11 MAY 1867, Page 6

LORD STANLEY AND THE LUXEMBURG QUESTION.

WllHAT is an endorsement on the back of a bill? Is it a promise to pay if the other parties to the transaction do not, or only in case they do? We should have thought that a simple question enough in commercial ethics, but that the Times has chosen this week to assume the second answer. It declares that no man is responsible for his signature unless the acceptor has paid the bill, and so rendered the signature unnecessary. The Prussian Government has been asked to evacuate the fortress of Luxemburg as a concession to the sensitive dignity of France, and has agreed, it is reported, upon the condition that Europe shall guarantee its neutrality. In plainer words, each of the Five Powers is to pledge itself in writing to declare war upon any Power which may attempt to seize this military position. Thereupon, the Times declares that such a promise is without danger, because "if all the Powers act together resistance would be out of the question, while, on the other hand, any repudiation by one Power of its obligations would necessarily absolve the others." If the acceptor does not pay the endorser ceases to be liable, a novel doctrine, which proclaimed in big type in the City article of the first commercial journal in the world, will, we doubt not, carry much comfort to the souls of bankrupts, speculators, and rogues generally. If Lord Stanley has agreed to guarantee Luxemburg with any such arriere pense'e, he has simply agreed to a fraud which, of all forms of political fraud, we should have thought most alien to his political character. His forte is surely judicious directness, not diplomatic subtlety, and till he himself avows it we refuse to believe that he is playing a game of which Lord Palmerston would have been ashamed. He did at least try to keep his pledge to Denmark. The need of the guarantee can only arise when Luxemburg has been occupied by one of the Powers, and if that occupation of itself annuls the pledge, what is the use of giving it? It is merely a farce, a pledge to do that which, while pledging our- selves, we acknowledge that we never intend to do—a grandilo- quent assertion that we will be responsible for the bill if the acceptor pays it. Even the Times seems to feel this is a little disreputable, for after using this argument it argues that the pledge after all is a little one, because we already guarantee Holland. As a matter of fact, that statement is a trick, for we do not directly guarantee Holland against the great Powers, but only against Belgium—a very different thing ; but suppose we do, as Lord Stanley on Thursday seemed to assume, what is that to the point ? The guarantee for Holland, on the Times' own showing, is as unreal as any other. Nobody but a great power can attack Holland, and the moment a great power breaks its obligation ours ceases, and we may skulk away contented, like a hound who has stolen a bone and escaped the expected whip. We are not liable, 'because the contingency we promised to provide against has occurred. "If you hit that little boy again," says Fifth Form, "I shall thrash you," and the bully desists. By and by, plucking up his courage, he hits the little boy, and Fifth Form walks off, consoling himself as he goes by muttering that if "people will not keep their agreements he is not bound to keep his."

We looked to Lord Stanley to pursue a manlier diplomacy than this, and must, till he confesses the contrary, believe that he intends the guarantee, if he gives it, to be a reality, a promise to resist the use of Luxemburg by France against Germany. That is the common sense of the pledge, that is why it is asked, that is why it is conceded. And in this view, we believe, no more dangerous pledge could be made by - Great Britain. It is nonsense to compare it with our guaran-

tee of Belgium. We should fight for Belgium anyhow, and the guarantee makes no practical difference, except to give the advocates of war a new and unanswerable argument. But without the guarantee we should not dream of fighting for Luxemburg. Moreover, no power will attack Belgium merely as an incident in a campaign ; but Luxemburg is very likely indeed to be incidentally occupied. It is just the place a French General, wanting to sever railway communications along the Rhine, would declare himself compelled to take, and then Prussia would be able to demand our alliance against France. We do not want to fight France. Except a war with America, no calamity could be so detrimental to us, to Europe, and to civilization, so ruinous to commerce, so fatal -to progress, so meaningless in 'result. What have we to get from France ? Yet if the guarantee does not mean that we are liable to a risk of this demand, to a sudden war with our nearest neighbour, or a confession of cowardice before the -world, what does it mean? If we are to allow France to take

Luxemburg, what does Prussia gain in exchange for her

fortress Just this,—that if it is very convenient to us to. defend Luxemburg, we shall have legal locus standi when we say we intend to do it. What is the value of that to Prussia —of her right to ask an acquaintance to commence a grand. Chancery suit for her own advantage and his detriment ?

