MARGINAL COMMENT
NICOLSON
By HAROLD
It is even more difficult to decide upon the comparative effective- ness of activity or inertia when examining the evidence already accumulated around some historical episode of recent date. I have been reading recently two fascinating books upon the connected themes of the French surrender of 1940 and the French revival of 1941-1943. The first, which was published some months ago in Paris, is called "La Verite sur !'Armistice" (Editions Medicis. Decem- ber, 1944), and is written by Monsieur Albert Kammerer, one of the most precise and scholarly of all French ambassadors. The second, of which an English translation (Jonathan Cape. Nis. 6d.) was issued on Monday, is called " Algiers, 1941-1943," and is written by Madame Renee Pierre-Gosset. From each of these books one derives the impression .that in periods of rapid confusion men of goodwill, if deficient in momentary will-power, find themselves at the mercy of men of evil intentions who know what they want. In the former case Laval, in the latter case Darlan, were able to seize control of the situation, not so much owing to any superhuman energy on their part, as to the fact that they were able to profit by the honourable hesitations of others, and to force into their service the incalculable elements of chance. In each case, coming comparatively freshly upon the scene, they derived advantage from the physical exhaustion of their opponents ; in each case, when others were united only, by their common lassitude and despair, they were able in the general anxiety to impose their own formula. But their success was due, not so much to the force of their own motives as to the weakness of all other motives. It was not their activity which was the deter- minant factor but the inertia of those who were opposed to them.
Monsieur Kammerer, in analysing day by day the tragic events of June, 1940, has had the advantage, not only of studying all avail- able documents, but also of consulting people such as Monsieur Charles Roux, who were present at headquarters, during the final scenes of that tremendous drama. His account is the most authorita- tive which we are likely to possess until such time at least as the memoirs of General Weygand become available for publication.- It is inevitable that with the sudden defeat of great armies, with the piercing of defence lines which had been deemed unassailable, with
THE task and duty of the historian is to separate the true sequence of events from the tangle of contradictory evidence with which he is presented. His difficulty is that having once disengaged what seems to him to be the chain of circumstance from the sea-weed and the barnacles which encrust and obscure it he is so delighted with the continuity which he has discovered that he rubs and polishes his chain until it shines like silver. If he finds a weak link, then he will solder it together with careful skill ; if he finds a miss- ing link, then all too often he is tempted to replace that link with one of his own fabrication. In order to achieve clarity and conviction, he inevitably becomes obsessed and even bemused by the theory of cause and effect ; he observes a certain result and assumes that this result must have been caused by some deliberate and ascertainable motive ; he thus comes to attribute to the personalities whom he is describing a greater degree of prevision, prescience and intention than they in fact possessed. The historian, in his laudable desire to simplify, often falls into the error of over-simplification ; and is inclined to ignore the immense part played in the shaping of events by the incidental failings of human nature, such as personal affec- tion or physical exhaustion, even as he frequently forgets to attribute to the element of chance the often determinant influence which it exercises upon the course of events. When we study some famous episode of a hundred years ago, and plough through the innumerable diaries, memoirs and correspondence which form the contemporary evidence, we are left wondering whether the neat chain of circum- stance with which the historians have provided us bears any real relation to what the protagonists thought or intended oi hoped at the time. We ask ourselves whether it is not so much the presence, as the absence, of motive which determines history.
the rupture of all normal communications, and with the intense con- fusion wrought by mass evacuation and constant aerial bombard- ment, the functions and self-confidence of a central government should become completely dislocated.• The confusion and despera- tion which assailed the men of Tours and Bordeaux during those appalling days is fully comprehensible. It is understandable also that the French General Staff 'should have failed for the moment to foresee the miracle of the Battle of Britain, or to imagine the powers of resistance which this island, symbolised and inspired by Winston Churchill, and much fortified by twenty-five miles of salt water, would be able to develop. But even when we recognise the strain to which Paul Reynaud's Cabinet were exposed, and even when we excuse their lack of imaginative confidence in our own powers of resistance, three questions remain for answer. Was Weygand more afraid of internal chaos in France than he was of a German occupa- tion? M. Kammerer answers this question in the affirmative, and we must await Weygand's own defence before accepting this verdict as final. Two other questions remain. Why was the French fleet not sent to British ports? Why did not the President and the Government transfer themselves to Algiers and continue the struggle in North Africa? Monsieur Kammerer has some interesting information to furnish upon both these points.
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There is no question of bad faith on the part of M. Paul Reynaud. His intention from the first was to transfer his government to Africa, to take the fleet with him, and to continue the struggle from there. It was Laval, assisted by Petain, who by a series of disgraceful stratagems and ruses prevented this consummation ; and in the end Reynaud and his supporters found themselves interned in the s.s. Massilia ' in Casablanca harbour. Laval G. triumphed by kidnapping his opponents. M. Kammerer tells this book his feelings get the better of him. " Thank you, Churchill," sad story as impartially as he can ; but in the last sentence of his C he concludes in leaded type. " Thank you, de Gaulle! " • The story is taken up by Madame Pierre-Gosset in her book upon Algiers during the three years that followed. One turns with relief from the putrescence of Laval, from the sly senility of Petain, to the first trumpet-calls of the Resistance. Madame Pierre-Gosset tl has a good memory and a vivid journalistic mind ; she describes p the confused condition of French colonial opinion with acid acumen. The general atmosphere which pervaded Algiers during those eighteen months was to her " both loathsome and intense." She describes how gradually North Africa was bled white by German exactions ; how there was all the apparatus of the Vichy. system —the propaganda, the Legion, " a disarmed and hesitating army,' p the prisons and the police. She is by no means sympathetic to the French settlers in North Africa, whom she dismisses as " a crowd of indifferent and cowardly people." But she has a fervent admiration for the underground movement, and she describes with real brilliance the mixture of bluff and heroism with which they 0 suddenly seized control on the night of November 7th.
* * * * p The main interest of her book is, however, the analysis which she gives of the chance circumstances by which in the days that 0 followed Admiral Darlan came to power. Madame Pierre-Gosset is not, I feel, at all fair in this connection to Mr. Robert Murphy, the United States. Consul at Algiers at the time. The State Depart- F ment, rightly or wrongly, had placed all their hopes upon General Giraud ; he failed them at the crucial hour. The whole fate of the a,
expedition, the lives of thousands of men, the eventual' issue even
of the whole war, depended for a few hours on Mr. Murphy's powers of decision. He felt that the whole issue might be com- promised unless he summoned Fouche to his assistance ; he did b so, and by so doing gave a horrid shock to American, British and sl French opinion. The results of his action, both the good results and the bad results, are fully known to us. What would have been si the results of his inaction?
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