WHAT WILL THE smAr,r, GERMAN STATES DO?
NOTHING is easier than to be judicious when you are not called upon for judgment, and courageous when you are not in danger. So long as the prospects of war seemed dis- tant, the minor States of Germany wrote admirable des- patches and settled the whole question in a conclusive manner But now that deeds are wanted instead of words, and it is asked what these minor States will do, it becomes evident both to themselves and the world at large that they would do nothing if they could. Theymay cast in their lotwith one aide or the other, according to their sympathies or their situation. But it is clear that they will not be allowed to remain neutral, and it is still more clear that under any circumstances their course is not an easy one. So many conflicting duties call upon them, so many conflicting interests impede them, that if a choice was left them they would certainly do nothing. And as this is the line which they are most fitted to take, it seems hard that they should have to forsake both capacity and in- clination. But there is no help for it. Some of them have committed themselves too decidedly, the others will be dragged in, one way or the other. And we think the result will be, on the whole, to make an arbitrary division of North and South Germany, the group of States round Prussia and Hanover going necessarily with Prussia, and the States commanded by Austria and Bavaria adhering to Austria. We do not mean that the two Empires will be united either under one Sove-
reign or in one Confederation. But if they are dragged into the war they must take part with their neighbours, and Ger- many (unlike Italy, to which Metternich applied the term> being merely a geographical expression, must obey the laws of geography.
From a political point of view there might seem to be- another alternative. All Germany is agreed in execrating a civil war, and would gladly agree in opposing the man by whom the offence came. The people know what it is to have, dragoons quartered on them, and their execration of the First Napoleon for bringing war into Germany is almost as fresh as ever. To the immense majority of Germans Italy is indif- ferent, to a large majority she is hateful. It was with difficulty that Germany was restrained from taking part with Austria in 1859; the feeling in favour of retaining Lombardy was strong, and that in favour of retaining Venice even now amounts to a mania. Combining all these forces, the• hatred of civil war, the hatred of Italian freedom, the hatred of the Napoleon family, and the hatred of Bismarck, we- might have a very strong party to throw into the scale against Prussia. Even those who have hitherto been the untiring advocates of Prussian supremacy shrink from advancing the- supremacy of Prussia under its present ruler. The pro- posal for a Prussian Parliament, which was received with wild enthusiasm even in Munich, fell coldly on the ears of trained politicians, because of the character of its promoter. Yet we fear that if Prussia once begins to act, all these scruples will be forgotten. The Germans will think only of their- former powerlessness, and will hail any opportunity of escape- from it. They will think, as the Prussian Liberals have often thought of Prussian supremacy, that it is better to have a. strong government under Bismarck, than to wait for a better leader. Bismarck will pass away, but what he has won will remain ; while the better leader may keep his oath, but may want the will or the strength to advance the nation. This will no doubt be the conclusion formed by the Liberal friends of Prussia. They detest Count Bismarck, but they would like him to do their work, just as the lord's debtors may have objected to the unjust steward on principle, but were quite ready to have their bills reduced. But this rule does not apply to any part of South Germany. If it applied to any it would be to Baden, which is the stronghold of the National Verein, and the Government of which is highly Liberal and intensely Protestant. We may conceive that Baden would gladly side with Prussia, but its situation puts it out of the question. Divided from Prussia by Wurtemberg and Bavaria, and from the Prussian-Rhenish provinces by the Bavarian Palatinate, Baden is thrown into the arms of the South, with the overwhelming forces of her two Southern neighbours to keep her in order. Even thus she is more fortunate than the Northern States which may happen to differ from Prussia. Saxony, with her 25,400 men, her open frontier towards- Prussia, her Catholic King ruling a Protestant people, and leaning to Austria while his subjects favour Prussia, her Minister who has taken a strongly anti-Prussian line, and her vain appeals to the Diet, must find by experience that
"Pis dangerous when the baser nature comes Between the pass and fell incensed points Of mighty opposites."
And though Saxony is doomed to more imminent danger than the other States, the position of the infinitesimal Duchies- bordering on Prussia is quite as fatal to them. Like Victor Hugo's pieuvre, Prussia throws out arms in all directions, en- closing Brunswick, shutting up Hanover between itself and its Rhenish provinces, and grasping without an effort a herd of Saxon Duchies. Russia's apocryphal threat of inter- ference for the princely relations of the House of Ro- manoff might, even if really uttered, be made light of in these days, when all rulers are related by marriage with- out bringing bringing Europe any nearer to the state of a happy family. Nor must we forget that Prussia has a further hold on some of the adjoining States by means of military conven- tions. The North German Gazette says that a treaty of alliance has been concluded between Prussia and Hanover, which would give Prussia the absolute command of the western part of North Germany. For with the help of Hanover Prussia encloses Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, and the greater part of Darmstadt, without counting the Waldecks and Lippe Detraolds, which might be so painlessly absorbed or extinguished.
