11 OCTOBER 1986, Page 13

THE NELSON TOUCH

Caspar Weinberger imagines

what would be made of Nelson's moral courage today

This address was given at a Trafalgar Day dinner last year.

ON THE night of 20 October 1805, Admiral Viscount Nelson, Duke of Bronte, spoke these words to his assem- bled midshipmen. 'Tomorrow,' he said, 'I will do that which will give you younger gentlemen something to talk and think about for the rest of your lives.' That may have been the only time in his life that Lord Nelson indulged in under- statement. The last of Trafalgar's 'band of brothers' has long since passed from the earth. But 180 years after the battle, we still have 'something to talk and think about'.

It is, I understand, the tradition of Trafalgar Night dinners to draw lessons for today from Nelson's great victory of yester- day. I am far too staunch a conservative to break from this tradition. But as I thought about Nelson and Trafalgar, I was struck by a somewhat bizarre idea. What if instead of Parliament and the Lords of the Admiralty receiving Nelson's dispatches and reviewing his activities — what if a modern-day United States Congress had been the legislative body to whom Nelson had to report? Allow me then, if you will, to warp time, or at least summon H.G. Wells's time machine, and journey with me to Capitol Hill, on 20 October 1805. A highly classified Congressional committee staff report has just been issued, and of course a copy has been made available to the London Post. It reads as follows: `In the first place, this committee has serious questions about Admiral Nelson's fitness for duty, and asks the Admiralty why he was assigned to this command. There is his physical condition. Admiral Nelson has not reported for the Navy's physical fitness test since entering the service. And little wonder. The man has only one eye, and only one arm. He suffers from recurrent malaria, and indeed has not yet recovered from a recent attack. Finally, several of his colleagues have testified that Admiral Nelson actually becomes seasick when his ship encounters any but the lightest breezes. The committee fails to understand why this individual should ever have been allowed into the Navy let alone been given an important command although we have noted his undue reliance on family influence to obtain positions.

`We have further questions about Admiral Nelson's character and mental stability. His financial disclosure forms reveal that he has repeatedly petitioned the Government for irregular pay increases and not just for himself, but also for someone charitably described as a close friend. His fitness reports indicate that he regularly sees visions. And all who know Admiral Nelson acknowledge that he is inclined to boast. Just a few days ago, Admiral Nelson actually wrote to a friend saying, 'I verily believe the country will soon be put to some expense for my account, either a monument, or a new pension and honours.' Where is Admiral Nelson's concern for the taxpayer?

`The committee also notes that Admiral Nelson is prone to take great risks in his defiance of express orders. At Aboukir Bay he brought his ships through com- pletely uncharted shoals. At Cape St Vin- cent he pulled out of the line of battle, and singlehandedly attacked seven enemy ships. At Copenhagen he refused to obey a signal to disengage. The committee recog- nises that in this last instance Admiral Nelson did, upon request, raise his spyglass to scan the horizon for the signal flag. His insubordination is emphasised by the fact that he put the glass to an eye that was also glass. `The committee acknowledges that Admiral Nelson's insubordination may in each case have been responsible for a technical victory. Nevertheless, we are deeply disturbed about his prospects against the French tomorrow. By his own admission, he plans to break completely with established procedures, by making the order of sailing the order of battle. Only five of his captains have ever commanded a ship before, yet he assumes that they will know how to proceed, simply because and these are his very words — they have felt "the electric shock" of "the Nelson touch". He even goes so far as to admit, in a memorandum, that "something must be left to chance". `Of greatest concern to the committee, however, is Admiral Nelson's undue en- thusiasm for battle. "My disposition," he has written, "cannot bear tame or slow measures." In the opinion of this commit- tee, his disposition is insufficiently sober to understand the danger facing our nation. Intelligence sources report that 90,000 assault troops have assembled to invade our shores. Only the fleet stands between us and them. Admiral Nelson proposes that we risk our Navy in an all-out battle where we will be outnumbered and out- gunned by 33 ships with 2,600 guns to 27 of our ships with only 2,148 guns. He prop- oses that our ships take direct fire for several minutes before they can engage the enemy — a plan that in the opinion of this committee ensures we will suffer heavy casualties. In short, the man is imprudent and irresponsible. The committee urges that the Lords of the Admiralty recall him immediately before all is lost. This is just another example of the mismanagement caused by having separate services.'

Such might have been the report of a committee staff of the US Congress, had it been overseeing Nelson and British secur- ity, and listening to its staff as is customary.

Now, let us twist time futher: I am afraid I know what some of the questions would have been had Nelson survived and been summoned for the inevitable hearing. On the basis of some experience, I think it would have gone roughly like this: Senator A: Admiral, I would like you to tell this committee how you possibly can justify the deaths of some 450 sailors when only 6,100 of the enemy were killed?

Senator B: The London Post carries a story this morning that your action was provocative in the extreme, and really destroyed any hope of securing the negoti- ated peace which informed observers re- port that Napoleon was about to offer. What do you say about that, Admiral?

