PERSONAL COLUMN A plea for triennial Parliaments

JOHN GRIGG

Before 1911 the life of a Parliament was limited to seven years in Britain. Since then it has been limited to five years, and the purpose of this article is to suggest that it ought now to be limited to three years.

When the present statutory term was adopted the tempo of politics was far more leisurely than it is now, and the scope of government far less wide. The state has gained enormously in power since 1911, while the means of exerting parliamentary and popular control over the state have re- mained largely unchanged—a sad case of ar- rested political, development. The British people are better off and better educated, but they are not significantly better placed in the matter of deciding their own fate. No wonder they are showing signs of apathy (the total poll has gone down in every general election since 1959), and no wonder there is a widespread, if confused, desire for greater `participation'.

Some look for a remedy in syndicalism or industrial democracy; others in the alien device of a referendum. But the British tradi- tion is parliamentary and it is by making Parliament more democratic, rather than by seeking any form of democracy which would bypass Parliament, that a suitable answer to the present discontents can be found. In practice this must mean, above all, that there should be more frequent general elections.

In the United States the executive power has to submit itself to the people every four years, but the power of Congress is established as a counterpoise to that of the Presidency and there are elections to both houses of Congress every other year. Thus an American President may have to govern throughout his term, or (more often) for part of it, with a hostile_ majority in Congress, whereas in Britain no government can survive for long without a parliamentary majority and the acts of electing a Parlia- ment and choosing a government are one and the same. They constitute the only gen- uinely democratic exercise allowed to the British people, at national level.

Granted the difference between the British and American systems, it seems reasonable to put forward as the appropriate term for a modern British Parliament a compromise between the four-year Presidential term and the two-year Congressional term; that is to say, a maximum life of three years. The idea of triennial Parliaments can hardly be regarded as a wild innovation, since it was endorsed by Mr Gladstone as part of the Newcastle Programme on which he fought (and won) the general election of 1892. And however strong the case for three-yearly elections may have been then, it is infinitely stronger now.

As a rule British Parliaments do not, of course, last their full term but are dissolved, on the advice of the Prime Minister of the day, normally within a -year of the quin- quennial limit. The absence of a fixed date for elections, and the discretion now enjoyed by the Prime Minister, are both highly debatable features of the constitution but in my view worth preserving, on balance, for the sake of flexibility. In that case it may be argued that to achieve triennial Parliaments de facto it would be necessary to set the de jure limit at rather more than three

years—say, at three and a half years. The argument has substance but is clearly one of detail which need not be pursued here. Once the principle is conceded that elections should be held roughly every three years, there is plenty of room for discussion as to how that result can best be achieved.

The principle will, however, be resisted with all the weapons of casuistry. It will be said, first of all, that no government can be expected to put through a constructive pro- gramme in less than four or five years; that a term of that length enables it to do patriotic, but unpopular, things at the outset, of which time alone can prove the worth. We shall be asked to think of Her Majesty's Ministers as sage, supernal beings who, if only they are left undisturbed, will govern beneficently and in accordance with a master-plan.

That ideal conception of government is pure fantasy, as anyone who looks at the historical record can readily see. Ministers are human and the world is a place where the unforeseen is always- happening.

Governments tend to be judged not by what they do on their own initiative, but by their reaction to events. Their first measures are likely to be relatively popular, because they usually hasten to implement policy for which they have secured majority support. But they soon have to face circumstances which they never reckoned with beforehand, and it is then that they either confirm or forfeit the nation's trust. When they lose popularity, in nine cases out of ten they do so inad- vertently, not by deliberate intent.

The government elected in 1959 illustrates the point as well as any. Mr Macmillan did not embark upon his risky European policy the moment he was returned to power; he shilly-shallied for eighteen months and then embarked upon it in the knowledge that it would become effective, if at all, towards the end of his term. In fact it came to nothing, because even when a government can disregard its own public opinion it cannot control the behaviour of foreigners. De Gaulle's veto was a further blow to the credibility of a regime already in serious trouble on account of a clumsily applied pay pause. Both the economic difficulties and the setback in Europe were extra-curricular events, in no way anticipated by Mr Mac- millan. On the other hand one intensely con- troversial measure during the 1959 Parlia- ment was introduced, quite deliberately, at

the tail end of it—Mr Heath's abolition of resale price maintenance. The whole story of 1959-64 makes nonsense of the first objection to triennial Parliaments.

Another objection is that more frequent voting would condemn the country to a

permanently electioneering atmosphere But can anyone pretend that, in a nation which guaranteed free association and free speech, the voices of faction are ever silenced? Re- cent exchanges in the House of Commons

could hardly have been more acrimonious if a dissolution had been imminent. Moreover it would be quite wrong, even if it were prac- tical, to inhibit the vitality of public debate. Those who shrink from partisanship and hanker after coalitions or conspiracies of silence are those who fundamentally have no stomach for democracy. They are, of course. entitled to their opinion, but they should not disguise it from themselves or others as con- cern for democratic government.

