FAR EASTERN RUSSIA. T HE landing of Japanese and British forces
at. Vladivostok is apparently regarded in Washington as a purely local measure for the restoration of order. Temporarily that view may be sound enough, but it is impossible to avoid the con- viction that in substance the whole problem of Far Eastern Russia is involved. Of necessity that problem is one of extreme diplomatic difficulty. If the Russian Empire had continued in being, the Allies of Russia would certainly not have considered even the possibility of any military or terri- torial rearrangements in the Far East. The destruction of the Empire and the substitution of a Socialist Government, strongly suspected of being at the service of our enemies as well as nominally at peace with them, alters the whole character of the problem. Nobody in this country of course desires to take advantage of the present chaos in Russia to injure the interests of the Russian people, but in view of the manner in which we have been abandoned by our former Allies we are justified in looking at the problem of Far Eastern Russia from our own point of view. By that phrase we mean, not a distinctively British point of view, but a point of view which takes into account the interest of all the remaining members of the Entente. According to reports from Siberia, a large number of armed German prisoners are making their way eastwards with the permission, if not with the positive approval, of what remains of Government in Russia. If this German contingent were to seize the whole of the Siberian Railway and to establish itself at Vladivostok, the Germans— presuming upon the continued tonnivance of the Bolshevik Government in Petrograd and Moscow—would have direct railway communication with the Far East, and would be abk to establish in Vladivostok a new naval base from which to attack our Japanese Allies, to attack British shipping in the Pacific, and possibly even to make raids as far south as Aus- tralian sea-ports. Therefore, however much the Bolshevik Government of Russia may dislike the intervention of Japan in Siberia, the Allies are justified in supporting that intervention.
For geographical reasons which are sufficiently obvious, Japan is the member of the Entente most immediately con- cerned in this German push towards the Far East. The main island of Japan lies immediately opposite to Vladivostok, separated only by two days' steaming at a moderate speed. In addition, the peninsula of Korea, now forming part of the Japanese Empire, is in the north actually conterminous with Russian territory, the frontier being barely two hundred miles from Vladivostok. Moreover, Japan has a very obvious interest in the security of the great Chinese province of Manchuria, the home of the dynasty which so long ruled over the Chinese Empire. This province is traversed from east to west by the Trans-Siberian Railway, and that railway is con- nected at Harbin with the Manchurian Railway, running almost due south to Port Arthur, a Japanese possession. At present Chinese guards are reported to be in possession of the junction at Harbin, but apparently they arc confining their efforts to the protection of Chinese property. The right of way across Manchuria from Siberia to Vladivostok still remains open. It would be a reasonable measure of military precaution to close this right of way. China is at war with Germany Russia is at peace with Germany. Therefore the Chinese Government would have a perfect right to say that they will no longer permit Russian forces, whether alone or accompanied by German armed prisoners, to cross Manchuria in order to establish themselves at Vladivostok. If this precaution were taken, the immediate danger to Vladivostok would be re- moved ; but it would only transfer the danger to some point or points on the frontier which separates the Chinese Republic from Russia, and the most obvious way of meeting that danger is to make military preparations against it at the points threatened on that frontier. In other words, the action taken by the Japanese at Vladivostok implies, if it is to be finally effective, action further to the west along the line of the Siberian Railway, so as to keep the Germans at a safe distance.
In such action China as well as Japan is intimately con- cerned. How far the present Chinese Government are capable of acting as free agents in any political or military measures it is not easy to determine. The Chinese Republic is at the moment almost as disorganized as the still more recently created Russian Republic. The South is threatening the North, and no Government appears to have any very secure tenure of power. But it may be presumed that if all the Entente Powers agreed in advising China to support Japanese action along the Siberian Railway the advice would be accepted.
Hitherto the American Government seem to have been opposed to Japan taking any action in Far Eastern Russia. That opposition may have been solely due to a prudent anxiety on the part of President Wilson lest a Japanese landing at Vladivostok should throw the Russian Bolsheviks into the arms of Germany. It is however at least possible that President Wilson is influenced in his attitude by the very great hostility towards the Japanese which exists on the Pacific coast of the United States. This hostility is industrial rather than political. It arises from the American working man's objection to the competition of the relatively cheap labour of Japan, and it has led to local anti-Japanese legislation which was bitterly resented in Japan. The out- break of war has diminished for the time being the acuteness of this controversy, but one cannot for a moment imagine that such fundamental economic differences can be removed by new political groupings. The worst of antipathies of this character is that they are so constantly carried to a point where reason is entirely outweighed by prejudice. Looked at impartially, a Japanese advance into Far Eastern Russia would almost inevitably have the effect of diminishing the Japanese industrial pressure on the Pacific States of America. The Japanese population is not unlimited, and if Japan extends her activities to the coast of Asia she will have lest energy available for the coast of America. From this point of view, the ultimate interest of the American working man on the Pacific coast lies on the side of Japanese enterprise is Far Eastern Asia. From the world's point of view, there is no obvious reason why Japan is not as fully entitled to advance her commercial interests in this Chinese-inhabited portion of Asia as either Russia or Germany. The Kaiser in a famous speech a good many years ago, which probably no Japanese has ever forgotten, suggested an alliance of all Europe against what he called " The Yellow Peril." The Japanese and the Chinese, with at least equal justification, might denounce " The White Peril " which would certainly t hreaten their independence if Germany were to establish herself in Far Eastern Russia.
Happily President Wilson's opposition to the new movement in Siberia seems to have been withdrawn, and it is reported from Washington that an American contingent will be added to the British and Japanese contingents already landed in Vladivostok. That is a very satisfactory step, for it empha- sizes the unity of the Allies in meeting a common danger. As to future territorial rearrangements which may con- ceivably be requisite, the consideration of these must be left till the termination of the war. We cannot yet forecast the conditions which will then arise. It may be that the great Russian Empire will be restored to its former boundaries ; it may be that Russia will disappear altogether as a single Power, and be replaced by a number of separate republics. But whatever the future may bring to Russia, it is clear that the present interests of all the existing members of the Entente, and the ultimate interests of Russia herself, are on the side of immediate action to prevent a further German advance towards the Far East.
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