11 SEPTEMBER 1880, Page 18

BOOKS.

THE MANCHUS.*

No event more remarkable in its way than the conquest of the Chinese Empire by the Manchu Tartars has occurred in modern times. Approximating in many of its features to the Norman conquest of this island, the comparison will be found not to bear close examination, when it is discovered that the Manchus were a more or less savage tribe triumphing over a civilised people. Nor were the Manchus even apowerful clan in their own region, like the Mongols, before they waged war in China. Only one generation before their conquest of the empire their army, including every fighting-man, barely exceeded one thousand strong. Yet, in the short space of thirty years they had learnt so much, and rallied

• The Manchus; or, the Reigning Dynasty of China: their Rise and Progress. Maps and Illustrations. By Rev. John ROW. Paisley : J. and R. Parlane.

to themselves so many of their neighbotirs, that they could bring into the field a force capable of worsting the " millions " of China, and of overthrowing the intensely national dynasty of the Mings. Mr. Ross, in the somewhat bulky volume before us, gives a graphic account of the rise of the Manchu power; and it may be questioned whether there is a fuller or more correct description than his extant of the wars between the followers of Noorhachu and Taitsong, on the one side, and the Ming Emperors on the other. Mr. Ross appears to us to be singularly well imbued with the spirit of Chinese institutions, and many readers might do worse than have recourse to his pages for the purpose of acquiring some idea of the strong national feelings which are at the root of the policy of the Pekin Government. It is apparent that he has consulted many Chinese documents not available to the ordinary student, while there is internal evidence that the pages now before us are not the hurried work of a few months, but the labour of years. The service which Mr. Ross has rendered those desirous of pur- suing the threads of Chinese history by publishing this account of the Manchu subjection of China, is quite as conspicuous as that conferred upon the same class of historical students by his previous work on Corea, while we are glad to recognise that the later work is marred by fewer literary peculiarities than its predecessor.

In the year 1584, Noorhachu, chief of the Manchus, found cause to quarrel with the local governors of the Ming Emperor. A rival had been set up over his head,—a circumstance bitter enough in itself, how mach more so when that rival happened to be the murderer of his father ! Noorhachn was not the man to waive his pretensions, because others laid claim to what he held to be his right; and the measures which he took to make good his position were so effectual, that the Chinese found it con- venient to hand over to him the rival, of whom they had sought to make a puppet prince. Noorhachn had no scruple upon the point, and at once ordered his execution. By this concession the Chinese virtually admitted that Noorhachu was the supreme chief among the Manchus, and he proceeded to establish his supremacy by defeating all his neighbours. At this time the Manchu country formed but a very small district in the southern portion of modern Manchuria, and it was Noorhachu's special glory to have extended its modest dimensions into those more becoming the source of a great empire. The Chinese authorities in the province of Leaontung regarded with ill-concealed dis- favour the rapid growth of the military power of Noorhachu, and were on the point of declaring war upon the ambitious ruler, when he forestalled them by assuming the offensive. At first he carried everything before him, but the Pekin Government, fully aroused to the gravity of the danger, assembled a large army, and compelled him to relinquish his hold upon his new conquests in order to defend his capital. The war which he carried on against the vastly superior Chinese, reminds one of the unequal contest between Frederick the Great of Prussia and his neighbours. With 60,000 well-trained and seasoned troops, turning his central position to account, he strove to make up for deficiency in numbers by attacking each single divi- sion of his adversaries ; and he strove successfully. -In a great battle at Sarhoo Hill he routed the western division, and he followed this success up by another victory the next day. The secret of his success, so far, had been that he had brought his whole army to bear upon the isolated detachments of the Chinese. Numerically the weaker, he had supplied the deficiency of numbers by greater celerity in his movements; and, like both Napoleon and Frederick, baffled his clumsy antagonist by the rapidity and skilfulness of his attack. In a succession of battles round his capital, Hingking, he was again uniformly victorious, and the war closed with the practical annihilation of the host sent to crush and subject the Manchu chief. His skill in the conduct of this campaign ensured for Noorhachu the in- dependence which he had throughout consistently claimed. But for some time it appeared doubtful whether he had obtained anything more. A prudent General was appointed to the com- mand on the frontier by the Ming Emperor, and so efficient were his precautions that Noorhachu did not deem it safe to molest him. This General fell into disfavour at Court, where the influence of the eunuchs was all-powerful, and was recalled. Upon this, Noorhachn at once resumed his opera- tions, feeling sure that the Ming Emperor was not likely to be so fortunate as to possess two great commanders. In this second campaign, the city of Monkden fell into his possession, and an attempt to retake it was repulsed

with heavy loss. In this instance, also, the excellence of his tactics led to the superiority of numbers being on his side in every encounter.

