Going Like a Bomb?
Itti remarkable how discussions of the 'British nuclear deterrent have come to hang on the emotive word 'independent.' For some Conservatives it has become a battle-cry, for the Labour Party a smear, an attempt to pass off as our own something we regeived out of American bounty. In fact, the Tories know full well that the likelihood of our using the deterrent without American agreement is infinitesimal, just as the Labour Party must be aware that however much American money and know-how go into the British Polaris, the ultimate decision on its use will lie with the British Govern- ment. Anyone doubting the contradictions in Labour policy should look immediately at Leonard Beaton's new pamphlet Will Labour Give Up the Bomb?
There are two possible defence policies for this country, neither of which is at present claimed by the Labour Party. The one is abandonment of nuclear weapons altogether, with the consequent withdrawal from NATO and the path towards neutral- ism. This remains as unthinkable as it has always been. The other is to preserve those nuclear weapons and plans we have, at the same time working for a general disarma- ment agreement and a more satisfactory form of consultation within the NATO alliance.
General de Gaulle's determination to push ahead with his own deterrent put paid to the chief argument for unilateralism long ago. British unilateral nuclear disarma- ment would no longer have the slightest moral influence on anyone, and on Germany indeed might well have the contrary effect. Certainly the likelihood of a Franco-German deterrent would be increased, as would Ameriea's cultivation of Germany as a most loyal ally. Neither result would serve to encourage the Russians in their search for a détente.
It is true that the Labour Party has advanced some way since the heady days of the Brighton Conference of 1960. Mr. Wilson claims that his party will be an even more loyal ally of the United States than the Conservatives have been. Whether the Americans will accept him on his terms is another matter. They can hardly be im- pressed by his intention to abandon Polaris in return for a greater say in American strategic planning. Mr. Wilson calls this his bargaining point. He seems inclined to throw it away before the bargaining has even begun. Mr. Gordon Walker's promise of Labour support for the American nuclear monopoly in the West is equally unhelpful. He has conveniently forgotten the French. Neither of them has advanced any reason why the Americans should be prepared to consult more fully with an ally who must appear to be back-pedalling on the alliance. It is said that the Labour Party will make up for this deficiency by increasing our con- ventional forces (they do not say how), and this would be a development the Americans could only welcome. But what if the Americans themselves begin to bargain? If they agree that Britain should abandon Polaris, they will almost certainly ask that American Polaris bases in this country be extended. As a model ally Mr. Wilson will find such a request hard to refuse, nor will he be able to gain the right of veto over the missiles' use. Mr. Wilson's party will not take this easily. He will have surrendered whatever independent bargaining power this country has at the moment. He would even find it harder than Sir Alec has done to take an independent line on such issues as Cuban trade.
It is, of course, perfectly possible that Mr. Wilson does not regard any of his state- ments on defence as final, and that if he fails to achieve adequate consultation he will stick to the Nassau agreement on Polaris. It would upset his balancing act to say so, but some of his supporters might bear the possibility in mind. It may please the Left to seek a position of influence without responsibility. But they will not find it.
In the meantime Tory defence policy, inevitably simplified in an election cam- paign, is hardly static. The option remains of giving up the deterrent whenever there is something effective to put in its place. The discussions on the mixed-manned force continue; there is always the possibility of Anglo-French co-operation in the back- ground. Above all, the value of the British deterrent lies no longer so much in its effect on the Soviet Union, as in securing Britain the greatest influence whenever a more satis- factory system of consultation and planning within NA),TO comes to be devised. Such discussioia must begin shortly after 'the American election, whoever wins. Yet this is the very bargaining power Mr. Wilson is prepared to throw away.
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