THE RETREAT FROM MONS.* Is we were asked how to

get the best idea of the early fighting by our small but immortal Expeditionary Force, we would say : Read Lord Ernest Hamilton's book, The First Seven Division., for the facts, and Major Corbett-Smith's book, The Retreat from Mons, for the spirit. The latter deals with Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's corps more than with Sir Douglas Haig's, and even on its own ground does not attempt a connected narrative. It gives us specimen episodes in the fighting ; but these are so well chosen that they do in effect convey to us an accurate idea of what the whole strategical issue was. Above all it suggests the authentic spirit of those distressing and exhausting yet ennobling and morally triumphant days. This is a very informal, cheery book. It might have taken for its title a word continually on the lips of the men—" Cheeroh ! " Not that the British soldier con- tinually turns everything to merriment and good-natured raillery ; a very false impression of him may be obtained by accumulating his sayings which happen to be best worth remembering. Major Corbett- Smith is careful to insist that during the retreat from Mons the men were far too exhausted to have much heart for fun ; but all the same, if they had not had an immense fund of cheerfulness to draw upon they could not have accomplished the retreat in the marvellous way they did. Their feat will stand among the almost incredible pages of military history ; for all through the retreat, even when formations were utterly lost owing to the pressure of the overwhelming German forces, our men kept a winning spirit and inspired their pursuers with a very wholesome respect for them. "What are we retiring for I We give 'em socks, didn't we?" was a typical and very significant grouse. If we read Major Corbett-Smith's thoughts aright, he is rather jealous of the French method, which is often traceable, of allowing knowledge and appreciation of the general idea of a military movement to penetrate far through an Army, so that every capable brain may have the moral advantage of knowing what is aimed at and how each individual effort serves the whole scheme. Again, he is a great believer in a well-directed and instructive publicity. "We are not children," he seems to say in effect, "and we shall all do better for being regarded as men and being expected to comport ourselves as men." His own work in disseminating "war facts and ideas" is well known, and in our opinion has been extremely useful.

From the beginning of mobilization Major Corbett-Smith noticed with deep satisfaction the evidence of careful forethought for the despatch of the Expeditionary Force abroad. The management of the railways (most trains being able to start actually in advance of their time) filled him with wonder. He was also reassured by the devices for maintaining secrecy as to the destination of all bodies of troops. Trifling ruses are a sure sign that brains are at work which are not afraid to be uncon- ventional. Here is an example :— " An A.S.C. motor transport unit was detailed to embark upon a certain ship. Nearly a day's warning had been given to the 0.0. The lorries were driven to the dock-side and were just being got on board. The Embarkation Officer, who was standing quietly by, suddenly informed the C.O. that his ship was not that one but another due to sail from another dock some distance away. The C.O. had barely time in which to get his lorries across, and the ship sailed the moment all was reported clear. An incident trivial enough, and how un-English it seemed at the time. But after the secret landing of the 9th Army Corps at Suvla, and the subsequent evacuation of Gallipoli, it would appear that we have nothing to learn in the art of ruse."

The hobnobbing of the British soldiers with the French people is very well described. Our soldiers could understand the older French people having learned to talk French so glibly, but what amazed them was that the children should have picked up that outlandish tongue so cleverly ! There was an odd contrast in the attitude of the British and French soldiers as they entrained for the front. The British scribbled "To Berlin" all over the doors of the carriages, but the French were restrained by memories of the fatal omen of 1870.

The more tremendous events which make up the unforkettable story of the retreat occurred in the week which began on Sunday, August 23rd. On that morning the information at the disposal of the British G.H.Q. induced them to believe that the Germans had about 130,000 men advancing against the 80,000 of our own two corps. Asprobably every one has learned by this time, our let Corps under Sir Douglas Haig stretched westwards from Binche to Mons, and the 2nd Corps under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien from Mons westwards to Conde along the Mons Canal. The confident belief of our Army that it could hold that line against a superiority of numbers which did not reach two to one was unfortunately based on faulty information. On our right the fight did not go well for us, and the suspicion that some mistake had been made as to the German numbers gradually became a certainty. If only two German corps and a cavalry division were in front of General

• The Retreat from Moss: by One who Shared in it. By A. Corbett-Smith (Major IL.F.A.) With I PLites and Map. London: Cassell and Co. Os. ed. net.]