The success of the Manchus was far from being unpopular in the northern districts, and some even of the officials shaved their heads and adopted the Tartar tail. As the new race pro- ceeded. in their conquering career towards the south, the token of their triumph was furnished by the imposition of this badge of conquest. Whether the ambitious dream of ousting the 'Wings, and founding a dynasty of his own, had yet suggested itself to Noorhachu, or " Taitsou," as he was subsequently styled, appears to be doubtful ; but at all events, with each suc- cessive conquest, he moved his capital further to the south; and at this period he devoted most of his attention to the embellishment of Moukden. At a favourable moment he resumed the war, but he was repulsed in an attack on the town of Ningyuen, mainly by the valour of the commandant, and by the fire of the " terrific Western cannon," used for the first time in Chinese warfare. Mr. Ross says that these guns were cast by the Jesuit mis- sionaries, but we were always under the impression that they were lent by the Portuguese of Macao. It would be interesting to know his authority for his own statement. Their effect was dreadful in a double sense. Their fire routed the Manchu soldiery, and the chagrin of defeat brought on a fever, to which Noorhachu succumbed. What more auspicious opening could be asked than this for the introduction of Western science into China? Of Noorhachu, or Taitsou, Mr. Ross tersely writes that " revenge made him a soldier, abilities a general, the stupidity of his opponents a conqueror, and wisdom a ruler and founder of a dynasty."

By this time the Manchus had been joined by many of the Mongol tribes in the countries lying on their western borders. It would even appear that some of their chiefs, having more ex- perience in Chinese wars than the Manchus, were the foremost in urging upon Taitsou's successor that it was incumbent upon him to pursue the same line of policy as that great prince. The new ruler of the Manchus was Taitsong, the fourth of the sons of Taitsou, and he showed no signs in his correspondence with the Chinese Governors of abating his pretensions to supreme rank. In a very short time the old hostilities between the Manchus and Chinese were resumed, and Taitsong, by a rapid march, passed the frontier guard and laid siege to Pekin. After beleaguering the city for some weeks, the Manchus retired, and the results of the war were not wholly satisfactory. Several reverses befell detached bodies of his army, and the Chinese presented a bolder front at the termination than they had at the commencement of the campaign. In the meanwhile the Manchus were bringing the whole of the Mongol Bafers under their influ- ence. This was attended with great advantage, as, in the first place, the Mongols held possession of the best road into China; in the second, they furnished valuable auxiliaries ; and in the third, unless won over, they would have proved formidable oppo- nents. Before Taitsong died, all the Mongol tribes had been brought into a common league with the Manchus, but it was left for the Generals of his youthful heir to make good the con- quest of China. The weakness of the Ming Emperor exposed him to attack from several quarters. Scarcely a province in the country was free from the presence of rebels, and the ambitious sought to turn the prevailing discord to the further. ance of their own selfish ends. In the troubles which fell so thickly upon the unfortunate Chinese, it is said that " for every robber slain, ten honest families were ruined." And among these robbers, including many Mahommedan Tungani, there arose a great leader, called Li Dsouchung, who, before many years had elapsed, could bring into the field a host of a million " mailed " men. Their mail was not to be laughed at, seeing that its folds of silk could resist the shock of bullet or arrow. It would be impossible to describe in any similar detail the farther growth of the Mancha power. Suffice it to say, that what between the hordes of the robber Li Dsonchung, and the veterans of the young Manchu prince Chnntcbe, the Ming Emperor had a bad time of it. His capital, Pekin, was, after a close siege, captured, and the Emperor in despair put an end to his existence.

It was after this great victory, won by the robber-chief, that the Manchus crossed the Great Wall for the last time, and entered China as conquerors, while they had the sagacity to put themselves forward in the character of deliverers of the country. They were joined by the remnants of the Ming national army, and an encounter on a tremendous scale between the three armies took place at Shanhaigwan. At first the Manchus held aloof, but when they charged, their onset carried everything before it. The robber force was scattered to the winds, and the robber-chief became an outcast. Pursued to the extremity of the Empire, but turning to bay at every favourable opportunity, Li, when on the eve of falling into the hands of his pursuers, committed suicide, thus bringing to a close one of the most remarkable careers of the age. After this episode, the Manchus slowly extended their conquests over the northern provinces, in preparation for the subjection of the country south of the Great River. The capture of the great cities of Nankin and Hankow showed that the Manchu conquest was assured, although in effect- ing it the Manchus derived little aid from the native population. The wars continued during many years, and had not even con- cluded when the great Kanghi ascended the throne, in 1660. Chuntehe had lived long enough to witness the conquest of the greater part of modern China, including Manchuria, Corea, and a large portion of Mongolia. In the hands of his successors, Kanghi, Yung Ching, and Keen Lung, the Manchu power was extended so far that it embraced all the outlying dependencies subdued in former ages by the great rulers of the dynasties that had gone before them. The Manchus have since had the ability to guide the national mind into a safe channel for themselves, while they have always figured as a Chinese and not as an alien administration, their policy being to intensify the national characteristics. At the same time, there is abundant evidence that deep down in the Chinese bosom there lurks a dislike and suspicion of the Manchus,—feelings which, so long as they exist, must always constitute an element of weakness in the tenure of authority by the present rulers of China.