BOOKS.

CATHCA.HT ON THE RUSSIAN AND GERMAN CA.MPAIGNS 'OF 1812 AND 1813.4 Ix 1812, Colonel Cathcart, then in his nineteenth year, and a Lieu- tenant of Dragoons, accompanied his father, Lord Cathcart, to a. Petersburg, whither his Lordship had gone as the representa- tive of Great Britain, whe,n Napoleon's inyasion induced the Em- peror. Alexander to receive a British Ambassador. During the Russian campaign, Lord Cathcart remained in the capital with the Emperor; when .Alevander took the field in the spring, the Ambassador accompanied bira, and was followed by his son the Lieutenant. "From that time.to the capitulation of Paris in 1814, he was constantly with the army, and had an opportunity of aeeing and hearing what was fang on during the following cam- paigns, as well as of witnessing much of their interesting a.ncl in- structive details: thus he had the good fortune to see eight general aotions lost and won, in which Napoleon commanded in person." This personal opportunity of .observation does not apply to the Russian campaign ; of which Colonel Cathcart gives a summary account as an introduction to the War of liberation in Germany. In the mode of treatment, however, there is no difference between the two narratives.. Colonel Cathcart's object is a military commentary pointing out the mill— causes of success or failure, not a re coated litterateur's set of sketches, where the picturesque in mass and the gallant in individuals are the writer's subjects. Anec- dotes and incidental accessories are occasionally noticed, when they lie directly in the way; and the freshness of personal know- ledge pervades the descriptions both natural and -military : but professional criticism and mathematical demonstration are the cha- racteristics of the -work. The essential difference in the various arms of the service will enforce some difference in the description of their action, but "the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war" are disregarded, or if mentioned at all it is only for the force that lurks under them. The campaign is considered as a game or a problem. 'The general scheme of the whole is -described and cri- ticized; the successive moves are subjected to a similar considera- tion ; their effect or that of any accident is pointed nut; and the reader is conducted to the scour:dein-a/tete. conclusion, -with the necessary allowances for luck. Hence, mere figirting, which seems to the Uninitiated the all-In-all of war, occupies an appa- rently small space; while the strategy, the preparations, and the muster-rolls, are treated at greater length than the victory itself, which for romance-readers will seem lost and won too easily. Sub- ordinate affairs, partisan warfare, and individual actions, that furnish so much of the stirring and picturesque, are omitted alto- gether, unless in the rare case of exemplifying some pig/maple of tactics ; even the campaigns of collateral armies are only noticed for their influence on the main result.

The effect of this mode of composition is not dryness, as might be supposed, but clearness. Cause and consequence, which in rhetorical an4 descriptive history are overwhelmed by words, or somewhat lost sight of because perhaps the historian may not clearly perceive them himself, are continually preiient to the reader in Colonel Cathcart's Commentaries. He is taken behind the scenes, and shown the whole machinery, so that he can trace the progress of the campaign, as an intelligent operation, barring luck,--which- der or luck,--which in fact did turn the scale in favour of the Al- lies ; their delay in attacking Dresden causing their defeat, and the victory at Cahn over Yandamme not only saving them from fatal disaster but restoring their affairs. This olearness is the more valuable because the campaign of 1813 has not excited so much at- tention as it deserves; or its complexity when noticed has given rise to a kindred complexity if narrative. The unity of the Rus- sian campaign, and the vastness of its catastrophe, fill the mind ; as do the rapidity, the singleness, and the immediate results of the campaign of Waterhio. The liberatin war in-Germany, asColonel Cathcart observes, is less regarded, although in a inilitarj sense more worthy of study, as it was in reality successful through supe- rior strategy on the part of the Allies; Napoleon having replaced his Russian losses in a manner almost miraculous, so as to be at the Outset superior in force. It Should, however, have been more dis- tinctly stated that the prestige of Napoleon's name was shaken, that his new levies had not the experience or confidence of his lost veterans ; and that the long tyrannies of the French in Germany had entirely reversed the political and moral aspects of the war. Napoleon in 1813 was in the position of the old- anstoeratical ar- mies in 1793, whereas the despotic sovereigns represented the beau ideal of the French Revolution and its hopes. Either from the nature of his mind or a long course of Tmiraculolis good fortune, Bonaparte was ill qualified to play a losing or cautious game, and he could scarcely shut his eyes to the treachery by which he was surrounded. The military force that Austria brought to the Allies was not much, but she gave great territorial facilities ; and her conduct, before she joined them, was calculated to cause uncer- tainty by infusing doubt. Neither was Napoleon so young as in bis earlier campaigns. It is -true, his years were only forty-four; but the vivacity and rashness of youth were past, and they seem to have been necessary to the thorough carrying out of Napoleon's tactics.

