'R io ' ' THE awful disaster to the largest airship in

the world -11- has raised the blackest doubts about the wisdom of the whole policy of building airships. That is a fact to be faced. Yet it must be remembered that moments of horror and overwhelming grief are the worst time for dispassionate thinking. It may be that some remediable cause of such an accident will be discovered by the conimittee of inquiry. In that event we shall at least be able to say that a higher degree of safety has been bought at an incalculable cost. "Best safety lies in fear." Conceivably the fear of such another sacrifice of highly accomplished and brave men will really lead to the discovery of the necessary safeguards. On the other hand, the present doubts may be substantiated. All that need be said now is that the extreme gravity of the misgivings do not justify any conclusions one way or the other until the inquiry is complete.

The notion that 'R101 ' had been weakened by being lengthened after her first trials may be dismissed. Colonel Richmond and the other experienced designers who were responsible for the new bay in '11101 ' were confident that she had actually been strengthened. And their confidence seems to be reinforced by photographs of the wreckage at Beauvais. One instantly notices the small amount of damage done to the framework. It is crumpled underneath, and the bow which struck the earth first is smashed ; but that is all. The great size of the airship must have exposed her to tremendous assaults from the wind. Her beautiful streamline reduced to a minimum her resistance to the wind alongthe course she was steering, but there could not, of course, be any streamline evasion of the terrific thrusts of tempestuous winds from above or below or at the side.

Some experience had already been gained of the effect of irregular gusts of wind upon an airship, but not enough for a decision as to whether the Airship Policy should be held defeated by an insurmountable danger. In 1925, the American airship 'Shenandoah' was caught in vertical squalls which tossed her up from 8,000 to more than 5,000 feet, blew her down again, and smashed her. The ' 11100 ' during her recent voyage to Canada went through a lesser test over the St. Lawrence. She was driven up and down between a height of 2,000 feet and 4,000 feet. The brilliant Dr. Eckencr in his 'Graf Zeppelin' was also assailed by vertical winds which nearly brought him to grief in the Rhone valley. If the United States fulfils her present programme of building two airships even larger than R101 ' there ought to be plenty of opportunity for deciding whether airships are or are not unmanageable in certain winds.

When 11101 'left Cardington it was noticed that she was flying low. Unquestionably she had a very heavy load, though it must be remembered that fuel—plenty of which is one of the first precautions for safety—is a diminishing cargo. In any case the altitude of the airship was evidently the preoccupation of the officers. One of the messages sent to ground said "Gradually increasing height." The last message about her height not long before the disaster said that she was at 1,500 feet. The weather conditions when she reached Beauvais on her way to Paris were evidently as bad as could be—a strong gusty wind with thick driving rain. It -appears from the evidence of one of the survivors that just before the crash an attempt was made to increase the height as the airship was near the ground.. According to this account speed was increased but almost immediately afterwards was reduced. The airship then -hit the ground at an angle of about 45. Something quite exceptional- must have •

happened for such an angle to be taken near the ground.

One suggestion is that the elevators jammed ; another that the weight of rain-water which had accumulated in

the concave panels forced the airship down and that in a vertical gust of wind she touched the ground before anything could be done to gain height ; Yet another that the altimeters did not register correctly and that the Captain was quite unaware that he was flying so low. Such evidence as there is inclines us to think that.the rain and the wind were the joint cause of the crash. No signal of distress or even of minor trouble had been sent out. Even a vertical gust of wind from below, tilting the stern up and the bow down, would have had much the same effect as a vertical gust from above.

It had been hoped that as the engines of 11101' were driven by heavy oil there would be no question of the

hydrogen in the gasbag catching fire in an accident.

Apparently, however, the engines being forced bodily into the gasbag, ignited the gas. One's thoughts naturally turn to the alternative non-inflammable gas known as helium. The objections to helium are that it is rather heavier than hydrogen and that the supply so

far has been limited. Major C. C. Turner, writing in the Daily Telegraph, mentions that Dr. Eckener when recently visiting England declared definitely that there would not

long be a shortage of helium. The main sources are in

the United States, but Dr. Eckener said that there was a prospect of obtaining 7,000,000,000 cubic feet of this

gas and that at present the American Government required

only 10,000,000 cubic feet a year. The combination of heavy oil for the engines and helium for the gasbag may possibly mean safety from fire, but it plainly has nothing to do with the other and even graver question whether cer- tain weather conditions are unconquerable. The list of

airships which have collapsed under strains too great for them—mostly weather-strains—is long and depressing. In spite of this Lord Thomson ardently believed that there was no problem in the use of airships which could not be solved. Sir Sefton Brancker was very doubtful, but was open to conviction.

One of the principal disadvantages of airships as com- pared with heavier-than-air machines is that they are dependent on their mooring masts. An aeroplane can descend upon any fairly smooth field and a seaplane upon any reasonably smooth sheet of water, but an airship needs hundreds of trained hands to bring her safely to earth where there is no mooring mast. There were only two mooring masts ready for R101 ' on her voyage to India —one in Egypt and the other at the end of her journey.

An airship which is short of fuel, at the mercy of the wind, and near neither a mooring mast nor a staff of trained men, is in a desperate position. This consideration alone tilts the scale for some people decisively against the Air- ship Policy.

Major Turner is not immoderate when he says :—

"It is very disturbing to realize that the airship staff have been very nearly wiped out. Such an administrator as Wing. Commander Colmore, such a chief airship pilot as Major Scott, such an experi- enced designer as Col. Richmond, a navigator as Squadron.Leader Johnstone, a meteorologist as Mr. Giblett, cannot be replaced for many a day. All were highly specialist, and much of their know- ledge and experience is now lost to us. Actually, it would not be possible at present to put the '1(100' into commission, except with a crew below its proper strength."

The facts compel in any case a delay in the Airship Policy. The next step will be the report of the committee of inquiry. Much—perhaps everything—will depend upon that. It will then be seen more-clearly whether it is reasonable to hope for victory or whether it -is better to abandon a hopeless -quest.