THE DEBATES ON THE EASTERN QUESTION.
THE two Debates of this week on the Eastern policy of the Government, present many features of unspeak- able importance, some of which have not yet been adequately recognised in the English Press. And in the first place, there are some remarkable personal features in them which should not escape our notice. While the leader of the Upper House was roaring like a lion,—talking of the necessity of organising the land forces of Great Britain, with a view to prevent the march of possible armies through Syria, and saying of some presumed opponent, whom he pointedly declined, of course, to identify with Lord Derby, as the most decent mode of indicating whom he really meant, that if he wished England to remain disarmed when all the other nations of the Continent were armed," Naviget ad Anticyram, only I trust that, for Heaven's sake, his lunacy would not imperil the British Empire,"—Sir Stafford Northcote in the House of Commons was all the time bleating like a lamb, ex- pressing his cordial hope that the Conference might still meet, assuring Russia that the last thing he wished to do was to use lan- guage in any degree irritating or offensive to her, confessing that he recognised her great sacrifices, and her claim to be considered in the new settlement of affairs, and was, indeed, altogether producing on the House of Commons the impression that he would be the last to embark in any enterprise likely to pre- cipitate a needless struggle. This impression was even deepened by Sir Stafford Northcote's reply at the end of the second day's debate ; and both his speeches must suggest to any shrewd observer of the policy of the Cabinet, that if the pro- cess by which that body of the Queen's advisers is gradually shedding the more reasonable and pacific of its elements, is not yet at an end, the next extraneous atom ex- pelled from that organisation will be Sir Stafford Northcote. The contrast between the tone of Lord Beaconsfield's and Lord Salisbury's speeches on Monday and the tone of the leader of the House of Commons on both days is even heightened when we note his tone after he had had the opportunity of reading the whole debate in the Lords. Lord Beacons- field, as we have said, had politely implied that Lord Derby was a lunatic for doubting that our land forces, as well as our Navy, must be put in readiness now, and for an object which may apparently involve stopping the march of an army through Syria. Lord Salisbury had spoken of the project of giving Bulgaria a port on the Egean as if it implied giving Russia a port on the Egean, and of giving Russia a port on the Egean as if it would be at least as dangerous to English interests as to give her Constantinople itself. But Sir Stafford Northcote, though he said a good deal about keeping intact the great British Empire, was even more completely pacific in his professions than on the previous day. In answering Lord Hartington, he said, "The noble lord asks whether we are going to fight for British interests, or in support of European policy. We , are not going to fight at all, but we intend to maintain , both British interests and European policy." After the ' speech of Lord Beaconsfield, which had not dropped a single pacific word, and the speech of Lord Salisbury, which had balanced all its pacific words by other words not at all pacific, this increasingly pacific character of Sir Stafford Northcote's tone is at least remarkable. It assures us that for the present at least, the ex-Ministers have still a , colleague in the Cabinet whose bias is the same as theirs, whether his resolution is or is not equal to theirs, and should certainly teach us to see at once the significance either of any approximation of tone between Sir Stafford Northcote and his chief,—which would mean that our last security for a reasonable policy was gone,—or of any sign that Sir Stafford Northcote was less at ease in the Government than he is now, which would mean that he himself might be , going soon. At present, all the conciliatory and pacific ; language of the Government is reserved for the Lower House, which is one way, no doubt, of accounting for the far less important character of the Opposition speeches delivered , in the Lower House than of those in the Upper House, where , the danger of a boastful and mischievous policy was far more distinctly realised.
