OURSELVES AND RUSSIA
EVASTOPOL, it is clear, is the prime objective of this phase of the German offensive in the East, and the Russians are efending the port against an almost irresistible mass of men and etal with the indomitable courage they have manifested throughout e whole campaign. If, as is rumoured, Hitler himself is directing rations in this sector, no sacrifice of life, however terrible, will allowed to stand in the way of the capture of the fortress. ough the German losses at Sevastopol may outnumber the Russian two or three to one, there are always fresh German divisions to brought up, whereas the city cannot be reinforced except on a all scale from the sea. This country, unfortunately, can send no ect help to Sevastopol, but aeroplanes and tanks from British -tories are assisting Russia effectively farther north. The comrade- thip between our two countries is driving its roots steadily deeper, ad it can be counted on to survive and develop in that post-war Rriod when Anglo-Russian co-operation will be as essential as it s in war to the welfare and security of Europe.. The Russians to intense realists. For all their ineradicable hatred of the Hitlerism ,y which they were so treacherously assailed a year ago, they will, erfectly reasonably, expect any plans for collaboration to show dear enefits for themselves. That is as it should be. We expect equally enefits for ourselves from collaboration with Russia. As each ountry is essential to the other in the war, each will be indispensable ) the other in the period of reconstruction. The more openly their nion is demonstrated the greater will be the impression made on cutrals—and on the enemy. Differences between ourselves and hina in social structure and political and religious philosophy are rofound, but they need cause neither division nor antagonism. For omediate purposes the important fact that Russia months ago ulorsed the Atlantic Charter suffices.