But we shall be told the guarantee is essential to preserve. the honour of Prussia, and so to maintain peace. It is a bit of high comedy, like an English duel, but one which it i& necessary for the political grandees to go through with. There' is a certain amount of truth in that suggestion, but then the question arises why England, which of all Powers manages high comedy worst, should be compelled to play her part. How is it her interest? The Times, which cares about nothing: but the price of Consols, always assumes that peace is the- grand interest of this country, and that might be true, were the peace real. But it may very well be doubted whether- the condition of armed preparation now maintained all over' Europe is not worse Ulan war, whether it does not exhaust. the nations more, more deeply imperil the profits upon trade. At all events, it is clear that there is a future price at whicb even peace may be dear. If France and Prussia equally accept our mediation, and find no new cause of quarrel in some detail, and rest content without trying their relative strength about Luxemburg, then we shall have purchased a postponement of a war which we can keep out of, at the price of a future war into. which, if we are decently honest and straightforward, we must perforce enter. We buy an escape from the annoyance e giving evidence in a Chancery suit at the price of a Chancery suit to which we shall be principal parties. That is at least. exceedingly bad economy, as Lord Stanley out of office would. probably be the first to see.

It would be rather a grotesque finale for the negotiations if we found ourselves burdened with a guarantee without obtain- ing the compensatory peace. Of course, as England assents- to the sine Tad non, war can, if France and Prussia are equally willing, be easily postponed, but are they willing ? The- Foreign Office thinks so apparently, but the British Foreign Office has always shown itself the most credulous of detective- establishments, and the broad facts do not bear out that. theory. It is almost certain, as certain as anything carefully- concealed by officials can be, that France is arming fast, and that Berlin is taking either real or affected umbrage at these, armaments, the reality and the affectation being about equally dangerous. It is argued, of course, in France that the- collection of the camp at Chalons two months earlier than usual, the enlargement of that camp, the completion of the works at Metz, the incessant manufacture of cart- ridges, the increase in the effectives, and above all, the calling out of the reserves, are all precautionary measures ; but they have been taken on a scale and at a cost which Sovereigns do not sanction unless they see very serious. dangers ahead, and they are continuing now, when, to believe the newspapers and the funds, the reign of peace has been solidly re-established. Why is the Emperor embarrassing his exchequer, if he feels so certain that the Conference is- sure to . give him a great diplomatic victory, for the evacu- ation of Luxemburg is a victory for him ? and why does Count von Bismarck pass the word to dead-official journals to com- plain of armaments which, as he knows, cannot be made the- subject of official remonstrance ? France will not take orders- as to the extent of her armaments from any power in the world, least of all from the one which has so recently excited her jealousy, and with which she is in such open diplomatic conflict. It is not like Count von Bismarck to publish state- ments so wounding to the amour propre of an adversary merely because they are wounding, with no intention of fol- lowing them up, and no motive in calling the attention of the- people behind him. The clouds are very thick still, and_ though they seem to be breaking, perhaps we may say are- breaking, the barometer is still far from having risen to " set- fair." Despite the meeting of Conference, the acceptance of a. basis,—the neutralization of the Duchy,—which does not involve the grand point at issue, and the optimist tone of the- British official world, the grand security for peace is still that if Napoleon fights he knows he must succeed, and that in a. warbetween equals success is never certain.

One word more. If the Conference succeeds in maintain- ing peace one fact will be established of far greater im- portance than any possible solution of the Luxemburg question. The European tribunal dissolved by the Crimean war will have been re-established, to the immense benefit of mankind. There is no longer a power on the Continent which can do as it likes, without consulting anybody, but many Powers so equal and so bound together that they must perforce prefer the regime of law to the re'ginge of force. The fate of Belgium and Holland, for example, is no longer dependent upon Napoleon's fiat, or that of Denmark upon the policy of Berlin. The Powers are jealous again, and with reason, and every accession of territory, however small, every intrigue, however secret, will be watched with anxious care, and, if needful, arrested by the Council of Five, which alone has the strength to maintain the European peace and an interest in doing so. When France arms to obtain a bit of outlying land and cannot obtain it, Europe is safe from the aggression of any less potent State.