But by far the most important feature of either debate was Lord Derby's very striking and weighty speech, from which we learn two things of the greatest moment to the true understanding of the policy of our Government on the Eastern Question. The first of these things is that Lord Derby himself has been throughout quite inclined to discourage the meeting of the Conference, instead of to promote it,—and this not from any bellicose senti- ment, but from his own habitual dislike to the dangers of discussions between many Powers marked by very different ten- dencies on the subject of those grave responsibilities which, if undertaken at all, should, in Lord Derby's opinion, be under- taken after the calmest and most deliberate consideration, by each Power separately. Lord Derby has seen something of Conferences, and he evidently dislikes them, except when they meet simply to register and give formal effect to de- cisions arrived at separately and on the fullest consideration by the individual members of these Conferences. He dreads being hurried into premature engagements by the pressure of other Powers. He strenuously opposed the notion of attending any such Congress himself, on the very sound plea that after all the British Cabinet, and not the British Plenipotentiary, must decide what was best; and that the Cabinet would decide it much better by full consultation with the Foreign Minister, than by telegraphic communication with him. And on the same kind of ground on which he objected to attending the Congress himself as Foreign Minister, he objected in his heart to having any Congress at all till all the principal lines of policy had been determined by separate negotiation between the Powers. But this being his own avowed bias in this matter, just observe what use the Prime Minister was astute enough to make of him. He kept him as his colleague, no doubt by dint of much persuasion, till,—by his agency,—in other words, the agency of one who was otherwise the warm friend of peace,— the Congress had been almost broken off, and then got rid of him because, this having been successfully effected, he found him opposed to other steps of a still more critical and dangerous ten- dency. He succeeded in keeping him, after Lord Carnarvon had resigned,—in order to break off the Congress,—and then having shielded himself under Lord Derby's great authority for that great step towards a rupture, proceeded to take the further steps which Lord Derby did not approve, and so to emancipate him- self from his now hampering influence. Nay, he hinted not obscurely that Lord Derby was a "lunatic" for going with him so far, and not going any farther. We hold Lord Derby's con- fession of his personal distrust of the Congress,—on pacific grounds,—and his preference for separate negotiations, a confession of the greatest importance, because it gives us a key to Lord Beaconsfield's drift. Lord Beaconsfied has always used, as far as possible, men who were understood not to sympathise with his ends, in order to obtain the means to those ends ; and Lord Derby's aid was in- valuable to him in getting rid of the Congress, just because every one knew that Lord Derby really did de- sire a pacific solution like that which, as it was hoped, the Congress would attain. No doubt Lord Derby's colleagues have, many of them, been since expressing their astonishment and regret at hearing that Lord Derby attached so little im- portance to the Congress. But we may be quite sure Lord Beaconsfield did not share their astonishment. He was well aware of Lord Derby's feeling about the Congress, and because he was aware of it, he moved Heaven and Earth to keep Lord Derby,—in spite of profound differences on most essen- tial points,—just for the purpose of breaking off the Congress negotiations,—and then he got rid of him. The other confes- sion of Lord Derby which marks an era in the history of our policy, is the avowal that the calling-out of the Reserves "was not the sole, nor indeed the principal reason for the differ- ences which unfortunately arose" between Lord Derby and his colleagues. "What the other reasons are I cannot divulge, until the propositions of the Government, from which I dissented, are made known." That is a most important state- ment, which ought to have had a greater effect on the second night's debate in the House of Commons than, so far as we can see, it had. Very few of the speakers are reported to have referred to it at all. Lord Hartington made no reference to it. Yet when a Foreign Minister who is known to be pacific, resigns office with the express state- ment that though objecting to some extent to what the Government have done, he objects far more to something that they have in contemplation, it is the business of a competent Opposition leader to help the country to see the full signifi- cance and the immense risk which the country is incurring. Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone spoke before Lord Derby, or we should doubtless have had the immense importance of this communication of the late Foreign Secretary's adequately brought before the country. But for Lord Hartington,—except that he criticised with some severity Lord Derby's reluctance to enter Congress, and inquired (with notable simplicity) why the Government had left the conduct of those negotiations in the hands of a Minister who was indifferent to the meeting of the Congress,—Lord Derby's speech might almost as well never have been spoken.
The last very important feature of the debates is the avowal of the opinion of the Government,—and the tacit acquiescence, we may almost say, of the chief Opposition leaders, Mr. Gladstone probably excepted, in that opinion,—that the Treaty of San Stefano, as it now exists, is absolutely incompatible with British interests. Even Sir Stafford Northcote said, "In our opinion, our communications with India and with Egypt would be threatened, if the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano were carried into effect." Lord Salisbury committed himself to the opinion that to give Bulgaria,---or as he called it, Russia,—a port on the /Egean, was as dangerous as to give her Constantinople at once. So far as we can gather, what the British Government would propose, in the interests of the British Empire, is the separation of Bul- garia into two autonomous States, instead of one large State, the exclusion of the more Slav province of the two from any sea- port,—the exclusion of all Russian influence from those Greek provinces in which a limited autonomy is to be established,— and probably the association of other European Powers with Russia in the provisional organisation of the new States. If concessions of this kind can be obtained by a Congress or Con- ference, then, if we understand the pacific members of the Cabinet aright, they still desire to promote such a Congress or Conference. If not—then the ultimate measures, whatever they may be, to which Lord Derby referred, and which in his opinion are but too likely to lead to war, will be adopted. Appar- ently, too, our Opposition leaders are very much disposed to concur in the first branch of this alternative policy, and have not had the courage to look the second and more menacing policy steadily in the face. That is not very encouraging to the humbler members of Opposition. In our belief, the Opposition is as timid and feeble as the Government is ambiguous and double-sided in its policy. The tone of Sir Stafford Northcote does not differ more from the tone of Lord Beaconsfield, than the tone of Lord Hartington from the tone of Mr. Gladstone. The debates show that there are still two tendencies in the Government, and that there are still two tendencies in the Opposition, and that these four tendencies bewilder the followers on both sides. But if we may be permitted a prognostic, we think we shall see the rod of Lord Beaconsfield swallowing up the rods of the feebler members of the Government ; and that eventually, too, we shall see the rod of Mr. Gladstone swallowing up the rods of the feebler members of the Opposition. It would be all the better, if this era of greater definiteness were not too long delayed.
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