A glint of hope in the Lebanon
II is difficult to tell precisely what motive lies behind `gria's intervention in the Lebanon. For years now e a„mascus Radio has poured out propaganda for a soailed Greater Syria—to incorporate both Lebanon and Part of Jordan. The suspicious—especially the Israeli s ernment—could be forgiven for supposing that the trian Army has now merely seized its opportunity. On e other hand humanity alone encourages relief at the tiProspect of an end to the slaughter in what was once the s °s.t peaceful and prosperous of Arab states. And the Y flans have clearly taken—with the help and advice of tile United States—the greatest possible care to avoid piii3voking an Israeli counter-strike. It is clear, too, that Whatever the objective of President Assad it cannot be achieved without the destruction of the power of the PLO. r he attitude of Arab governments to the Palestinian ef' sh,uges, and particularly to the militant organisations wned by their experiences during the last twenty-five Years p has always been a curious One. On the one hand the dra.'estinians are the spearhead of the concentrated Arab exi,ve against Israel. On the other—and in spite of the livi,stence of a guilty Arab conscience about the squalid tio-s so many of the refugees have had to livefora generash,,n—the PLO and its various allied organisations have pe;;w„ri themselves to be dangerous friends. They imto -"ed the stability of Jordan; they have brought havoc the Lebanon. Even Iraq and Libya, loud though they thehlPet their support for the Palestinians, have avoided granting of base facilities to Mr Arafat. President Sadat has always been friendly towards them—but he has kept his clients at arm's length. Only Syria has been practical as well as rhetorical in her support of the PLO; and that support is now at an end.
For all this Israel has reason to be profoundly grateful. It is unlikely that sufficient agreement can be reached between the Arab states, divided among themselves as they are, to put an international peace-keeping force into Lebanon: the task there will remain Syria's alone. By their folly and excess the PLO have contributed mightily to the always potential break-up of the Arab front against Israel. Even in the occupied territories where, a few weeks ago, the Israelis seemed to be in serious trouble, the local Arab dignitaries seem to be attempting to dampen down the fires of frustration and revolt. Given all these developments—and in spite of the hideous suffering that has been inflicted on the Lebanese—the prospects for an overall Middle Eastern peace must be brighter than they were even after the Sinai accords. It is interesting, too, that President Assad waited carefully for the renewal of the Golan ceasefire agreement before moving his troops down the road to Beirut, thus giving striking evidence that the last thing he wants now is a clash with Israel. Of course, Israel remains embattled ; and it is far too early for her to make any gesture, whether conciliatory or minatory, which might be construed as an attempt to take advantage of a tragic situation. But provided Israel is prepared in due course to make concessions, it has reason to see glints of hope in the future.
