The road from communism

Timothy Garton Ash

Belgrade

When you first meet the white-haired old man in his quiet Belgrade flat, with its parquet floors, bookshelves packed with literature from every corner of Europe, writing implements neatly arrang- ed on the massive wooden desk, it is hard to believe that he had not sat here all his life, tranquilly composing his novels and short stories. But when Milovan Djilas begins to speak his brown eyes kindle with fire, and you see that this is indeed the young poet who was arrested, tortured and imprisoned as a communist under the pre-war Yugoslav monarchy; the tough Partisan commander; the rebel against the regime he had helped to build, imprisoned by his former com- rades in the same prison as before the war, with 15 common murderers for company. Almost 30 years after he broke with the Yugoslav Communist Party, the author of The New Class and Conversations with Stalin is still engaged in a passionate argu- ment with the communism in which he once as passionately believed.

'The Poles vill yin,' he exclaims in his im- pressionistic English, 'the Poles VILL VIN!,' and flourishes a hand. What has happened in Poland, he says, is eVen more important for the history of communism than Yugoslavia's break with Stalin. In Poland they have begun to dismantle the system: not to reform it, to dismantle it. Djilas does not now believe that it is possi- ble for communistic politbureaucratic dic- tatorships to reform themselves. Even the Yugloslav system, without the imperatives or constraints of Soviet imperialism, has not proved capable of generating the forces for fundamental reform, he argues.

True, the three years since the death of Tito have seen a ferment of debate in a press which has at times been closer to the American than to the Soviet model. True, these years have seen a marked 'loosening up' in several of the country's six Republics—notably in Belgrade and in in- dustrially advanced Slovenia—and critical groups have there enjoyed more freedoms. But now, he says, the regime is entering a period of 'consolidation'. Unable to agree whether the political system needs more centralisation or less, let alone who should give up power to whom , the ruling groups have effectively agreed to leave the present constitution (dating from 1974) and institu- tional structures much as they are. They will merely try to use the existing machinery (which might unkindly be described as a system of checks and imbalances) to im- prove the co-ordination of economic recovery. If a real shock comes, it will come not from inside the party but from out- side—perhaps from the International Monetary Fund. Western observers, Djilas cautions, are inclined to take brave words for deeds in Yugoslavia.

Thus even in Yugoslavia the Communist Party is not capable of democratising itself. In fact Djilas agrees with Leszek Kolakowski that 'democratic communism' is like 'fried snowballs'. The more com- munism you have, the less democracy; the more democracy, the less communism. To the extent that the Italian Communist Party has become democratic it has ceased to be communist.

This argument, which applies a fortiori to the Soviet Union (see Djilas's article in the Spectator of 8 January this year) does not, however, lead him to a wholly pessimistic conclusion. For although the communist system cannot be reformed from within it can be ruined from within—as in Poland. He does not believe that the Polish example can be followed directly by the other East European nations. Every nation must find its own road away from communism. In- deed, he says, they have already begun. He holds it to be a general rule that the longer

Spectator 11 June 1983 communist parties are in power, the more national characteristics overtake their prac- tice and programmes. The differences bet- ween East European 'satellite' nations to-

day would have been unthinkable 30 years ago. Like the Ottoman emperors in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Russian rulers have been impelled to grant increasing areas of national and cultural autonomy.

Moreover, he believes that the 'loosening up' of the Soviet empire will continue — so long as East Europeans keep up the pressure. The general rule of what we might call the nationalisation of communism also applies a fortiori to Russia. Today, he says, the Soviet bloc can accurately be described as a Russian military empire. Russia's rulers still 'need the superstructure of ideology, both to legitimise their rule at home and, as important, to sustain its at- tractiveness abroad — particularly in the Third World. But, says Djilas, in their oval thinking they are essentially pragmatic im- perialists. In the short term they may even 'see a political advantage in the growing dif- ferences between their 'satellites': all the better for divide et impera. In the long run' however, this process must weaken the em- pire, as it weakened the Ottoman empire, from which the Serbs wrested

their independence in the 19th century. Yet this Russian empire, despite or

perhaps because of its internal decay, has, rarely been more vigorous in its extern policy. Djilas has no doubt that Russia .a2 continue to expand its physical dominiondominion`over lands and people' — its formal em- pire, so to speak — wherever and whenever it can. Its military leadership, he maintains, is today as cautious as it is opportunistic — despite, or perhaps because of, the Afghanistan blunder.

The West, by contrast, dismays him by

its weakness and confusion in confronting the Soviet Union. What is needed, he saYs, is more firmness and negotiation from strength. Western Europe should build up its conventional forces. 'As an old pot pagandist,' he smiles wryly, 'I think the 5 eto thing might be for all American troops _ leave Europe... ,' for then the West Eurvv% peons would have to make up their o minds to defend themselves (conventiona!, ly). As for nuclear weapons, 'Above, al don't believe,' he says, cryptically. nuclea,t Russians will never give up weapons.' He does not, however, regart ue economic sanctions as effective againstcabse the'f' the Soviet Union, except marginally

to

of military high technology. But whatries West really did agree to cut grain s juuppt 'let a the Soviet Union? 'Oh, they'll couple of million people die, you kh.or,w4ias A few years ago there was talk or ti.1

resuming some formal role in

perhaps even as President of theYFtigeosrlaeat; after Tito's death. Predictably thistfr sl not materialised and Djilas himse h no signs of wanting power again. d when he celebrates his 72nd birth ay r Sunday, he can enjoy the uno t

pean 'dissidents'. of an elder statesman among Eas fficial honou Instetandts,