AFRICA TO THE RESCUE
By G. D. K. McCORMICK
THERE is a lamentable tendency today among European states- men to forget that the continent of Africa exists. At the most they seem to regard it, if they regard it at all, as having little more than a nuisance value. Even among the Powers most directly concerned in Africa there is little better than a spirit of laisser faire, of negative rather than positive action. On the other hand, the United States, confronted with the prospect of a Europe that at times seems unwilling to help itself, is increasingly concentrating its atten- tion on Africa. For the first time in history the U.S.A. has come actively into the Mediterranean, and regards the whole North African coast from Agadir to Alexandria as a front-line defence of America and a rearguard defence line for Europe.
It has been fear of the indifference of the major European Powers to Africa quite as much as fear of what would happen in this vast continent in the event of a Communist Government in France which has caused the U.S.A. to make its weight felt in these parts. The Americans have noted the British evacuation of Egypt, the rising tide of a unified Arab nationalism in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, the intrigues of the Soviet Union directed from its unnecessarily large Consulate-General at Algiers ; and they have assessed remark- ably accurately the strategic importance of Africa. They have seen, too, the great scope for industrial and agricultural development here and the possibilities for vast new markets for their own products. Many new markets have already been won by the U.S.A., and with its great wealth and technical ability it is anxious and prepared to assist in the development of North Africa. It has established important cable stations in Morocco, obtained many new concessions for trade and set up an air naval base at Port Lyautey, which has been retained despite Soviet-inspired objections. Indeed, it is anxious for more bases in North Africa, paradoxical though this may seem in view of its scarcely veiled championship of native aspirations for independence. Only a short while ago it sent a secret military mission to spy out the land for such bases in the Spanish possessions of Teneriffe, Ifni and the Rio de Oro.
Its policy in North Africa has not been without mistakes, it is true, but they have been mistakes of enthusiasm rather than of deliberate calculation. It is doubtful whether many of its diplomats on the spot have any great experience of North African affairs and whether they appreciate the difficulties of speeding up reform measures for the native populations. Their obsession with the Com- munist bogy, which is little more than a King Charles's head in North Africa, has caused unnecessary rifts with the French. For Communism, which is an alien brand of politics to orthodox Moslems, has made little headway in these territories except for local influence in Algeria. Nevertheless some American diplomats in North Africa have made it clear that they regard these areas as a bargaining counter in putting over the Marshall Plan. In effect, they say to the French that they would prefer to come out openly in support of Arab nationalism rather than risk seeing a Communised North Africa under a French Communist Government. Such talk is rather in the nature of political bluster, and does not always accord with reality. It might in the long run be justified, but it is equally a dangerous political gamble. It may even lead to the Arab League exploiting America against the latter's best interests. Already some of the League's leaders have cleverly exploited the Communist bogy to win American support, and have even hinted at a " common front against Communist aggression." • But the important fact is that, notwithstanding American tendencies to display most regrettable anti-French sentiments in these lands and the display of indiscreet and premature approval of Arab nationalism, the U.SA. has realised to the full the strategic value of North Africa and its economic potentialities, whereas the European Powers have given the impression of being blind to them. If it is vital that Europe should be united, it is equally vital that it should be united in a common policy regarding its possessions in Africa. Otherwise it may be speedily confronted by a new iron curtain—a barrier of Arab States, united by the Arab League, which the isola- tionist tendencies of„ extreme nationalism seeks to place between Africa and Europe. All that has been done so far is to try to placate nationalism with appeasement reforms and to play for time when time is definitely not on the side of Europe. The manoeuvring of the Powers regarding the future of Tripoli is typical of the short-sighted- ness that seems to dominate present-day European policy in Africa.
There is no doubt that Africa can help European recovery to a very great extent. Europe could considerably replenish its empty larders with more foodstuffs from Africa, and it could also supply Africa—especially North and West Africa—with the industrial equip- ment and agricultural machinery which are so desperately needed. But to achieve this it is of vital importance that the European Powers which have African possessions should form a common plan to develop these areas and, where necessary, agree on common measures of reforms and social and governmental progress for the native peoples. It may well take many years before the stupid suspicions and petty jealousies of the Powers can be completely eliminated as far as a common African policy is concerned. It may well be that some American idealists will even view such a common policy in Africa as the last kick of a dying imperialism. But there is no reason why economic agreement cannot be reached speedily.
Already at the recent conference at Dakar the British and the French established cordial relations on the basis of promoting a common economic plan for Equatorial Africa. They agreed to pre- pare joint schemes for the closer economic integration of these terri- tories. These projects include the development of road, rail, telegraph, telephone and radio communications betwen French and British territories, and the establishment of schemes to combat disease and to improve the welfare of the native population and in consequence raise productivity. Both Portugal and Belgium have shown their willing- ness to enter into co-operative arrangements such as this. One can only hope that this item of news, hardly mentioned in the British Press and certainly ignored by leader-writers, will find an echo in many other lands of Africa. South Africa has shown itself willing to play a leading role in helping Europe. The British Government is to spend L25,000,000 on growing groundnuts on Tanganyika's fertile plains, and the French are pressing ahead with their plans for the industrialisation of Morocco, where there is vast mineral wealth as yet untapped and the possibility of still larger-scale agricultural pro- duction.
But little can be achieved while economic experts and political leaders remain obsessed with the dollar. No one questions that Europe must export more to the U.S.A. and that it is badly in need of dollars. But this is only because it has made itself increasingly dependent on American imports, a dependence which is blinding it to the possibility of importing from elsewhere and seeking markets outside the dollar area. An example of this blindness can be seen in the lack of reciprocal trade agreements between European coun- tries and African territories. In French Morocco Britain is the biggest buyer of phosphates ; we bought 700,000 tons last year. In Spanish Morocco we buy iron ore in fair quantities. With neither territory have we a reciprocal trade agreement of any consequence. From French Morocco we buy twice as much as it buys from us. Yet the French want agricultural equipment for Morocco and want it badly. We could -supply it, but prefer to sell elsewhere. Two reasons are given for this attitude. The first is that we cannot spare the goods, and the second is that we have more than enough francs and that we need to sell goods for dollars. Yet it can hardly be called revolutionary finance if we saved a few more dollars and spent a few more francs. We could spend all the francs we get from Moroccan trade very usefully.
The sixteen Powers which have agreed to get together on the Marshall Plan should also co-operate in the creation of a European- African Plan. If we don't do this, it is not improbable that Africa will become, like Asia, a troubled and strife-ridden area where pro- duction must dwindle and so add another famine area to a world that is already in grave danger of passing into a long era of semi- starvation. These Powers should ask all the African territories what they need from Europe and what they can supply to Europe. Freer trade with Africa should be aimed at as a preliminary step. State monopolies, which in some areas have made a farce of the original equal trading agreements and have restricted the develop- ment of industry, should be revised. Marketing arrangements should be brought up-to-date and where necessary supervised by co- operative buying institutions which would enable each country to have a fair share of goods at a fair price. Closer co-operation between the democratic empires of the west can pave the way to the creation of more democratic government in Africa and to the establishment of a common defensive system. Economic union of Europe and Africa can help to persuade the African peoples that a sincere democratic partnership with Europe is something worth having. But first Europe must become more Africa-minded and Africa must become more Europe-minded.
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