THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY
By STRATEG ICUS
IN the west and in the east there are now signs of a strategy which is logical and consistent, though not yet coherent. The attack in Libya no longer stands alone as an isolated piece of the
enemy's plan. It has always had a strategic connexion with the Russian theatre, and it is probable that it would have been launched sooner after the Kerch operation but for the diversionary offensive of Timoshenko at Kharkov. This offensive threw the German time- table out of gear. Kerch was attacked in order to brush aside the
possibility of a renewal of operations from the peninsula when the Germans were engaged in assaulting Sevastopol. The Kharkov- Izium battle intervened before the enemy could attack the Rostov sector and, by crushing Sevastopol, secure freedom of movement in the Black Sea. Now the attack upon Sevastopol is in full swing and it is in Libya that the new check has been suffered.
Both these attacks, however, look towards the same direction—the Riddle East. There is probably another movement which will find a place somewhere in the enemy design ; but there is no indication of where and when it will be launched. All that we know is that there are air divisions in Crete and the Balkans, and, while the general direction in which they point is the same as that of the other attacks, they may have Syria or even the Nile Delta for their objective. The success of the enemy offensive, however, will depend on the success of the various parts that constitute it ; and, so far, it can be said that in no direction has any significant advantage been gained. In Libya there has been heavy and very bitter fighting for a fortnight, and up to the present Rommel has not secured any of the objectives which were the immediate purpose of an attack that was carefully prepared at great cost in the air and launched at his selected moment on his chosen sector.
His success at present has been limited to the capture of a bridge- ead across the British positions. But that is so ambiguous a victory Jut it is omitted from the picture of the success he is claiming. This is represented as inflicting upon Ritchie's force such casual- zs that we are compelled now to enter the decisive battle with weakened forces." That is, of course, true ; but it is equally true at there is no vestige of evidence that Rommel has lost less than chie. It is not even true that Rommel can reinforce more easily. e significant point about the picture of the battle which official ermany is presenting to her people is the omission to claim any- g more than the infliction of losses upon the Eighth Army. It is vious that this prolonged and violent attack has caused Ritchie to ffer many tank casualties ; but if one may judge by the tactics he using and the general conditions of the battlefield he has suffered s than Rommel.
The British commander has heavier tanks at his disposal. He is
• ing more artillery more skilfully. He has a better anti-tank gun. s repair services are functioning very much more effectively ; as the battlefield over which most of the heavy fighting has en place remains in his hands, he is salvaging more of the aged tanks. He has driven in the bridgehead from the east, cut section out of its northern boundary at Tamar and another out of southern, in and about Harmat. Rommel is still free to make ties ; but they suggest the violent lunges of a lion caught in a Unless he can capture Bir Hacheim that must be his position ; we could balance his maintenance of the bridgehead by the cap- e of Rotunda Segnali. The position of Bir Hacheim remains one cardinal importance, and the gallant defence of the Free French the Indians is one of the magnificent features of a very hard- ght battle in which so many Imperial units have excelled selves.
Ii it must be admitted that the decision is yet to seek, it must also recognised that Ritchie is as intent as Rommel on securing a • ision, and he is fighting with a resolution and confident tactics are very reassuring. If he should succeed in defeating Rommel in his victory will be much more important than that of the 'n Campaign. Now he is grappling with an essential part of enemy strategy, and his success must affect Hitler's plan. He done well so far, and the outlook is favourable. At the other end of the world events are taking place of which we can gather very little reliable news. If we are to credit the exuberant reports of official America, the Japanese threw into their attack upon Midway Island " the bulk of their sea power." That seems completely incredible. Something is happening about Dutch Harbour in the Aleutians ; and the news there is even vaguer. Admiral Chester Nimitz suggests that after the success at Midway Island the United States Navy is " about halfway to our objective "- the reduction of the Japanese sea-power to impotence. It is extremely difficult to credit that suggestion ; and such language, which must seem irresponsible to us, is difficult to understand. What we may gather is that the Japanese have lost " two or three " aircraft- carriers and their aircraft, plus a destroyer, as against the loss by the United States of a destroyer and some aircraft. The damage claimed is important ; but we have had enough experience to remind ourselves that damaged vessels rarely die ; they simply fade away.
It is evident, however, that the Japanese intended to occupy Midway Island and received a very heavy check ; and the most important lesson that can be learned from the episode is the growing use and success of aircraft in sea-warfare as well as on land. In this way the incident has an importance far beyond its immediate results, and it links up with the great raids on Cologne and Essen. Major Seversky apparently maintains that the appropriate use of aircraft may even achieve victory over the enemy. It is at least clear that the beginning of these gigantic raids has changed the face of the war in Europe. If they could be maintained regularly, day by day, they must have an important influence upon Germany's industrial and moral potential. Taken in conjunction with Major Seversky's contentions, they certainly suggest a role for aircraft which seemed credible at the beginning of the war and which appeared to wither in the blight of actual experience. The gist of Major Seversky's contribution is the assurance of unlimited range. He meets the vexed problem of mobility by the suggestion that the aeroplane should provide its own ; and this is the first time logic has invaded that problem. There is apparently an upper limit for speed which is not very far beyond that already attained. But when he claims unlimited range for aircraft, adequately armoured and armed, he is revolutionising strategy in many directions ; and the important point is that, upon this aspect of the question, he can speak with recognised authority.
The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island, therefore, take on a fresh significance. It must be admitted that the Americans are charier of solid information than the British dare be ; but so far as can be gathered the United States Navy has administered a check to the eastward penetration of the Japanese Navy mainly by the use of aircraft. There are apparently in existence American aircraft with a range of 8,000 miles, and if they can be built in sufficient numbers, and given the speed to meet fighters, they should give the United States Navy the power to carry the war into the enemy's waters. As I pointed out some time ago, no battle can be conceived without the use of aircraft, and, granted sufficient range, the United States Navy should be able to give battle any- where. Warships should be as easily fuelled at sea by aircraft as by tankers, if size and range are unlimited ; and in such condi- tions sea power would take on a new colour.
For the present, much earlier than we were entitled to think possible, the enemy has been checked from the east. He has already been checked in the south. It is difficult to think of his adventuring too far towards the west, when his area of liberty has been so much restricted in other directions. If it seems wiser to shape our hopes with modesty, it is nevertheless inevitable we should reflect that in this phase of the war the enemy's set- backs are more evident than his successes. East as well as west the period of his easy victories has lapsed for the moment. If we could feel more assured about the state of the " battle of the Atlantic," we should have the soundest reasons for confidence, although we know that critical months lie ahead.
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