Self-deception comes easily enough to us all when our interests are at stake, and it is surely a fair guess that the chief objection of most politicians to a shorter parliamentary term—however they may choose to ra- tionalise what they instinctively feel—is that it would reduce their own security of tenure. Who would willingly jeopardise a seat of power and a goodish salary after three years, when the existing law confers a longer period of immunity? The public, however, has a right to ask why MPS should be treated more indulgently in this respect than members of the orc and other local authorities, great and small, or for that mat- ter than members of the Australian House of Representatives (who are elected for three years).

It may perhaps be thought that some ex- cellent candidates would be deterred from a parliamentary career if it were made more hazardous than it is now. Maybe, maybe not—such views are of their nature speculative. But let us assume thal this one is correct, and that triennial Parliaments might to some extent lower the quality of in- take. Are we then to conclude that there is no way of meeting the problem? Would it be out of the question to give MPS the sort of financial security which would reconcile them to a greater degree of political insecurity? My own view is that just as good candidates would come forward for three- year as for five-year Parliaments, but on the opposite assumption I would gladly see defeated MPS compensated or pensioned quite generously out of public funds. It would be a small price to pay for a healthier democracy.

That is the issue: how to put fresh vigour into a system which is now languishing almost to the point of atrophy. In the con- temporary world five years is a mighty long time, and after two or three years governments are apt to lose touch with the people, who in turn are apt to become cynical and listless. The only means then open to them for expressing as a body their views on general politics are through local elections and public opinion polls, both of which are thoroughly inappropriate means. The fact that local elections are increasingly fought as mini-general elections is almost universally deplored, but the • obvious moral—that general elections should be as frequent as local elections—is seldom drawn.

The public opinion poll is an even more regrettable substitute, because it has all the vices of a referendum without its advantages. People are invited to give snap judgments on particular issues when their minds have not been informed or focused as in a general election campaign, and when they know that their replies are unlikely to have any prac- tical effect. The result is a quasi-referendum without the sobering ingredients of reflection and decision (and anyway of doubtful ac- curacy). On the strength of public opinion polls one might well despair of democracy, but they are not a real test. When it comes to the real thing the British people are seldom foolish or irresponsible, and often wiser than their more sophisticated mentors.

Suspicion of the people remains endemic in the British governing elite, in spite of changes in its social composition. The idea that the country could actually benefit from more frequent elections would seem absurd .- .

to many of our rulers. It is taken for granted CHURCH AND STATE- that the Whitehall and Westminster gentlemen know - best, _although- the im- prudence of saying 'so expliCitly is now recognised. Elections are seen as at - best' a necessary evil, interfering with: the smooth conduct of public business, while the stimulus which they bring.fo 'the efforts' of public authorities is either discounted or resented. =.. --

In fact triennial Parliaments, so far from making government less efficient and assiduous, would almost certainly act as a tonic. Nor is there any reason to feat-that they-would undermine our political stability, which is so widely envied. The Australians have found that three-yearly elections do not produce a bewildering alternation of governments—quite the reverse. The long reign of Sir Robert Menzies and his suc- cessors should reassure any- who feel ap- prehensive on that score.

Apart from inducing a proper sense of urgency in all the echelons of government, more frequent elections should also have a salutary effect on opposition politicians, by making the prospect of office seem less dis- tant and therefore encouraging them to be realistic as well as biting in their criticisms. But needless to say it is the electorate, above all, which stands to gain, for the chances of the people themselves having a direct share in decisions affecting their whole future would be much enhanced. For instance, the question whether or not to join the Common Market might well have to be decided at a general election, if it became a matter of controversy between the major parties. And quite right, too.

British voters are as competent as any group of 'experts' to adjudicate on an issue of that kind, so long as they are given time to reflect and all the necessary information.

Machinery of government is now all the rage. We hear much of streamlining and ra- tionalisation in the public sector and many seem to be inspired by Pope's dangerous sophism that 'whate'er is best administered is best'. Businessmen are being recruited to impart their techniques to the Civil Service, the Cabinet Office is being fitted with a think-tank, and- further marvels of engineer- ing are promised for the months and years ahead.

All this is very admirable in its way, and much good may come of it—provided we do not allow it to take our eye off even more vital aspects of the political system. Good administration is much to be desired in itself, but liberty of the subject is a greater good and in any case the quality of administration is likely to be improved rather than impaired by more effective democratic control. To concentrate upon overhauling the official machine without at the same time, and even more zealously, attending to the parliamen- tary side of things, would betray a false sense of values.

Recent years have witnessed an ever- widening gulf between government and the governed, not so much because government has been inefficient (although it undoubtedly has been so, on many occasions) but rather because it has been arbitrary and remote. Triennial Parliaments are not the whole answer, but they would go a long way towards bridging the gulf.

Mr Heath believes passionately that the people should have more freedom. He could give a splendid demonstration of his belief by entrusting them with more freedom to decide their own fate.