POLITICS
The week that Mr Mandelson wobbled and Sinn Fein reverted to type
BRUCE ANDERSON
The latest political crisis in Ulster could have an unprecedented outcome. For the first time in a generation, the Unionists may win the blame game. This week, even the American press has been almost unanimous in support for Mr Trimble and criticism of Sinn Fein. The New York Times, the Wash- ington Post, the Boston Globe: in all of them — and other papers — the message is the same. David Trimble has made a gesture, but Sinn Fein have failed to respond.
Unionism has always had much stronger arguments than Unionists have succeeded in articulating, and not only because most Ulster Prods are antimatter when it comes to public relations. The Unionist case depends on intellectual complexity and historical analysis: as such, it has been perennially vul- nerable to Irish nationalism's sentimental simplicities and glib skill in historical falsifi- cation. But now, at last, the Unionists have the best slogan: 'If the IRA have made peace, why do they want to hold on to their weapons?' It is hard to disagree with such a common-sense proposition.
But there have been attempts to do so. True to form, the Irish government is unhap- py about suspending the Stormont Executive. The Anglo-Irish Agreement gave Dublin power without responsibility in Ulster, and since then almost no Irish government has been willing to think through the Ulster problem — and certainly not during the past few days. Dublin explains why it would be a retrograde step to suspend the Executive. London agrees, but points out that there is no alternative. If there is no suspension, David Trimble walks anyway, which creates an even more unholy mess. `Ah,' says Dublin, `that's your problem.' One would have to go back to the Haughey government to find equivalent examples of naivety, selfishness and intellectual dishonesty.
Last week, however, there were alarming signs that Dublin's pressure was working. Peter Mandelson seemed to be wobbling. This may have been no more than sales pat- ter: the perfume-seller seeing whether the dowager might be persuaded to buy yet another expensive little bottle. But Mr Trim- ble would be an unlikely customer in any such emporium. In November, he did persuade his fellow Unionists to renounce their earlier 'no guns, no government' stance. In so doing, he pushed himself and his party to the limit and still won only 58 per cent support, much of that a reluctant, grudging concession to personal loyalty. Afterwards, he insisted with adamantine clarity that he neither had nor wanted any further room for manoeuvre, and that if the February deadline were not met, that would be that. So it is, and even if Mr Mandelson did go through a gelatinous phase, Jonathan Powell of No. 10 had grasped the realities at least a fortnight ago.
The failure to decommission is a disap- pointment. Back in December, intelligence reports suggested that the IRA might hand over some weapons. A paper was circulated among leading Provos arguing that decom- missioning would be an aggressive political move which could help Sinn Fein to win seats in the Dail and to complete the destruction of the SDLP. It was assumed that Messrs Adams and McGuinness supported this line, and there was even a rumour that McGuin- ness might resign from the Provisional Army Council because his membership conflicted with his ministerial responsibilities. He was certainly unable to conceal his enjoyment of his ministerial perquisites; his face seemed permanently fixed in an inane grin. As the historian Henry Patterson put it: 'Thirty years of armed struggle are ending not with a bang but a simper.' So it had been hoped that the IRA would begin to decommission; it was also assumed that the new SF minis- ters would behave in a reassuring manner. Both hope and assumption proved ground- less; the Republican movement merely reverted to type.
McGuinness and his fellow SF minister, Bairbre de Brun, began by ordering that the Union flag should no longer fly over their government offices. Miss de Brun then refused to sit on a committee dealing with the drug problem, because one of its other members was an RUC officer. She also hired a convicted murderer as a political advisor, while ordering the closure of a maternity unit in a Protestant area of Belfast. This would mean that the principal NHS maternity facil- ities available in the city were located in the Royal Victoria Hospital, surrounded by ha,rd-line Republican territory. In future, that could make life easier for those SF/IRA murderers who are still trying to qualify to join a ministerial payroll.
All this not only outraged the Unionists; it alarmed them. It had been thought that, in serious matters, the new Ulster ministers could only make policy with the approval of their Parliamentary committees. But over the maternity issue, Miss de Brun was outvoted seven to four; yet it seemed that she still had the power to act. If the Executive is suspend- ed, there will also be a review of ministers' powers and functions. That could facilitate some necessary corrective action.
The trouble is that even Sinn Fein moder- ates are prisoners of their movement's histo- ry, and its fantasies: in love with themselves and their grievance culture. That is why Miss de Brun behaves in a gratuitously offensive manner; she cannot help it. 'Not an ounce, not a bullet' is what they chant in the IRA drinking clubs of west Belfast, and even those Shinners who would gladly trade some weaponry so that they can do their drinking in more salubrious environments have to heed the chants. Otherwise, the bullets might come for them. To judge by its performance over the past couple of months, Sinn Fein is not a political force. It is merely a terrorists' political fig-leaf. Northern Ireland's immediate political future is cloudy, but some reassessments are overdue. It is time for Mr Mandelson to explain why he is still determined to press ahead with the release of terrorist prisoners. If the IRA will not decommission its weapons, why should we reinforce its man- power? Why, indeed, should the government propose to decommission the RUC? When I wrote scathingly about Chris Patten's report, he accused me of not having read it closely enough. I must now plead guilty to that charge. I have recently re-read the Patten report, and it is even worse than I had thought. There is a basic intellectual flaw, which is responsible for the most destructive proposals: the assumption that policing can operate in an historical vacuum; that there is one model of policing appropriate for all societies at all times.
It is true that if Ulster were as peaceable as Dorset, there would be no need for the present RUC. But in the real world, it would be as absurd to transform the RUC into the Dorset county constabulary as it would be to turn the Dorset police force into the RUC. That is common sense, but common sense is an uncommon quality. Then again, if formerly hostile American journals and commentators can now write commonsensically about Ulster, we should not give up hope for the Northern Ireland Office. And there is a further factor. The Patten changes would require legislation. i As the House of Lords proved this week, it has not yet been decommissioned.
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