THE FOURTH WINTER

By STRATEGICUS

Warfare cannot be conceived of in vacua; it is only possible to discuss it in connexion with a given group of conditions, of which topography is one. During the winter, Goering admitted, the topo- graphy of Russia changed fundamentally. On certain sectors of the front rivers and swamps had interposed so effective a barrier that the troop concentration could be enormously economised. Such obstacles enabled the Germans to strike with a great superiority of force on some sectors while holding others thinly. These dis- positions were not only approved by common sense but were sanctioned by success. When winter came, however, the swamps were turned into hard ground. The rivers became shining highways for skis, the horse-drawn and the aero-propelled sleigh. The bulwarks which had before held off the assailants then provided avenues through which they could penetrate to the rear of fortified positions. Instead of part of the defensive system they became the raw material of the most precious commodity of all warfare— surprise. To the detached onlooker the really surprising thing is the fact, admitted by Goering, that the revolution took the Germans by surprise.

There are, however, phases which precede and follow that change; . and the present is one. The deep snows impose an obstacle to swift and massive movement. Although light artillery, the general- purposes mortar and anti-aircraft guns can be moved by sleigh, and at times even by troops provided with skis, heavy artillery and tanks are difficult to concentrate against positions which yield to little else. Large masses of troops are also leg-bound, and manoeuvre, except limited tactical manoeuvre, becomes almost im- possible. It is in the light of these conditions that we must view the operations on the Russian front. In the Stalingrad area the Russians have won a great victory; and, whatever the sequel, that fact cannot be ignored. But the exploitation of the victory lags, and must lag, unless the Russians are to undertake unnecessary risks. They have cut off before Stalingrad, between the Don and the Volga, a con- siderable force ; and another body of troops appears to be cut off between the Chir and the Stalingrad-Tildioretsk railway.

Timoshenko seems to have launched a number of columns across the Don and interposed between the army encircled in the Don- Volga corridor a very considerable force. The territory in which it is operating contains numerous pockets of the enemy, which are being surrounded and reduced as occasion serves ; but, as it is as extensive as three or four of the largest English counties put together, the reduction must take time. These pockets of enemy troops, and the large pocket east of the Don, are condemned to live and operate upon the stores on the ground, with the additional supplies which can be brought by air. The deep snows that impede rapid movement by the Russians must check even more the attempts at relief ; and the great quadrilateral which the Russians occupy up to the upper Chir stands between the isolated enemy and his reserves.

A somewhat similar situation governs the operations on the central sector of the front. About Rzhev, in the neighbourhood of Bielyi and about Veliki Luki, there are pockets of German troops which have been more or less comp!etely cut off from all the normal sources of supply and reinforcement. The Russian objective is not neces- sarily to reduce these pockets ; not at all events to shoulder any undue risks in their rcduction. It is to make their relief or main-

tenance so difficult that the Germans' winter strategy will be rendered almost impossible.

The invasion of North Africa and the advance into Libya have compelled a dispersion of the German forces. Hitler has had to

dip into his reserves and draw upon other fronts in order to find the new forces required to garrison southern Europe against the day when the Allies can threaten invasions at many points. Some part of the force has been drawn from Russia already. It is clear from the evidence of reliable correspondents that some of the Luftwaffe squadrons which were lately in Russia are now in North Africa.

In spite of the experience in Russia last year, Hitler undoubtedly thought the country would be winter-bound ; and the fresh calls in the south had to be met. It is because of the swift enemy reaction that the Allies are finding difficulty in clearing up the situation in

the north-east corner of Tunisia. Hitler has already transferred a considerable force of the Luftwaffe, including some of its latest

models, to Sardinia, Sicily and the airfields of Tunisia ; and the Allies who could place there a superior force are grounded for lack of airfields and the services that keep aircraft in the air.

Another element that is not without its importance in this con- nexion is the stand which Rommel is making about Mersa and El Agheila. There is no reason to doubt that the Eighth Army will

ultimately destroy the enemy force ; and General Montgomery is certainly wise to reorganise fully, and complete his concentration

of supplies, before striking. But while Rommel is able to maintain himself on this narrow strip of Cyrenaica, while he can prevent the Eighth Army moving into Tripolitania, he is performing the useful service of splitting the air-power of the Allies in North Africa. The Middle East Command cannot co-operate thoroughly with the Air Force in Tunisia. It can, and does, play its part in the strategic bombing of the airfields in Sardinia, Sicily and Bizerta and Tunis ; and without that assistance it is not easy to see how the First Army could have made such progress as it has ; but it cannot reinforce General Eisenhower's command in giving complete cover in battle.

As far as one can judge, the hard fighting which is going on in Tunisia is conditioned by the air factor. It was pointed out as soon as Bizerta rose above the horizon that it could not be taken, much

less held and maintained, without a superior air force. General Anderson appears to have thrust forward part of his troops in

defiance of the conditions in the hope that he could seize Bizerta and

Tunis by an attaque brusquee. He was justified in so doing by the knowledge that the Germans are steadily reinforcing the troops that

hold the bridgehead. In the event it proved that he attacked too slowly to find the position weakly held, and too weakly to maintain himself in the positions he had at first overrun. But his main weakness appears to have been the lack of air-cover. It is obvious that his communications are long and poor and that it may require some time before he can concentrate the requisite force to brush General Nehring off the narrow bridgehead. But it is only a delay ; and the army is attempting to secure the airfields from which to launch its fighter cover for the next challenge.

The part the climate can play in military operations is once again seen in this episode. The Eighth Army has made splendid headway, but it was bogged by mud for several crucial days, and the German commentators frankly admit the extent of their debt to the heavy rains. If it had not been for that unfortunate check, Rommel might well have been caught and destroyed, and the Middle East Air Force

might have been giving to the First Army the cover which proved of so much service to the Eighth. However much we try to write

down the influence of climatic conditions, they will, time and again, intervene with that marginal factor that turns defeats or in- decisive engagements into victories.

It is also evident that the climate in Russia is influencing the operations in North Africa and vice versa. What the Russians arc at present doing is to throw a spanner into Hitler's strategic plan, by compelling him to fight when he least desires to. The design of the new phase of the war is filling out, however disappointing be the detail of the sector in which we are most concerned.