Besides the personal knowledge already spoken of, Colonel Cathcart has carefully studied the statistics and other documents

• Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813. BY Colonel the Honourable George Cathcart. With Plans and Diagrams. Published by Murray.

connected with the campaign that have since been published, and brought much thought to bear upon the subject, as if the won- derful events he witnessed in early youth had formed a theme for the meditation of his life. He seems also to have carefully studio& the military characteristics a the different Continental nations, as well as the. principles of war. He has consequently infused into his book the spirit of a wide and varied professional know- ledge, which is conveyed in a plain and concise style. The follow- ing exposition of the leading principles of strategy to illustrate the war in Germany after the battle of Dresden, may be adduced as an example of Colonel Cathcart's professional marmeas " The author is anxious at this particular period to invite the attention- of the reader to the first principles of strategy, which, like the elements of all sciences, are, when duly recognised, elear and self-evident truths: In point of theory, the admirable Work of the Archduke Charles, or for practictil illustration, the base of Torres Vedras covering Lisbon, and the glorious achievements which emanated invariably from it, will be consulted and con- sidered with advantage by thoae who Aware a thorough knowledge of this science ; but for the present purpose, it will suffice to point out that the elements may be reduced to the three following postulates.

" First. A. base of operations ; being that locality from which the supplies, of the army are to he furnished. " Secondly. The objective ; being an object or goal, the attainment of which must renderthe campaign decisive, and to which, therefore, all move= meats must have reference.

" Thirdly. The line of operations ; beingtho most favourable route or Qom, munication leading from the base to the decisive point or objective.

" It follows, of comae that the base of the defending army mutt either be

the decisive point itself course, is menaced by the opposite party, or-some other: point covering it, and that the line of operations must be common to both. Bearing these principles in mind, it will be found in the history of mo- dem warfare conducted by regular armies on both sides, that in ever/ in. stance where they have been lost sight of or departed from, (and there am many,) victory has led to no good result, and defeat has proved an irretriev- able disaster: whereas, -where they have been duly attended to, each sue- COBS has become a point gained in the progress of the campaign ; and though partial failures may have retarded operations and even occasioned retreats, yet such failures have not proved decisive.

" In the following chapter it will be found that Napoleon through obsti-

,

nacy, like a headstrong gambler -playing a losing game contrary to his own experience and former practice, determined to cling to game, and make it a centre of operations. Under existing eircumstanoes, this was a wilful de- parture from the principles-of strategy; for by doing so he left the line of oommunication with his true base, the Rhine, at the mercy of .his powerful ene"milie author is the-more desirous of calling attention to this subject, be- cause a popular and in most eases accurate writer of general history has characterized this policy of Sapolecars as profoundly conceived, and most ably carried into effect, lie trusts that the events recorded in this book alone will suffice to justify the true principles of strategy, and prove the worthlessness of the miscalled 'profound conception' of operations with large armies radiating from an insulated centre, without reference to the true base and line of communication.

