12 DECEMBER 1941, Page 12

GERMAN AND BRITISH SOLDIERS

Sia,—I have been watching with interest for some comment, official or otherwise, on the broadcast made after the one o'clock news on Sunday, November 9th, by a marine who was captured by the Germans at Calais. The fact that I have seen only one—which may, I suppose, be due to the fact that I haven't looked hard enough —is sufficient stimulation for me to put my own reactions on paper. Reactions uninformed, I must admit, by any source other than the observation of a civilian.

Firstly, this man told, matter-of-factly enough, of the amoral, impersonal, murderous brutality of his captors. This was apparently sufficient to cause such a stir in some quarters that next day the B.B.C. hurriedly pointed out that this was the treatment meted out by front-line troops, and not by the authorities in the prison camps, where we had no reason to believe that conditions were not all they should be. This reaction, I suppose, is understandable enough among relatives of prisoners of war in German hands. But we have had pointed out to us, times without number, in books and films— and not only since the beginning of the war—exactly the type of man—or animal—we are fighting. The fact that so many people seem utterly to fail to realise it is sufficiently depressing to need no comment. The other, and even more important, point, which seems to need emphasis is the outstanding difference in the training and equipment of the German troops and of our own. Each Ger- man, said this marine, had his tommy-gun and was a dead-shot with it. They shot at anything and everything—dogs, cats, hens, men and women—just for the fun of it. And they hit their target in the head every time. They had grenades stuck in their boots and the ammunition for their guns they carried in their pockets.

They were laden with no bandoliers, did not even carry water- bottles; everything was apparently brought up behind them in lorries. One can almost hear our War Office complain that it is impossible to make smart troops out of men so equipped. The deadly efficiency of the German is sufficient answer to any objec- tions on these lines. In contrast to this are the news-reels we still see so often of our men advancing over open ground armed with rifles and bayonets, and, so far as we know, no body armour. Again, compare the German motor-cyclists, who rode into Abbe-

ville with tommy-guns mounted on the handle-bars, with the motor- cyclists I and many others have seen riding along our roads with rifles slung over their shoulders. These men would make a sitting target for anyone within range : to become fighting units they would

have to come to a full stop, straddle their bikes and unsling their rifles.

Finally, training. The marine saw many groups of Germans training, but hardly ever were they drilling. They were either at P.T. or target practice. Compare this with the endless drilling, bayonet practice and button-polishing of our own troops, and even, sometimes, the Home Guard. All along, in fact, it is the contrast between well-equipped, highly-trained individuals and regimented units; only, in contrast to the usual idea, it is the Germans who are the individuals, and our own men who are the drilled units.

This, I will admit at once, is the reason why the Germans have broken before the ferocity of a drilled bayonet attack whenever they have been exposed to it. But again, the fact that the method of warfare they have developed has only exposed them to such attacks on rare occasions and has permitted them to become, even only temporarily, military masters of the Continent, speaks for itself. Even granted that the bayonet has its uses in the hands of a small section of the regular army, it can be little or no use in the hands of the Home Guard, who still seem to be trained in its use. They will be called upon to deal with the most highly-trained men in the German army—the advance shock-troops. The very facts of their age (younger or older than the regular army), the functions they will be called upon to fulfil, and the limited time at their dis- posal for training indicate that their forte should be long-distance sharp-shooting.