11 OCTOBER 1935, Page 14

Communication

The Front Paysan in France

[To the Editor of Tun SPECTATOR.]

Sin,—There has recently been further evidence of the distress prevailing among the French peasants. The slump in prices, accentuated by the prolonged misfortune of three successive bumper crops, has driven many of them into debt. In various parts of the country farmers have had their property distrained upon, and the state of feeling is such that the sales have some- times been carried out amid the vigorous protests of their neighbours.

Political agitation has not failed to take advantage of the discontents. At a recent by-election an Agrarian candidate— who, however, seems to have received the full Conservative vote—was only beaten by a narrow majority in a Radical- Socialist constituency. The Front Paysan, an organisation which vaguely preaches a sort of Fascist corporative doctrine, -has launched a campaign for non-payment of taxes as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the public authorities. The Socialist Party has held a special congress to consider the agricultural problem and has drafted a number of Bills to be presented to Parliament, one of which proposes a partial moratorium for debts owed by farmers, except in the case of those owed to commercial suppliers. These political repercus- sions are not negligible. They disturb, momentarily at least, the normal flow of opinion in the ordinary party channels. But it would be imprudent to assume that the mass of the peasantry is ready to adopt windy revolutionary tactics. There have been spurts of agitation before, but none of them in the end has altered the configuration of French politics.

The immediate cause of the present troubles was the collapse in prices which occurred at the end of.July, when wheat fell to BO francs a quintal. Partly owing to the measures taken by the Government to dispose of the surplus wheat carried. over from previous seasons, but still more probably owing to the moderate size of this year's crop, the price afterwards recovered to 80 francs. This brought some relief, but the peasants are still not hopeful that they will ever sell their corn at a satisfac- tory profit. The more profound causes of their difficulties are a complex of over-production, under-consumption and the policy of self-sufficiency in food-stuffs which has been pursued by successive French Governments for many years. Such factors cannot be dealt with in a day.

It is pretty certain that the French people eat less bread than they used to do, perhaps as a result of a slow evolution in taste, perhaps owing to the deliberate baking of bread of poorer quality during the European War. Some estimate the national consumption of wheat at 85,000,000 quintals a year, others at 90,000,000 quintals. Let us assume that the lower figure is correct. The present position of supplies is roughly ascertainable. This year's crop is one of 70 to 75 million quintals. The surplus already existing is about 20,000,000 quintals. The total of 90 to 95 million quintals is therefore in excess of the home consumption, but not nearly so excessive as that of the previous year. That is so much to the good. The problerh is of more manageable proportions than it was.

M. Cathala, the Minister of Agriculture, recently pointed out, however, that the main problem is not solved. Apart from the difficulty of raising prices to a remunerative level in present world conditions, there is always the possibility henceforward that France will in a good year produce more wheat than she can consume. She has not seen" the last of bumper crops. The French farmer has 'steadily improved his efficiency. Stimulated by the State to sow essential cereals, to modernise his methods, to use fertilisers scientific- ally, he has increased his yield per acre. The average yield Of wheat in the years 1901-13 was 'under 14 quintals per hectare. From 1928 to 1932 it was 14.70 quintals and in 1938 no less than 18 quintals.

There is no obvious or easy solution for the problem of over-production. And so long as the problem remains it is a pathetic human problem. It is not a question of giving satisfaction to some anonymous " agricultural interest " consisting of people who can very well look after themselves. The need is to ensure a livelihood to proprietors of whom four-fifths occupy holdings of not. more than 25 acres. Given the value of his services to the community, the peasant is not exacting. He asks to be able to sell his wheat at a price which will enable him to live, to buy his seed, fertilisers and tools, and perhaps to put a little by in the legendary bas de table or to purchase an extra cow. Being a small man and an individualist, he is often compelled to sell his crop as soon as it is gathered—that is to say, at a time when the market

is well supplied and prices tend to be low. If he cannot sell, or can only sell at a loss, the bottom is knocked out of his economy. That is exactly what has happened to him.

Not the least vigorous of the peasant's complaints is that during this period of crisis his necessary purchases have had

to be made at high prices. By a singular irony, indeed, he has had to buy his bread at a prim out of all proportion to the price he received for the wheat of which it was made. To help the farmer, Parliament in July, 1933, passed a law fixing the minimum price of wheat at 115 francs a quintal. The farmer notoriously did not receive anything approaching that price. But the price of bread, being fixed administra- tively, was naturally based on the official and fictitious price of wheat. Nothing could be more irritating to the farmer than to be thwarted of the price decreed for his wheat and compelled to pay it for his bread.

It would seem that the various devices of juggling with maxima and minima no longer find favour with the authorities. One palliative, at least, is to remain. Advances are being made to farmers on the value of their corn, in order to enable. them to hold it instead of pouring it immediately on the market and so depressing prices. But such measures do not attack the real problem. For that fundamental task the idea most favoured at the moment is that of a general organisation of production, presumably by way of restriction. Some agriculturists demand the suspension of imports, with the exception of such produce as France cannot herself provide.

For a general organisation, however, the difficulties are rendered formidable by the character of the French agricul- tural community. Whatever system of restriction be adopted, the difficulty of controlling more than five million small holdings is obvious. As things are, every peasant probably hopes that the total national wheat crop will be small, but he certainly hopes that his own will be large. And the small man must be satisfied, for he wields a great and scarcely questioned electoral power. In the French Chamber the " agricultural interest " is often master.

What is certain for the moment is that the famous economic balance of France, which enabled her to resist the world crisis for so long, is seriously upset. If the purchasing power of the peasant—on which manufacturing prosperity largely depends—be measured by the value of the wheat crop, it has dropped by something like 40 per cent. between 1929 and 1934. Is it possible that, sooner or later, the whole ideal of a France self-sufficing in essential food-stuffs may be brought into question ? As far as wheat is concerned, France has hitherto been able to work towards the ideal, but she has had to pay the heavy cost of the policy. By her enormous agricultural protection—the duty of 80 francs on 100 kilogrammes of wheat, which has been in force in recent years, has at times been more than 100 per cent. of the world wheat price—she has encouraged the production of corn on lands in the is somutolre than doubtful.whose suit-

ability for the purpose doubtful. Now that she appears to have over-shot the mark and to risk occasional over-production, the question of self-sufficiency wears another