WORDSWORTH ON WAR..
[The following is the essential portion of the letter which the poet Wordsworth wrote in 1811 to Pasley on the publica- tion of his Essay. It was published in the " United Service Magazine" for April, 1913, and commented upon by us at length, and is republished in the new edition of Pasley's Essay (William Clowes and Sons, 3s. 6d. net) noticed by us on August 29th. A great deal of it is, of course, not applicable to the present war. The spirit, however, in which the poet faces the situation and reads its true meaning is wholly admirable, and has just now lessons for us all. We do not ask our readers to search for coincidences or prophecies, but for inspiration. They should, of course, for "France" read "Germany," and for "Napoleon" " the Kaiser."] T ET me express my zealous thanks for the spirit and beauty with which you have pursued through all its details the course of martial policy which you recommend. Too much praise cannot be given to this, which is the great body of your work. I hope that it will not be lost upon your countrymen. But (as I said before) I rather wish to dwell upon those points in which I am dissatisfied with your Essay. Let me then come at once to a fundamental principle : you maintain that, as the military power of France is in progress, ours must be so also—or we must perish. In this I agree with you, yet you contend also that this increase or progress can only be brought about by conquest permanently established upon the continent ; and calling the doctrines of the writers upon the law of nations to your aid, you are for beginning with the conquest of Sicily—and so on through Italy, Switzerland, &c., &c. Now it does not appear to me, though I should rejoice heartily to see a British Army march from Calabria trium- phantly to the heart of the Alps, and from Holland to the centre of Germany, yet it does not appear to me that the conquest and permanent possession of these countries is necessary to produce those resources of men and money which the security and prosperity of our country requires. All that is absolutely needful for either the one or the other is a large experienced and seasoned army—which we cannot possess without a field to fight in ; and that field must be some- where on the continent. Therefore, as far as concerns ourselves and our security, I do not think that so wide a space of conquered country is desirable, and as a Patriot I have no wish for it ; if I desire it, it is not for our own sakes directly, but for the benefit of those unhappy nations whom we should rescue, and whose prosperity would be reflected back on ourselves. Holding these notions, it is natural—highly as I rate the importance of military power, and deeply as I feel its necessity for the protection of every excellence and virtue—that I should rest my hopes with respect to the emancipation of Europe, more upon moral influences and the wishes and opinions of the people of the respective nations than you appear to do.
As I have written in my pamphlet, "On the moral qualities must its salvation ultimately depend. Some- thing higher than military excellence must be taught, as higher : something more fundamental, as more funda- mental." Adopting the opinions of the writers upon the laws of nations—you treat of conquest as if conquest could in itself—nakedly and abstractedly considered—confer rights. If we once admit this proposition all morality is driven out of the world. We conquer Italy, that is, we rear the British Standard in Italy, and, by the aid of its inhabitants, we expel, the French, subdue the country, and have a right to keep it for ourselves. This, if I am not mistaken, is not only implied, but explicitly maintained in your book. Undoubtedly if it be clear that the possession of Italy is necessary for our security, we have a right to keep possession of it, if we should ever be able to master it by the sword. But not because we have gained it by conquest, therefore may we keep it—no; the sword as the sword can give no rights—but because a great and noble nation like ours, cannot prosper or exist without such possession. If the fact were so, we should then have a right to keep possession of what by our valour we had acquired—not otherwise. If these things were matter of mere speculation, they would not be worth talking about ; but they are not so. The spirit of conquest, and the ambition of the sword, never can confer the glory and happiness upon a nation that has attained power sufficient to protect itself. Your favourites the Romans, though no doubt having the fear of the Carthaginians before their eyes, yet were impelled to carry their arms out of Italy by ambition, far more than by a rational apprehension of the dangers of their con- dition. And how did they enter upon this career ? By an act of atrocious injustice; you are too well read in History for me to remind you what that act was. The same disregard of morality followed too closely their steps everywhere. Their ruling passion and sole steady guide, was the glory of the Roman name, and the wish to spread the Roman power. No wonder then if their armies and military leaders, as soon as they had destroyed all foreign enemies from whom anything was to be dreaded, turned their swords upon each. other. The ferocious cruelties of Sylla and Marius, of Catiline, and of Anthony and Octavius, and the despotism of the Empire, were the necessary consequences of a long cours• of action pursued upon such blind and selfish principles. Therefore—admiring as I do your scheme of martial policy ; and agreeing with you that a British military power may, and that the present state of the world requires that it ought to be predominant in Italy and Germany and Spain—yet still 1 am afraid that you look with too much complacency upon conquest by British arms, and upon British military influence upon the continent, for its own sake. Accordingly you seem to regard Italy with more satisfaction than Spain ; I mean you contemplate our possible exertions in Italy with more pleasure, merely because its dismembered state would pro- bably keep it under our sway—in other words, more at our