* * *

"Alter the battle of Dresden, Napoleon, by no means satisfied with the conduct of Oudinot in the campaign of Gross Beeren, sent Marshal Nay supersede him in the chief command. With a view to his altered circum- stances, he had then formedthe plan of making Dresden a common centre for his armies; acting from which, instead of from a more orthodox base, he might bring 'concentrated and superior forces to bear against each of his three separate opponents in succession, and thus he hoped to beat them 3ti detail,—a fault in strategy of which he decidedly paid the penalty. "This principle of military action, when a general places himself with collected forces in the centre of a hostile circle, can only be justified in th4 ease of small armies in desperate circumstances, such as in civil war, 'where no ether strategic base -than the metropolis am be found: the possession of this by either party may then be decisive • and if the foe can be brought iv battle without delay,. a victory may be attended with a fa.vourable and con- clusive result. But in Napoleon's case, his subsequent failures will serve as a sufficient commentary on the uncertainty of that unscientific mode of war- fare, and the danger that attends it in the operations-of large armies."

Although the greaterpart of the book consists of matters treated in this scientific way, there are incidental passages of a more general kind, relieving the science of war by more natural touchea. This is the second morning of Bautzen.

"It was a fine summer morning on the 21st of May : all was still, and even the sound of an occasional musket-shot, discharged along the distant line of advanced sentries, __was scarcely to be heard. At daybreak we were in the field, and the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia were already an a height in front of the centre. However, the enemy were in motion, and appeared to be assembling in force on the rising ground immediately in front of Bautzen, menacing our left or centre. Napoleon himself was very distinctly to be seen, accompanied

his staff, and apparently euperintending the assembly of his troops Whilst his preparations were in prowess, he dismounted and walked about with his hands behind his back in conversation with officers of his suite. All our glasses were directed towards tern; and one belonging to Lord Cathe dirt, which proved to be the best there, was in great request, and was em- ployed on this occasion by the Emperor Alexander and -the King of Freesia. - "Although the two .hostile staffs were not out of the range ef each otherls artillery, and thonai Napoleon binualf was quite within the, reach of the Russian batteries, the Allies were too courteous to disturb his meditations by a shot. Berthier and others Were recognized; but one.person in the grou,p with whom Napoleon seemed to have much conversation, and while dis= eoureing with whom he frequently consulted his map, puzzled the allied head-quarters very much,: he -was in a height yellow uniform ; and after various conjectures it was agreed that it could be no other than Murat, wile delighted in dress, and was occasionally So be seen in all sorts of costumes. This Was important, ii the belief were well founded; because the presence of Murat argued that the Italian levies were in a state of forwardness ; be- sides that, the personal exertions to be expected from his well-lmown ao- tivity and skill as iv cavalry officer would require increased vigilance on our side. This belief was entertained till much later in the day, when it was ascertained from prisoners or deserters that the man in yellow was no other than a Saxon postillion employed as a guide, of whom Napoleon was asking the names of the different villages."

The following exhibits Alexander after the retreat from Lutzen.

"The Emperor of Russia passed the night of the battle at Pepin' whither his britcka containing his papers and camp-bed had been brought; and, after having been twenty hours on horseback, Lard Cathcart and his staff found the bare floor of a cottage se comfortable a conoh, without even the luxury of straw, that' no one seemed in any hurry to rise When we were formed, loon after daylight, that his Imperial Majesty was about to mount and depart, and that the enemy were approaching to dislodge 118. The Emperor slowly rode some miles towards the rear, along the Altenburg road, conversing with Lord Cathcart about the battle : he laid great stress upon the report of the Commandant of Artillery as to the want of ammunition, which he assigned as the principal reason for not renewing the action; he spoke of the result as a victory gamed on am side ; and it was afterwards the fashion in the army to consider it as such, though not perhaps a victory so important in its consequences, or so decisive, as could have been wished. At length the Emperor observed that he did not like to be seen riding fast to the rear, and that it was now necessary for him to go to Dresden with all expedition, and prepare for ulterior operations : he then entered his little travelling-carriage, which was drawn by relays of Cossack horses, and proceeded by Altenburg to Penig."