12 AUGUST 1949, Page 11

MARGINAL COMMENT

By HAROLD NICOLSON

THE first meeting of the Council of Europe took place on Monday at Strasbourg, and there are few people, in this country at least, who either understand what it is all about or who have any definite opinions on the subject. There are those

of course who have followed the idea from its inception, and who realise that this first meeting may mark a creative advance towards European unity or else may evaporate in many magnificent speeches and a few meaningless formulas. Yet to most British citizens the issue has been confused by party differences and falsified by the extreme claims advanced by popular propagandists or irresponsible visionaries. Is this Council of Europe, they ask themselves, with its Committee of Ministers and its Consultative Assembly, to be regarded as a European Government and Parliament, charged with the task of framing a constitution for a Federal Europe ? Is it to be viewed only as some revival, in European terms, of the old Council and Assembly of the League of Nations ? Is it to be no more than some Amphictyonic Council, meeting in moments of emergency to secure some common action against an external menace ? Is it to be the prelude to some far wider co-operative arrangement and to be integrated eventually into the Atlantic Coalition ? Or is it the first tentative step towards world govern- ment and an eventual Parliament of Man ? It must be admitted that the earlier publicists of the idea have not all of them assisted the ordinary citizen in understanding the scope and purposes of the Council. Mr. Clarence Streit, Mr. W. B. Curry, Mr. Mackay and Mr. Lionel Curtis have each in their several manners urged "Union Now," "The Case for Federal Union," or "Federal Europe," with- out setting any very practical limits to their Utopias. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the original prophet of the movement, has from the outset kept his feet upon the ground.

* * * A The main cause of the confusion which has arisen is the fact that, whereas 'the essential purpose of any such organisation is the avoidance of war, few people are agreed as to the circumstances and conditions by which wars are provoked. Theorists in successive ages have contended that wars are caused by dynastic ambitions, religious conflicts, imperialist expansion, demographic pressure or the strains and stresses of the capitalist system. The most fashionable theory today is that the conditions which produce wars are inherent in what are called "national sovereignties" and that if these sovereignties could be abolished mankind could look forward to an era of universal peace. It is true that the few centuries in which the world has been immune to the menace of general war have been those in which, as at the time of the Pax Romana, a single State possessed the monopoly or predominance of power. Obviously if every State were to surrender its independence to the rule of a single Super-State, wars would be replaced, so long as the Super- State retained its overwhelming power, by risings, revolts, mutinies and rebellions. The difficulty is that few nations would be willing to surrender their independence by consent, and could only be coerced into so doing by external or internal compulsion. It is true again that many great States have been created by fusion or federalism (and the propagandists of the idea have made great play with the Heptarchy and the War of Independence), but the examples of Germany and Italy do not lead us to suppose that union is always and in all circumstances the prelude to peace. The contentions of the theorists alo not therefore provide us with any practical assurance.

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The realists on the other hand argue that wars arc produced by a.disturbance in the Balance of Power. A powerful State, desiring either to increase its territories and resources or to impose its doctrines, may be tempted by the evident weakness and disunity of Its neighbours to absorb or dominate those neighbours by force. The only thing which will deter a potential aggressor from provoking a war is the•certainty that he will lose it. The only guarantee of

peace, therefore, is for the weaker countries to create among thenu. selves a union powerful enough to deter any potential aggressor None of the Western European countries is today strong enough. by itself, to create, or even to affect, the Balance of Power ; were they to pool their policy and resources, they would, however, be able to compose a block of power comparable to the two giants of the East and West. It is this underlying difference of concept and purpose which will render the Strasbourg Assembly so difficult to handle. The theorists will be intent upon diminishing the effects of national sovereignty ; the realists will be intent upon increasing the potency of international force. Even within the national delega- tions, which are composed on an all-party basis, these differences will be apparent. And since neither the national delegations, nor the Assembly as a whole, will desire to render their disagreement patent to all the world, the danger will arise that the Council will find refuge in discussions and resolutions which, although eminently pacific in tone, will not in fact advance the world much further along the road to peace.

It is possible, of course, that men possessing the international prestige of Mr. Churchill, Monsieur Spaak and Monsieur Leon Blum may be able to steer the Assembly away from otiose verbiage and to lend to their consultations some semblance at least of practical reality. It has been stated that the Assembly intends to conduct its debates according to English Parliamentary procedure. I am somewhat sceptical regarding the success of any such experiment. The British House of Commons operates, as we know, according to certain rules, regulations and conventions which have been estab- lished, on the principle of trial and error, by generations of parlia- mentarians. Yet these rules owe their validity, not to any institu- tional perfection, but to the fact that they correspond to certain national habits of mind. In a European Parliament our own pro- cedure would be regarded as cumbrous, dilatory and, since it is based upon the theory of a two-party system, wholly inapplicable. The Strasbourg Assembly, as a Parliament, will, moreover, be weakened by the absence of any organised opposition ; the Com- munist parties will not attend, Russia and her satellites will not be present, the United States, although sympathetic, will naturally remain aloof. These elements of unreality may perhaps be reduced to unimportance by the thoughtful preparations which have been made, by the watchful supervision of the Committee of Ministers and by the faith by which Mr. Churchill and those who share his convictions are inspired. Mr. Churchill ever since his Zurich speech in September, 1946, has worked ceaselessly at rendering the move- ment a reality ; he at least is well aware of the difficulties which will confront him at Strasbourg ; he at least realises, as he said at The Hague in May last year, how important it will be to prevent the Strasbourg Parliament from degenerating into "an overcrowded Tower of Babel" and to render it "a mountain top where all is cool and quiet and calm."

I do not expect that the Strasbourg Assembly will be either cool or quiet. Yet if it is to create confidence and achieve any practical effects it would be well advised to revert to the practical realities which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the Paneuropa move- ment, laid down ten years ago. He demanded only a European military alliance with a common air fleet, a European Court of Arbitration, the gradual creation of a European customs and currency union, and "the fostering of the national cultures of all European nations as the basis of a common European culture." The pro- ceedings of the Consultative Assembly and their relations with the Committee of Ministers will be watched by the world with passionate interest. Yet if confidence is to be created, then their objectives should from the outset be limited and precise. I do not see that there could be better objectives than those advocated by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1939.