Sidelight
By COMPTON MACKENZIE FROM time immemorial the Greeks have been recog- nised as champions of the mythopeeic art, but some of the recent efforts in our press to discredit Greece in order to justify our attitude over Cyprus challenge that age- long supremacy.
Herodotus was successful through nearly two and a half millennia in casting a stigma on the Corinthians for having run away from Salamis, and this calumny was accepted as truth until a commemorative stele was unearthed in recent times on Salamis : Once upon a time, stranger, we dwelt in Corinth's well- watered citadel; but now Salamis, the island of Ajax, holds us.
Some of the organs of our popular press are now prepared to cast a stigma upon Greece with much less justification than Herodotus had, writing at a time when the bitterness between Athens and Corinth was extreme.
One paper with an enormous circulation has produced the following gem in paste : 'Good will is running short in Britain towards Greece. That is the country which appealed for British help when the Nazis marched in. British troops were sent at once and many died there. Although a large body of military opinion was against him, Mr. Churchill felt that we could not tamely withdraw from our undertaking without moral loss, and surely he was right; our arms suffered a severe disaster but our honour was preserved.
The Axis occupation of Greece was a terrible ordeal, of which near starvation was the least terrible part. Yet no Greek betrayed a British soldier for gold, or even for food, and many Greeks chose death rather than not repay to the best of their ability with their own aid that aid which Britain gave.
With the end of that ordeal began the antagonism between the Resistance and those who were believed to have collabor- ated too easily with the enemy in occupation. That many of the Resistance were fired by the Russian fight against the Germans to declare for Communism is easy enough to understand. In the end, partly owing to the lack of imagination with which it was handled, the situation in Greece looked like developing into civil war and there was a natural fear in Britain of Russian predominance extending to the €gean. The Fourth Indian Division was sent to Greece to protect the anti-Communists. To call this keeping Greece free, in the words of that leader- writer, at 'a mighty cost in British blood' is unworthy of a great paper. Nor does it help the argument over Cyprus to talk about 'Greeks in the British island of Cyprus.' Cyprus was rented from 'Turkey for thirty-six years and almost completely neglected during that time. It was offered to Greece in 1915 if Greece would come to the help of Serbia when the situation of the latter was already past help. Greece refused that offer, and later Cyprus was constituted a Crown Colony. The desire for enosis or union with Greece is as old as the Greek war against Turkey for independence. But I do not want to be led now into the argument about Cyprus: I am concerned to rebut that ignorant accusation of ingratitude.
When Greece stood across the path of Mussolini her action was a tonic to the world. Even if the Italian troops had reached Athens within a fortnight in spite of all the Greeks could do to bar the way, the decision Greece took would still have exerted a moral influence, the benefit of which would have lasted the length of the war. Greece's refusal to yield to Italian demands restored Britain's confidence in her ability to be recognised as the guardian and champion of liberty.
If Greece had accepted the ultimatum, there would have been no attack by Swordfish aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm on the Italian fleet in Taranto on the night of November 11, 1940. The Italian fleet would not have had to move to ports too far from Africa for any kind of effective naval action against the British fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. Crete would have become an enemy air base at a time when it would have menaced the British position in North Africa much more seriously than it was able to do nine months later. if Greece had succumbed to the Italian attack the Italian General Staff would not have been in a condition of deliquescence at the very moment when Wavell anticipated Graziani's offensive by striking first.
Previous page
