THE REAL DANGER OF THE LORDS
FOR twenty-three years the Parliament Act has been on the Statute Book as an unfinished piece of legislation awaiting completion by some adventurous Government of the Left or the Right. For twenty- . three years successive Governments have fought shy of it. In introducing the original measure Mr. Asquith admitted the necessity of proceeding from limitation of the powers of the House of Lords to reform of its constitution. Conservatives have not ceased to regard reform as a means either of regaining some of the lost .powers or of staving off future attacks. But they have done nothing. Though the Coalition Government in 1917 appointed a representative committee presided over by Lord Bryce, which issued a report,. and Lord Cave produced proposals on behalf of the Conservative Government in 1927, the position is unchanged today, and a House composed mainly of hereditary peers (of whom on only two occasions during the last session did as many as one in seven take part in a divi- sion) remains charged with the duties of a Second Chamber.
But we do not suppose that it is from any passion for constitution-making, as such, that Lord Salisbury has introduced his new measure in the House of Lords. Just as Lord Cave's plan followed the General Strike, so the new Bill follows the threats of the Socialist League. Lord Salisbury has been perfectly frank about it. He has quoted the words of Sir Stafford Cripps : " The Labour Government's first step will be to call Parliament together at the earliest moment and place before it an Emergency Powers Bill, to be passed through all its stages on the first day." It is because their Lordships should " take some precaution to prevent the country from being exposed to these perils," that they are asked to give their attention to the reform of their House and the increase of its powers. It is fear of a Labour Gover- ment and its possibly revolutionary action after winning a victory at the polls that makes Conservatives like Lord Salisbury so anxious to strengthen the constitutional barriers.
It would be scarcely worth while to spend much time over the details of the Bill, for it was obvious that a National Government, claiming to represent all parties, could not adopt it. Unlike the Bryce report, which would have made the composition of the Upper House mainly dependent on election by the House of Commons, it would preserve half the seats for hereditary peers, opening the other half to Lords of Parliament outside the hereditary peerage. Thus it would be sure of a permanent Conservative majority. In extending its powers, it goes far beyond Lord Cave's proposals in 1927, which would have made it impossible to abolish the delay- ing veto of the House of Lords without its own consent, for it would make the veto effective not merely for three sessions, but for the whole life of a Parliament, referring the decision to the next House of Commons. Thus we should be back where we were in 1910: the Upper House would still be predominantly Conservative ; measures passed by a Conservative House of Commons would automatically pass through the Lords, but no highly controversial Liberal or Labour measure could get through the Upper House without a second successful General Election.
Such proposals, if we can imagine them being seriously taken up by any Government, would be a direct challenge to Labour, and would precipitate the very conflict which they are designed to avert. And yet the question is one which it is unwise to neglect. It can only be solved satisfactorily in a non-party spirit, and the Government might profitably explore the possibilities of an agreed settlement. The dangers ahead are not precisely those depicted by Lord Salisbury, but they are none the less real. A Labour Government, even if it were intent on measures far less extreme than those proposed by Sir Stafford Cripps, would nevertheless soon find itself embroiled with the present House of Lords ; and it would perhaps be driven into the position where it would demand its abolition. Nor is it improbable that the Crown would once again be drawn into the quarrel between the two Houses, and it is not right that the King should be exposed to the possibility of being called upon to decide in a great constitutional issue between two exasperated political parties. To fail to make any pro- vision for a struggle which, under the present constitution, is sooner or later almost certain to occur, is tempting fate and challenging disorder. If democracy itself is to survive, its institutions must be made democratic. If the defects of single Chamber Government are to be avoided, the composition of the Upper House must be such that its behaviour will not be a standing grievance to either party.
If we start from the assumption that a second Chamber is needed—and the case for it is overwhelming—it is necessary to ensure not only its efficiency but its security against prejudiced attack. Apart from the valuable work it may do in initiating or amending Bills, its proper function is to safeguard the country against the hurried legislation. of a Government returned on a passing wave of national feeling. Therefore, it obviously should not be a political duplicate of the House of Commons, elected at the same moment by the same electorate or by a single House of Commons. It might possibly be chosen by three successive Houses of Commons, each electing one-third of the members; or it might include nominees of successive Prime Ministers ; or some other device might be adopted for making it expressive of the will of the nation as declared, not at a single moment, but over a period of time. The only safeguard for its continued existence will be that by its constitution it is not perman- ently weighted in the interests of one party ; it must be free from the objection that it stands for privilege. If it is not free from this objection, it will never be safe from attack or threats of attack, and will defeat its proper end by being a constant challenge to the aggrieved party, tending to drive it back upon unconstitutional tactics.
Therefore, whilst it is highly desirable that among its members should be dignitaries of the Church, distin- guished lawyers, experienced administrators, wise elder statesmen, and some representatives of the old aristocratic families, their choice or nomination should not depend on any procedure which would tend to be more favourable to one side than another. If the House of Lords exists in its present form when a Labour Govern- ment comes to power, it will be attacked. It ought, therefore, to be reformed. But it will be of not the least use so to reform it as to leave it still open to the charge that it weights the scales on one side. Only if it is fully proof against such accusations, so that opinion cannot be inflamed against it on the ground that it stands for privilege against the people, will it be able to stand up against an unduly precipitate House of CommOns, and insist on time for reflection before irrevocable measures are taken in the heat and fluster following a triumphant election.
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