The accession of force to Prussia is not so considerable as that to Austria by the adhesion of the Southern States, Bat Prussia's task is much simpler than Austria's, and her gains will be much more decided. Let Count Bismarck once get these adjacent States into his grasp, and he will never let go of them, while the Southern States are almost large enough to form a group, giving Austria a qualified aid, but no accession of territory. If all the minor States lay together, there might be some thought of their combining under one head, and in- fluencing the fate of Germany. The armies of the German States, deducting Austria and Prussia, amount on a war footing to 435,320 men, and this number could be increased without serious inconvenience. For while the Prussian army includes more than 3 per cent. of the population, and the Austrian and Bavarian armies respectively a little under and a little over 2 per cent., the Federal contingent is calculated at 1 1-6th per cent, of the population of each State, and many of the smaller States scarcely keep up their Federal contingent. If Germany were fighting for life, such a State as Hesse Cassel, which put almost 50,000 men in the field during the final war against Napoleon, would not be contented with 15,000 men on her war footing. But besides being divided geographically and far from unanimous in spirit, Germany does not look forward to such a desperate struggle. It shows that it is not in earnest by resting still on that broken reed, the Federal Diet, in spite of the experience of 1864. The strength of the Diet and its supporters was surely shown, when a question in which Austria and Prussia were only backed by the votes of Lichtenstein, Reuss, the two Lippes, Waldeck, and Hesse Homburg, was carried by force against the majority, and when the Federal Constitution was formally and finally set aside. Yet MM. Beast and von der Pfordten are still wasting time in consulting the Diet, in appealing to articles of the Federal Act, and instructing their envoys to put in long- winded protests and to motiver resolutions. Even supposing that the Diet dared to act, it could do less than the minor States themselves. It could only call out the Federal con- tingents, which, deducting those of Austria and Prussia, do not number half as many men as the armies of the minor States ; and it could not ensure the Northern States furnishing their contingents with Prussia hanging upon their frontiers. Most people will agree with M. Maurice Block that the num- bers of the Federal contingents have a purely theoretical interest, though in this case it is difficult to build a theory upon them. Of one thing we are certain, that the Diet will remain to the last deliberating and protesting, and perhaps it may call out the Federal contingents when it has clearly as- certained that not one of them will answer to the call. Prussia's task is much simpler than Austria's, and her gains will be much more decided. Let Count Bismarck once get these adjacent States into his grasp, and he will never let go of them, while the Southern States are almost large enough to form a group, giving Austria a qualified aid, but no accession of territory. If all the minor States lay together, there might be some thought of their combining under one head, and in- fluencing the fate of Germany. The armies of the German States, deducting Austria and Prussia, amount on a war footing to 435,320 men, and this number could be increased without serious inconvenience. For while the Prussian army includes more than 3 per cent. of the population, and the Austrian and Bavarian armies respectively a little under and a little over 2 per cent., the Federal contingent is calculated at 1 1-6th per cent, of the population of each State, and many of the smaller States scarcely keep up their Federal contingent. If Germany were fighting for life, such a State as Hesse Cassel, which put almost 50,000 men in the field during the final war against Napoleon, would not be contented with 15,000 men on her war footing. But besides being divided geographically and far from unanimous in spirit, Germany does not look forward to such a desperate struggle. It shows that it is not in earnest by resting still on that broken reed, the Federal Diet, in spite of the experience of 1864. The strength of the Diet and its supporters was surely shown, when a question in which Austria and Prussia were only backed by the votes of Lichtenstein, Reuss, the two Lippes, Waldeck, and Hesse Homburg, was carried by force against the majority, and when the Federal Constitution was formally and finally set aside. Yet MM. Beast and von der Pfordten are still wasting time in consulting the Diet, in appealing to articles of the Federal Act, and instructing their envoys to put in long- winded protests and to motiver resolutions. Even supposing that the Diet dared to act, it could do less than the minor States themselves. It could only call out the Federal con- tingents, which, deducting those of Austria and Prussia, do not number half as many men as the armies of the minor States ; and it could not ensure the Northern States furnishing their contingents with Prussia hanging upon their frontiers. Most people will agree with M. Maurice Block that the num- bers of the Federal contingents have a purely theoretical interest, though in this case it is difficult to build a theory upon them. Of one thing we are certain, that the Diet will remain to the last deliberating and protesting, and perhaps it may call out the Federal contingents when it has clearly as- certained that not one of them will answer to the call.
Our answer to the question at the head of this article is that the minor States will follow the programme of Hanover —neutrality so long as Prussia (or Austria) will permit, alliance with Prussia (or Austria) as soon as she demands. The Northern States will be forced to take part with Prussia, and though opposed to a war, they will do it willingly, so far as the word "willingness” enters into their vocabulary. Saxony will probably shirk at the last moment between the conflict- ing interests of Court and people, or, if she has gone too far to shirk, will bitterly regret it. The Southern States will be more reluctant to act than the Northern States, and accident might decide their course so as to baffle all prediction. But so long as it is impossible to enlist Bavaria against Austria, Wurtemberg and Baden must follow her lead, and both by position and sympathy, both in the Court and with the majority of the people, Bavaria is bound to the Hapsburgs. The map of Germany may be redistributed, and Germany may find herself simplified without knowing it. But till these events happen there seems little doubt that the minor States must fall into the march of their chief neighbours, and that while the North cannot rule over the South, the weal particles of the North cannot combine with the small particles of the South, to ward off the present seizure of the one and the gradual absorption of the other.
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