12 OCTOBER 1889, Page 5

M. CARNOT'S DIFFICULTY.

OUT of the two great obstacles which impeded the formation of a steady and strong Government in France, she has got herself rid of one. It was almost im- possible in a centralised country like France to govern well while representatives and officials were alike doubtful whether the very nature of the Constitution would not be changed, whether Parliamentarism would not be super- seded by personal power, and, whether devotion to the Republic might not speedily become a disqualification for office. No great measure could be so much as proposed, lest it should send voters into the opposite camp ; and no one in the huge army of functionaries could obey important orders without a certain misgiving. Suppose the mass vote should crown General Boulanger ? Now, however, Boulangism lies sprawling. The verdict of the second ballots confirms the verdict of the first, and the Republic emerges from the struggle -with a majority of 365 to 211, a majority, if the Republicans would but stick together, large enough to accomplish anything. The form of government, therefore, may be considered settled, and. the greatest of all causes of weakness in France—the doubt whether anything can be depended on for more than a month—has been for the time removed. For four years, at all events, France will continue Republican. It remains, however, to create a strong Government for the solidified State, and there is still some doubt whether the election, satisfactory as it is in some respects, has furnished for this purpose quite sufficient material. There is no doubt a dominant party, irresistible alike in numbers and in the confidence of the electors ; but that party is united only for the maintenance of the Republic. It is not united as to the objects which that Republic should pursue, not even whether it should be tolerant or avowedly anti-religious. The central body or party of moderation has, it is true, been greatly strengthened. The avowed Moderates or Old Whigs, who will follow M. Loon Say, are now 50 in number, whereas they were only 6; and the total strength of the Moderate Liberals may be taken at 240 in a House of 576 Members,—that is, 29 more than the whole body of Reactionaries, Legitimists, Bonapartists, and Boulangists all taken together. But, unfortunately, it is not a clear half of the House. The Radicals have retained more seats than was expected, and their group of 125 Members will, if it holds together, re- main in permanent possession of the balance of power. They cannot and will not overthrow the Republic; but they can, and possibly they will, overthrow any Government which does not treat them with consideration, and allow them at least a veto upon the larger measures proposed. We know from past experience that such conduct will not cost them their seats, and will not seem to themselves an outrage on the morality they accept. To be even moderately safe, therefore, the Moderates must either gain 60 steady supporters from the Radicals, or must detach 60 from the Reactionary camp. Even with that increased force they would only have 12 more than half the House, which is 288, and would be terribly harassed by personal ambitions, by the thirst for patronage, and by that intolerable itch to be visible which is the curse of French politicians ; but still, with this number they might venture on great things, especially in regard to finance, which it is becoming more and more clear will be the first preoccupation. Naturally, under such circumstances M. Carnot is bombarded with advice, one set of counsellors recommending that he should, by making certain promises as to religion, win over the more moderate Reactionaries, while another set prophesies failure unless he can conciliate the saner men of the Radical division. He is told that by persuading the Royalists he will solidify the Republic for ever, and instructed that by irritating the Radicals he will compromise the future; in- formed that the wish of France is to stop religious perse- cution, and assured that it is longing for a relief from taxes, which it can obtain onlyfrom Radical finance, for Moderates, left to themselves, will never vote an Income-tax.

Meanwhile, nobody asks whether it is quite so certain that M. Carnot can make any choice at his own discretion. He may be able, for anything any one knows, for one-half the Deputies are new men ; but if he is able, his success will indicate a remarkable change in the condition of French feeling, which hitherto has forbidden any politician to give steady support to a party to which he does not belong. We see something of that feeling in England, where Unionists are called " renegades " for pro- tecting the State, and accused of going into Tor?, bondage in order to oppress Ireland ; but in France it rises into a passion. Society agrees on this subject with the politicians, and the Monarchist or Radical who supports a moderately Liberal Government is subjected to social ostracism. He may give a vote on occasion without much remark, for Frenchmen allow for caprice, and are not hard on isolated errors ; but if he steadily supports another side than his own, he is condemned as a traitor, and cut. Among all clericals, all aristocrats, all sincere Legitimists, the sixty Monarchists who voted steadily by the side of a Moderate but Republican Ministry would be accused of having betrayed their King ; while among the Radicals, the sixty who fell away would be accused of selling themselves for pecuniary gain. If Monarchists voted with M. Constans, the Comte de Paris would say a few sentences about each of them which he would feel like cuts with a whip ; while if Radicals pursued the same course, M. Chcmenceau would whisper to their constituents that they had been betrayed. The preference of the country to a party, hardly appreciated in England, is in France never understood, and the Unionists, whom Liberals here only scold or cry over, would there be treated as persons worthy of the galleys. The social anger in such cases is so hot, that it extends even to the families of the accused, and popular women have found themselves suddenly alone in Paris because their husbands agreed to support Ministers nearly, though not quite, of their • own complexion of thought. Such virulence is hardly comprehensible to English- men, trained for three generations at least to re- gard compromise as intellectually creditable, and rather Christian ; but they may gain some idea of it, if they remember what religious controversies were even here fifty years ago, or how even now a great squire would be regarded if, without becoming a Baptist, he habitually and steadily supported Baptists against the Rector. In France, men hardly acknowledge in politicians the right to alter an opinion, and to suppress one because it might be injurious to the country is little less than infamous. To this hour, the only department in which a Legitimist can serve without the faintest stain on his honour is the Navy ; and the Radical who accepted an Embassy from M. Ferry would be considered bought. The Comte de Paris could, no doubt, issue an order which would relieve his followers of much of the social stigma, if not all ; but he has shown no disposition to do it, and unless he does it, M. Carnot will find the greatest difficulty in securing that firm and consistent majority which he of all mortals in France must most desire. The electors have also that power, holding in this respect, as in some others, the position of Sovereign ; but when Monarchical they show no disposition to exert it, and when exceedingly Radical they refuse. Nothing crazes a Radical of the towns so suddenly as to hear of compromise from his Deputy, or to believe that his favourite representative is capable of behaving as moderately and as sensibly as if he were "an accursed bourgeois." It is possible that, the safety of the Republic being assured, Republicans may be less savage, and Reactionaries more hopelessly patient ; but we foresee grave difficulties for M. Constans, and only hope that among the 289 new Members, a man may start up with moderate opinions and a personal hold over either the popular or the Reactionary mind. A strong leader of a large " Dissentient " group might make the Government safe, but he would have to abstain from office, and to bear more than the usual scorn "which patient merit of the unworthy takes." France is full of capacity, but it does not breed Lord Ilartingtons.