Haig, as had been supposed, where did all the German guns come from? The explanation did not arrive till the evening of Sunday, August 23rd At 5 p.m. there happened one of the most dramatic incidents of the war, that day or afterwards. You will find the bare recital of the event set forth in cold official language in the 0.0.0.4,1-Chiefs dispatch beginning • 'In the meantime, about 5 p.m., I received a most unex- pected message from General Joffre.' It will be remembered that from information received from French G.H.Q. the previous night, and from his own reconnaissance reports, the Commander-in-Chief had concluded that his right flank was reasonably secured by the French armies, that the fortress of Namur was still being held, and that the enemy strength in front of him was about 134,000 men and 490 field-guns, at an outside estimate. All the afternoon the enemy had been attacking, and the British right had had to give ground before it, with the consequence that Mons itself had to be abandoned. Now, like a bolt from the blue, came the message from the French. Unexpected,' one would think, is a very mild term; 'Namur has fallen. The Germans yesterday won the passages over the River Sambre between Charleroi and Namur. The French armies are retiring. You have ai least 187,500 men and 690 guns attacking you in front ; another 62,500 men and 230 guns trying to turn your left flank ; and probably another 300,000 men' (the victorious army in pursuit of the French) 'driving in a wedge on your right.'" Even that thunderbolt did not convey the whole truth. As was after- wards ascertained, the Germans in front of us were not 187,500 men and 690 gum, but 250,000 men and 920 guns ; and the Germans on our right flank were not 250,000 men and 920 guns, but 500,000 men and 1,840 guns ! Major Corbett-Smith gives a striking illustration of the total superiority of the Germans to the French and ourselves along the whole front of the thrust towards Paris :-

All ranks,

Yield- VMS.

Marbles-

guns.

"British .„ 80,000 300 100 French • • .. 240,000 960 288 German .•

.. 812,500 3,016 936 Excess German strength over

Franco-British

492,500 1,756

MS

It is always rather difficult to grasp the meaning of big numbers like these, so let me put it another way. Place ono German against each man in tho Franco-British Force, and one German field-gun against each field-gun on our side. Now take all the German soldiers and guns still remaining over and imagine that you are watching them march past you down Whitehall, the men in fours all doing their 'goose' parade step and the guns going by at a trot. The army, marching night and day, without a moment's halt, would take just about three days to pass you."

As for the German machine guns, they had secretly multiplied out of all knowledge during the year 1913-14.

It had been hoped to make a stand at Maubmage, but with the French unable to nipped our right that was impossible. A gap developed between our two corps during the retreat, and when Sir Horace Smith- Dorrien reached Le Cateau he decided that his best chance was to stand and fight. The prospects on that day—August 26th—of holding up the enemy seemed almost hopeless, but our men were so exhausted that a continuation of the retreat seemed more hopeless still. Lord French did not at first approve of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's plan, but he yielded to the judgment of the man on the spot, only warning him that there was no possibility of reinforcing him. How Sir Horace Smith- Dorrien, with the unexpected help of the French cavalry under General Sordet, extricated himself as the result of his delaying battle is one of the most wonderful stories of a wonderful week. Imagine the exhaustion of men who preferred to stay and receive each a hellish pounding of artillery to marching further There are many incidents which we should like to quote, in par- ticular those which illustrate the German mass attacks, but we must refrain. The general impression we have is of a human tide advancing while the splendid shooting of our men took tremendous toll of it, but could not stop it any more than you could stop the sea by showering stones into it.