mercy. Now I think nothing would be more unfortunate for E mope than the condition of Germany and Italy in these respects. Could the barriers be dissolved which have divided the one nation into Neapolitans, Tuscans, Venetians, &c., and the other into Prussians, Hanoverians, &c.; and could they be taught their strength; the French would be driven back into their own land immediately. I wish to see Spain, Italy, France, Germany, formed into independent nations ; nor have I any desire to reduce the power of France further than may be necessary for that end. Woe be to that country whose military power is irresistible. I deprecate such an event for Great Britain scarcely less than for any other land. Scipio foresaw the evils with which Rome would be visited when no Carthage should be in existence for her to contend with. If a nation have nothing to oppose or fear without, it cannot escape decay and concussion within. Universal triumph and absolute security soon betray a state into abandonment of that discipline, civil and military, by which its victories were secured. If the time should ever come when this island should have no more formidable enemies by land than it has at this moment by sea, the extinction of all that it previously contained of good and great would soon follow. Indefinite progress undoubtedly there ought to be somewhere ; but let that be in knowledge, in science, in civilisation, in the increase of the numbers of the people, and in the augmentation of their virtue and happiness ; but progress in conquest cannot be indefinite ; and for that very reason, if for no other, it cannot be a fit object for the exertions of a people—I mean beyond certain limits, which, of course, will vary with cir- cunistances—my prayer as a Patriot is—that we may always have somewhere or other enemies capable of resisting us, and keeping us at arm's length.
Do I then object that our arms shall be carried into every part of the continent ? No! such is the present condition of Europe that I earnestly pray for what I deem would be a mighty blessing. France has already destroyed, in almost every part of the continent, the detestable govern- ments with which the nations have been afflicted; she has extinguished one sort of tyranny, but only to substitute another. Thus then have the countries of Europe been taught that domestic oppression, if not manfully and jealously repelled, must sooner or later be succeeded by subjugation from without; they have tasted the bitterness of both cups ; have drunk deeply of both. Their spirits are prepared for resistance to the foreign tyrant, and with our help, I think, they may shake him off ; and under our countenance, and following (as far as they are capable) our example, they may fashion to themselves—making use of what is best of their own ancient laws and institutions—new frames of govern- ment—which may secure posterity from a repetition of such calamities as the present age has brought forth. The materials of a new balance of power exist in the language and name and territory of Spain, in those of France, and those of Italy, Germany, Russia, and the British Isles. The smaller states must disappear and merge in the large nations and widespread languages. The possibility of this remodelling of Europe I see clearly ; earnestly do I pray for it ; and I have in my mind a strong conviction that your invaluable work will be a powerful instrument in preparing the way for that happy issue. Yet still we must go deeper than the nature of your labours requires you to penetrate. Military policy merely will not perform all that is needful, nor mere military virtues. If the Roman state was saved from overthrow by the attack of the slaves and of the gladiators,* and through the excellence of its armies—yet this was not without great clIfficulty ; and Rome would have been destroyed by Carthage had she not been preserved by civil fortitude—in which she surpassed all the nations of the earth. The reception which the senate gave to Terentius Marro after the battle of Cannae is the sublintest event in human history. What a contrast to the Austrian government after the battle at Wagram ! England requires, as you have shown so eloquently and ably, a new system of martial policy; but England, as well as the rest of Europe, what is more difficult to give it—a new course of education, a higher tone of moral feeling, more of the grandeur of the imaginative faculties, and less of the petty precession of the unfeeling and purblind understanding that would manage the concerns of nations in the same calculation with which it would set about building a house. Now a state ought to be governed (at least in these times)—the labours of the statesman ought to advance—upon the calculations and from the impulses similar to those which give motion to the hands of a great artist when he is preparing a great picture, or of a mighty poet when he is determining the proportions and march of a poem.
Much is to be done by rule ; the great outline is previously to be conceived in. distinctness ; but the consummation of the work must be trusted to resources that are not tangible—though known to exist. Much as I admire the political sagacity displayed in your work, I respect you still more for the lofty spirit that supports it, for the animation and courage with which it is replete, for the contempt—in a just cause—of death and danger with which it is ennobled, for ite heroic confidence in the valour of your countrymen, and the absolute determination which it everywhere expresses, to maintain on all points the honour of the soldier's profession, and that of the noble nation of which you are a member—of the land in which you were born—no insults, no indignities, no vile stooping, no despondency, will your politics admit of ; and, therefore, more than for any other cause, do I congratulate my country on the appearance of a book, which, resting on these points—our national safety upon the purity of our national character—will (I trust) help materially to make us, at the same time, a more powerful and a more highminded nation. Affectionately yours, W. WORDSWORTH.
Previous page
