POLITICS
When great questions arise, party management becomes irrelevant
BRUCE ANDERSON
William Hague's decision to poll his party on Europe was popular with Eurosceptics; in most other quarters, it aroused widespread dismay. Over the past couple of days, though more by accident than by design, Chris Patten has emerged as the principal spokesman for the dismayed tendency. Mr Patten had arranged lots of interviews to publicise his new book. He had expected to talk about Asia; instead, most of the attention has been on Europe — which does not mean that a book launch has turned into a leadership bid.
As is apparent from his comments on Europe, Mr Patten has become psychologi- cally detached from British politics, and especially from Tory politics. Even if he decided to return to Westminster, he would face formidable obstacles. He was asked what he would do if offered a seat with a 20,000 majority, but although Mr Patten was too polite to say so, that is not how the Tory party works. Seats are not offered, they have to be fought for, in front of constituency associations who are fierce guardians of their democratic prerogatives and whose decisions are always unpredictable. If Pro- fessor Heisenberg had known about the Tory party, he need not have based his uncertainty principle on the erratic behaviour of certain subatomic particles; he could have used Tory selection committees.
In the 1966 election, Peter Thomeycroft lost his seat. He had been chancellor of the exchequer and minister of defence; his wife, Carla, was one of the most elegant political wives in London. The then Mr Thomeycroft decided that he would like to return to the Commons, so he applied for a seat in Devon, and reached the last four; he was so much stronger than the other three that his selection seemed a formality. But there was no formality. Peter Thomeycroft was bully-ragged by truculent association members, who tried to blame him for the Macmillan/Home governments' failures, while their wives asked Carla Thomeycroft if she knew how to entertain. On their way back to London, the Thorneycrofts stayed with friends. They arrived traumatised. 'We're not going through that again, Peter,' insisted Carla. 'Don't worry, darling: never again. I shall take a peerage,' replied the soon-to-be Lord Thorneycroft.
Chris and Lavender Patten are younger and more resilient than the Thomeycrofts were, but the Conservative party is even less deferential, while most constituency associations also have an implacable Eurosceptic minority — in many cases a majority — which might well do everything it could to stop Chris Patten. His task would not be impossible, merely difficult, but would he really have the stomach to schlep round England, wrangling with Eurosceptics? Apropos of stomachs, Mr Patten would enjoy Brussels, and not only the cuisine. He would be well suited to the life of a Euro-commissioner, and is easily young enough to do that for a few years before becoming an Oxbridge Head of House. In the meantime, however, he will continue to contribute to the Euro-debate, no doubt with the same dubious arguments which he has deployed this week.
Mr Patten thinks that Mr Hague was doubly mistaken. Not only has he treated the single currency question as if it were solely a matter of party management, but in so doing he has made it harder to manage his party. There is no point in arguing about the euro: its fate, and ours, are in the hands of the markets. If it works, we will have to join, and as Mr Patten thinks that it probably will work, he believes that eventu- al British membership is virtually inevitable. So Mr Hague would have been better advised to say nothing at all, but if he had to take a position, he should have imi- tated Harold Wilson and devised one which would have minimised intra-party conflict, not maximised it.
It is a clear argument, but an increasing number of Tories would reject it in every detail. In the first case, the markets' judg- ment is likely to be slower in arriving and more ambiguous in conclusion than Mr Pat- ten seems to expect. It is unlikely that the euro will implode: too much political will has been invested in it. It is equally unlikely that it will be an unequivocal success, and its problems will not just occur on the currency trading floors. The single currency will transform continental Europe, yet there has been remarkably little democratic contro- versy, such is the grip which the Euro- nomenldatura has on the Continental politi- cal process. So what will happen when some regions of Europe suffer from high infla- tion, while others experience a sharp rise in unemployment — and none of them will be able to secure a change in economic policy by voting out their government? The euro's fate could be determined on the streets, as well as in the markets.
As Mr Patten points out, Britain too would suffer if the euro were to fail. But that is out of our hands. It is much less clear whether we are bound to suffer if it suc- ceeds, with us outside. As long as we run a disinflationary monetary policy while keep- ing the public finances under control, and as long as the private sector can produce goods that people want to buy at a price they can afford to pay, we need not fear the heat of the euro. Over the past few years, British economic cycles have diverged sharply from those on the Continent. This has not pre- vented us from prospering, and need not do so in the future. The danger would arise, not from divergence but from the attempt to impose a monetary policy which disre- garded it. Yet the euro would condemn the UK to Procrustean interest rates.
But the Tory objections to the euro run deeper than interest rate regimes. Most Tory opponents of the euro agree with most of its Continental proponents. They believe that a single currency would necessitate a single government and, ultimately, a single patriotism. They wonder whether this is right for the Europeans; they are certain that it is wrong for the British. They are also aware that Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Ken Clarke and the leadership of the CBI are agreed on one point: a horror of debate.
As long as the single currency can be pre- sented as a concept, endorsed by all the most photogenic public figures in the land, the sole aim of which is to make it easier to buy a pint of beer in Benidorm, it might prevail in a referendum. But if there is an extensive public discussion, in which the euro's political and constitutional implica- tions become apparent, the single currency could be defeated; the British people are not yet ready to unite with Europe. Hence the Europhiles' unhappiness with William Hague. They know that the Tory party is the only political force which could defeat then' and that, despite their threats, Mr Hague is determined to turn his party into just such a force.
When great historic questions are in dis- pute the minutiae of party management become insignificant. And there is a further point: if the Europhiles have their way and Europe does unite over the next genera- tion, the Tory party would become an irrel- evance. To avoid irrelevance, it is worth risking destruction.
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