Senator C: We understand that there were 33 ships of the line on the French and Spanish side. How could you have hoped to accomplish anything when you only had 27 ships?

Senator D: We understand that half of your ships were damaged — and while, it is true, none were lost or surrendered, and it is also true that you were able to get them all back to port after the battle, neverthe- less you captured only 17 of the enemy ships. How do you justify your losses?

Senator E: We understand that you divided your ships, even though you had a smaller number, and insisted on leading one column while you assigned Admiral Collingwood to take a second column, instead of keeping all of your ships together. Perhaps you can explain to this committee why you did not concentrate all of your firepower on one or two of the French ships instead of dispersing your ships in this dangerous manner.

Senator F: When will you have for this committee the exact cost of this operation, including the cost of repairs to the ships you allowed to be damaged?

Senator G: How many more such fai- lures do you think we will be able to fund in view of the increasing cost of repairs?

Senator H: Do you not agree that this tragic failure is a strong argument for abolishing the Lords of the Admiralty, and putting the conduct of naval affairs under direction of a Senate Committee, or at least a group of retired admirals? Senator I: And finally, Lord Nelson, I must ask you, why you were careless enough to allow yourself to be killed?

So much for a not altogether unlikely legislative heating in the wake of the Battle of Trafalgar.

`Fearful commenting,' warns Shakespeare's Richard III, 'is a leaden servitor to dull delay.' Admiral Lord Nel- son was never dull, and he never could stand delay. In an age when dispatches went by ship and not by satellite, before the nay-sayers could begin their 'Fearful commenting', England had won a great victory and lost a great man.

The Battle of Trafalgar did not end the war. On 20 October, even as Nelson reviewed his battle plan with his captains, Napoleon received the surrender of 30,000 Austrians at Ulm. Less than two months later, came the great defeat at Austerlitz. It would be ten long years to Waterloo.

But if Trafalgar was not the final victory against Napoleon, it was the first, and therefore perhaps the most important. As Winston Churchill observed, 'All dicta- tors must move from one triumph to another.' They depend on their aura of invincibility. They depend on their victims' resignation and despair as history moves or appears to move — inexorably forward. Until Trafalgar, Napoleon and France seemed to represent everything that was vigorous, and confident, and dynamic in Europe. Nelson retrieved that laurel for himself, and for England.

After Trafalgar, Napoleon ordered ev- ery ship in the French Navy inscribed with the words, 'France compte que chacun fera son devoir.' In borrowing Nelson's famous signal to his fleet — 'England expects that every man will do his duty' — Napoleon acknowledged Nelson's moral victory. It was a victory born of Nelson's supreme confidence, not just in himself, but in the justice of his cause, the ingenuity of his captains, and the willingness of every Englishman to give his all. In the words of one of Nelson's biographers, his men `believed that they were as magnificent as Nelson believed them to be'. And there- fore of course so they were.

In 1803 Napoleon boasted that 'forty- five millions of people must prevail over sixteen millions'. In 1814 he admitted he was wrong: made a mistake about England, in trying to conquer it. The English are a brave nation.' As the youn- ger William Pitt more accurately predicted in the month after Trafalgar: 'England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, I trust, save Europe by her example.'

Those are poignant words to me, for in my lifetime I have seen Pitt's prediction come true — again. I can remember waiting for news of the Battle of Britain. I can remember hearing the voice of Win- ston Churchill on the radio: 'Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free . . . . But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age . .

The British may be outnumbered. They may be outgunned, but they simply refuse to accept the inevitable, even if it means standing alone. And because they do not accept it, it is no longer inevitable. Even- tually, of course, their confidence becomes contagious. And with contagion comes victory.

Today our two nations share responsibil- ity for protecting and fostering freedom. Other nations look to us. Are we resigned to military inferiority? Are we, as it was long ago predicted, selling our adversaries the rope with which to hang ourselves? Have we accepted the doctrine that the march of communism can go only forward, never back? Or, have we accepted the responsibility, not only to save ourselves by our own exertions, but to save the free world by our example?

I am speaking not just of military lead- ership, but even more of moral leadership. And moral leadership, like Nelson's, must begin with confidence in ourselves, in the principles we stand for and the men and women who must defend them.

Yet self-confidence has not always been popular in recent years. We hear that it is injudicious, even crass, to discuss our moral superiority. We are told by some there is no moral difference between ourselves and the Soviets. We hear that it is provocative to call ruthless adversaries evil. Plain-speaking presidents and prime ministers are accused of exhibiting bad form . . . although the voters do not seem to mind. Sometimes it even seems that we accept the verdict of our adversaries — accept that they and not we ourselves wear the mantle of the future.

It is useful, in these moments, to become reacquainted with our heroes. We still revere Lord Nelson, not in spite of his boldness and his insubordination, but be- cause of it. In Admiral Lord Nelson ardent, unruly, supremely self-confident — a nation and a principle found concrete form in a man. May we, who have inher- ited the responsibility for freedom, be his worthy heirs.