THE REFOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.* COLONEL MALLESON has succeeded
in giving within the compass of a book of three hundred pages a very interesting and instructive account of the events between 1848 and 1871 which culminated in the refounding—or, as we should prefer it, the founding—of the German Empire. The distinction is not without importance, for it gives quite a false conception of the new State that has been created if we regard it as the restoration of anything that had preceded. The Holy Roman Empire as founded by Charlemagne, or as restored by Otto, or under the sway of the Habsburgs, was never in any true sense of the words a German State. It professed throughout its history to embody that ideal of an International Power which had descended from the time of the Users ; and so far from representing the unity of Germany, its existence was the great obstacle to a national unification. The new German Empire, on the contrary, is a State without any pretensions to world-wide power, founded on the principle of nationality, and the greatest outcome of that principle since it began to be consciously applied in European politics. No doubt the traditions of the older Empire made themselves felt in the creation of the new. But modern Germany only became possible through the final abandonment of the aims of Charlemagne and Otto the Great, and through its liberation from bonds which were more or less remotely a heritage from their work ; and there is, if anything, more reason to look for their successors in Vienna rather than in Berlin, in the Habsburgs rather than in the Hohenzollerns. Except, however, as regards the title, the determination of this point need not greatly affect our judgment on Colonel Malleson's work, for his aim is only to give a chronicle of the events which ended with the ceremony of January 19th, 1871, with- out pretending to give an estimate of the significance of the new creation in the politics of Europe. And this brings us to the first criticism which we have to pass upon the book. As a. military history, it is excellent ; but when we turn to the political side, Colonel Malleson's knowledge is less complete, or his interest seems to flag, and we find, in consequence, a great want of proportion. To the political history of the four year from 1866 to 1870, with all their intrigues and prepara- tions, less space is accorded than to the single battle of Spicheren. When it comes to the actual foundation of the new Empire, there is only. the barest mention of the fact,—no explanation of what it was that was founded, no account of the Imperial Constitution, of the relation of the smaller States to Prussia, or of the powers of the Emperor.
* Th4 Refounding of the German Empira : 1818.11311. By Colonel G. B. Sdaefion, CBI, London: Seeley and Co. 1893. The meagreness of the record of political events is not the only objection we have to make to it. Colonel Malleson has evidently not much enthusiasm for the movement of unifica- tion of which he relates the history. In the later stages of the war of 1870, we hear more than enough about the sorrows of Napoleon III., but not one word of sympathy with the great people who, after a thousand years of waiting, were at last fighting out their national unity. He is always ready to do justice to the energy and ability of the Prussians in the field ; but to their ultimate aims, either as against France or Austria, his attitude is one of reserve, not to say hostility. The treatment of Prince Bismarck, in particular, is most unsympathetic. The darker side of his character is given with far too much emphasis and reiteration ; we hear too much of his unscrupulousness, not enough of the greatness of his purpose, and of the consummate statesmanship with which he realised it. We have no desire to paint Prince Bismarck as spotless, or to explain away the shortcomings that have marred both his character and work. But after all, it is for his statesmanship, not for his short- comings, that he will be remembered ; and to dwell on the latter, and forget the former, is to miss much the more important part of the truth. Colonel Malleson describes, in very severe language, the policy by which Austria was drawn into the war of 1866 :— "The acquisition of such a territory" [as Schleswig-Holstein] "was so valuable that the utterance of falsehood and the practice of fraud might well seem, to an utterly unscrupulous man, not only justifiable but patriotic. That he bad been able to delude Austria to go so far with him as to be a partner in the expulsion of the Danes, was a marvellous feat of diplomacy. But it was a part only of the great scheme. The awakening of Austria would come when the time for the division of the spoil should arrive.
Such was the policy of Bismarck ; a policy truly of ad- venture, a policy which could succeed only by deliberately deceiv- ing Austria until the pear should be ripe—a policy rightly called of fraud and falsehood,' to be supported at the proper time by force."
Austria, we may take leave to say, was, in 1866, by no means the guileless and disinterested power Colonel Malleson would have us believe ; and whatever we may think of Prince Bismarck's diplomatic proceedings, there was something more than falsehood and greed in the policy of a war which con- tributed so directly to the creation of Germany, the inde- pendence of Hungary, and the liberation of Italy, and which thus, in fact, gave their present shape to the three Powers in whose union now lies the chief conservative force in Europe. And whatever was Prince Bismarck's conduct before the beginning of the war, he deserves all credit for his conduct at its end. His moderation towards Austria, in face of the demands of the military party and the expectations of an army elated with victory, was a signal exercise of far-sighted statesmanship. Colonel Malleson repeats the ordinary story that Prince Bismarck precipitated the war of 1870 by pub- lishing false accounts of the interview at Ems between King William and Benedetti. As Prince Bismarck has lately claimed this doubtful honour for himself, no one has any right to object; but there is little doubt that war was desired on both sides, and was, in any case, inevitable.
The fact is, that Prince Bismarck's policy and career are not to be judged by the standards which we apply to an ordinary foreign Minister. The duty of the latter is simple,—to strive for peace as long as it is consistent with the due preservation of the interests of his country. Prince Bismarck's policy, on the contrary, was necessarily aggressive; he was engaged in the making of a nation, and nations are rarely made by men of tender consciences, or without some accompaniment of violence and fraud. England and France were consoli- dated in the Middle Ages ; Germany was belated, and it almost seems as if its founder were a mediaeval statesman born out of time to do in mediaeval way the work which gentler methods had failed to accomplish. From the beginning of his career as First Minister, Prince Bismarck had made up his mind that before the unity of Germany could be realised, both Austria and France must be fought and defeated, and that he was right in this conclusion there can be little doubt. Whether the object in view was great enough to justify the waging of two great wars, is the question which has to be decided, and which different people will, according to their temperament, decide differently. If we once admit his right to pursue a forward policy under these circumstances, it was obviously also his right, or rather his duty, so to play his cards as to meet
Austria and France separately, and at the most favourable moments. This, as Colonel Malleson admits, Prince Bis- marck did with consummate skill, and if his methods will not always bear the light of day, let him that is without sin among diplomatists cast the first stone at him.
We have already indicated our opinion that Colonel Malle- son's book is chiefly valuable as a contribution to military history. His account of the military operations of 1866 and 1870-71 is much the best, on a moderate scale, that we have seen. It is painstaking, clear, and, for its limits, very full and complete. Colonel Malleson is not, we observe, a believer in Von Moltke's infallibility. It is a common criticism of Moltke's strategy that he endangered his two armies by uniting them in face of the enemy at K6niggratz ; and the common defence is that he ran the risk deliberately, confiding in Benedek's incompetence. From the account of the battle in the present work, it would seem, however, that the Prussians were more than once in a position of danger from which only great good-fortune and the mistakes of Benedek could have liberated them, and Moltke could have had no reason for believing that Benedek would show himself so unfit for com- mand as he undoubtedly did.
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