BOOKS OF THE DAY

Russia Revealed

Mission to Moscow. (Light on the Critical Years, 1937-9). By Joseph E. Davies. (Gollancz. 15s.) MR. Lrrvarov, in an extensive estimate of this book, which the publishers have used as a " blurb," describes it as " the most

important contribution to the literature on the Soviet Union." It deals, it is true, with his own period of office, and the American Ambassador has an equally high opinion of Litvinov's statesmanship, but if we are thinking of the light which the book throws on Soviet poticy, it cannot be said that this estimate is exaggerated.

How was Ambassador Davies able to get so much closer an understanding than other diplomats of the Government and country to which he was accredited? By character. From start

to finish he made quite clear his critical attitude to Soviet principles of government ; but this is just what most calls for the

respect of the Soviet statesmen. On his departure, Litvinov said

to him, " We do not like being just looked at, gullibly talked of, preferring to be studied, and, of course, to be properly understood."

And President Kalinin, the old Russian peasant, with peculiarly Russian prettiness, put it: " The worst that you have had to say, you have said to us, and the best that you have had to say, you have said to our enemies."

That is true ; for the Ambassador, always convinced that the best system of government was that of his own country, had a

genuine sympathy for the ultimate ideals of his hosts—to make

the world a better place for the poor and disinherited— and a sincere admiration for many of their achievements,

which comes out again and again in the private record of his diary,

letters and despatches, which his Government has wisely allowed him to publish in full. For instance, " Moreover, they have done some extraordinarily good things over here, and there is much I see to admire and respect. But the price they pay is too high." Of these achievements he made a personal study in extensive tours, and this in itself was much appreciated. He also at once got past all prejudices to the obvious truth that what Stalin, as the transformer of Russia, most of all required and sought for, was European peace. Anyhow, in the outcome, Mr. Davies enjoyed an intimacy with the rulers of Russia accorded to no other diplomats, which was the friendly envy of all of them, ending with the surprise of a two hours' heart-to-heart talk with the secretive Stalin himself. Of Stalin he writes: • " He has a sly humour. He has a very great mentality. It is sharp, shrewd and above all else wise, at least so it would appear to me "; and later he writes from his new post in Brussels:

"Stalin's whole plan since 1926 has been to develop an internal economy that would be self-sufficient and create a socialistic com-

munistic community that would be a model for the world ; and he said to me himself that they figured that for him and his associates :o achieve that was a man-sized job and as much as they could do, without trying to run the whole world." As to Russian Communism, Mr. Davies is throughout a reasoned critic. "There is no question but that human nature is working here the same old way." " The world revolution is secondary." " The

communistic principle here has in actual fact been abandoned." 'From everyone according to his abilities and to everyone according

to his needs ' is gone. They get what they earn." " The idea of the world proletariat and revolution has been set aside and replaced with the idea of a nationalistic Russia." " Communism won't work. It hasn't worked here. This Government is not Communism. It is a Socialism." (And this last is just what this Government says of tself.)

Seeing all this, and watching the new world conflict approaching, especially from his later " listening-post " to which President Roose-

velt sent him in 1938, Mr. Davies, though full of admiration and sympathy for our own country, is a very outspoken critic of our failure to see what he did. As it is clear that he was the trusted adviser of the President on Russia, and that American policy has rgely been guided by his views, this part of the book presents us with a field for not too pleasant but very necessary study. He was viously all for the firmness with which Mr. Eden treated Italy. He elicits from Stalin the opinion that Mr. Chamberlain " would Probably fail because the Fascist dictators would drive too hard a bargain.' From Brussels he wrote on June 18th, 1939, with more at: "The reactionaries in England and France have quarantined

(Russia). The bogey that a war would entail Communism in a eated Germany and Central Europe is plain bunk Germany would go Socialist or become a sensible military autocracy." " The Chamberlain policy of throwing Italy, Poland and Hungary into the arms of Hitler may be completed by so disgusting the Soviets that it will drive Russia into an economic agreement and an ideological truce with Hitler " (That was written before the seizure of Prague and the ultimate turn in British policy.) " The reactionaries of England and France will shortly be wooing the Soviets' support in their desperation, but it may be too late if the Soviets get thoroughly disheartened."

Lastly, he foresees (on November 28th, 1939) the German pressure which will ultimately bring Russia into the war. " The great value of the Russian pact depends on the Genii-tan ability to make it fructify through technical assistance in the organisation of staff work and, particularly, industrial production. . . . It is my opinion that, given German technical support, the Russian economy, with Soviet co-operation, will be of great value to Germany. . . ." " But there are indications that the Russians. will not really co-