature of the change which thus took place. He failed to see that he bad no longer to deal with Governments and dynasties but with nations. European thought was quicker to appreciate the transformation. Sir Robert Seeley, in his Life of stein, has fully explained how the Spanish success revived, even if it did not create, Prussian Nationalism, and helped to inaugurate the movement which eventually culminated in the liberation of Germany from the French yoke. English Liberalism also woke up to the necessity of a supreme effort Great were the expec- tations excited when the first news arrived of the successes at Rolica and Vimiero. Correspondingly great was the disappoint- ment when it was learnt that the full fruits of victory lied
apparently been snatched from our grasp. Wordsworth rightly interpreted public opinion when he stated that the evacua- tion of Portugal was not the prime object of the campaign. The important point was "the manner in which that event was to be brought about." Ho inveighed against what he called "the moral depravity" of the Convention, and he seems not to have exaggerated the effect produced on public opinion when he said: "Not a street, not a public room, not a fireside in the island which was not disturbed as by a local or private trouble ; men of all estates, conditions and tempers were affected apparently in equal degrees."
There is, however, little to be gained by dwelling any further upon the merits of this controversy. It will be both more interesting and more instructive to speak of the general political programme which Wordsworth advocated. Professor Dicey says that the main items of this programme were four in number. The first may be summarized by saying that it laid down the general principle that national independence was in itself a blessing to the people concerned. This may now be regarded as a commonplace. It is, however, to be observed that the problems involved in the application of the principle have changed their character a good deal since Wordsworth wrote. He only had in his mind's eye the evils which arise from the oppression exercised by a bad foreign Government over a people who were capable of governing themselves, and he dwelt, with great reason, upon the fact that oppression generally is more deeply resented when it is inflicted at the hands of aliens than when it is the result of native misgovernment. The question which now occupies the minds of many political thinkers in connexion with British Imperialism is the extent to which it is justifiable to impose good government at the hands of aliens on the inhabitants of countries such as India and Egypt The second principle laid down by Wordsworth was that "every independent nation, and above all England, is interested in the maintenance of the national independence of every other country." When Wordsworth wrote, this idea had germinated but had not as yet taken firm root in the public opinion of the country. The present war, which in a large measure is being waged to ensure the application of Wordsworth's principle, is of itself sufficient to testify to the fact that in this particular respect his view has been essimilated by the main body of his countrymen.
The third and fourth of Wordsworth's principles, which may conveniently be considered together, are of special importance at the present moment They are stated by Professor Dicey in the following terms : "No State ought to possess irresistible military power so as to menace the legitimate independence of other countries. It is desirable to create a new balance of power." At a time when the principle of the balance of power is being vigorously attacked for reasons which are often very valid, it is as well to be reminded that so earnest a Liberal as Wordsworth recognized the feet that some balance of power was necessary. But, of course, the balance which he contem- plated, and which it is the duty of English statesmen now to contemplate, diffesed widely from that which found favour in the eyes of Metternich, Castlereagh, and the other statesmen who assembled at Vienna to discuss the question. They aimed at a balance of power which was wholly disconnected with nationality. Wordsworth, on the contrary, as Professor Dicey points out, "contemplated a balance of power which should exist to guarantee the independence of each separate nation." The establishment of such a political equilibrium is at least as necessary now as it was a century ago. One of the main aims of the European statesmen who will have to discuss the terms of peace at the close of the present war should be to assert the very wise principle laid down by Wordsworth in 1809.
Finally, as an instance of Wordsworth's statesmanlike fore. sight, the following passage from Professor Dicey's preface may be quoted. "He seems," Professor Dicey says, "to have seen the possibility that Bonaparte might find imitators, and that a State might come into existence where 'at the head of all is the mind of one man who acts avowedly upon the principle that everything which can be done safely by the supreme power of a State may be done.'" The Treitschkes, Bernhardis, Nietzselics, and other Germans have, for a long while past, been the apostles of this detestable principle, and at last they have produced the "one man" who is seeking to apply it—
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